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CHAPTER I
A CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The American attitude toward the defense of Formosa
and the offshore islands during the Quemoy crisis that
erupted in September 1954 was intertwined with American
policy toward China in general and the Nationalist Govern
ment in Formosa in particular.

The United States had tried

to stay out of the civil conflict between the Nationalists
and the Communists.

Yet the sequence of events that developed

in the Far East forced the United States to take a position
in favor of the Nationalists on Formosa.

The American policy

toward Formosa, although it ran counter to the Communists,
was not fully identified with the cause of the Nationalists.
A review of the divergent objectives of each of the three
parties involved is the first point in order.
The American Attitude
Formosa^ was Chinese territory before it was ceded
^"The word Formosa is used throughout this paper to
indicate Formosa and the Pescadores unless otherwise speci
fied.
It is to be noted that the Chinese, both the
Nationalists and the Communists, always use the Chinese
terms, Taiwan and Penghu, to denote these islands.
The
tendency of the western world has been to use the term
Taiwan rather than Formosa since 1960.
However, in order
to follow the customary usage of western literature in the
1950*s, the word Formosa is used throughout this paper.
1

2
by treaty of Shimonoseki to Japan as a result of China*s
defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895.

During the

Second World War,, the: Cairo Declaration of December 1,
1943, stated that Formosa' should be returned to "the
2?

Republic of China.." ' The. Potsdam Proclamation of July 26,
1945,

3

reaffirmed the Cairo; Declaration and the instrument

4^
of Japanese surrender: ' accepted the terms of the Potsdam
Proclamation.
After V —J day ,., General Order Number One of the
Japanese Imperial Headquarters issued under the direction of
General Douglas MacArthur,.. Supreme Commander of Allied
Forces in Japan,,- provided' for the surrender of the Japanese
forces in China and' Formosa to Generalissimo Chiang Kaishek.

5

With the: assistance of the United States Navy, the

Chinese forces landed on.Formosa in September 1945 and disarmed
r/

2

Herbert Feis, Contest Over Japan (New York: Norton
& Co., 1967) ,- Appendix: X,. p. 155. The Chinese Nationalists
often stress the significance of the use of "the Republic of
China" in the Cairo Declaration.
To them, this terminology
carries a desirable, implication that Formosa should be re
turned to no other: government of China than the Government
of the Republic of China,., the Nationalist Government.
Ob
viously, in referring to: China as "the Republic of China,"
the framers of the Decl'aration merely used the official title
of China in use after' the revolution of 1911.
3

Ibid.., Appendix:IX,, p . 160.

^TlE.S. Department o f State Bulletin, XIII, No. 324
(September 9, 194.5;),,. p., 3.64.. Hereafter cited as D.S.B.
5
Feis, Contest Over Japan, Appendix VI, p. 165.

3
c
the Japanese troops on the island.

After the Japanese were

removed from Formosa, the Chinese Government took administra
tive control of the area, and formally incorporated it as
the thirty-fifth Province of the Republic of China on ,t
October 25, 1950.

7

In Chinese eyes, Formosa was restored

to China in accordance with the Cairo Declaration by virtue
of the fact that they had regained control of it.

8

The end of the Second World War did not bring peace
to Chipa.

The struggle for national power between the

Nationalist Party, which had constituted the legal govern
ment of China, and the Communist Party, which had possessed
an independent army, soon developed into a large scale armed
conflict or, from the Nationalists' point of view, a com9
munist rebellion.
£he China White Paper, published by the
Joseph W. Ballantine, Formosa, A Problem for United
States Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Insti
tution, 1952), p. 57.
7

China Handbook, 1950
1951), p. 33.

(New York:

Rockport Press,

8
The Chinese Nationalist Government designated
October 25 as "Taiwan Restoration Day."
It is interesting
to note that the Chinese Communists also claimed that Octo
ber 25, 1945, was the date when China regained sovereignty
over Formosa.
For instance, in his telegram to the United
Nations General Assembly on October 10, 1954, condemning
"United States aggression against Chinese territory of
Taiwan," the Red Chinese Premier Chou En-lai declared, "It
is a fact that Taiwan was taken on October 25, 1945 by the
Chinese government of that time."
Important Documents Concerning the Question of Taiwan (Peking: Foreign Language
Press, 1955), p. 151.
9
A detailed study is Tang Tsou's America's Failure
in China, 1941-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1963) .

4
State Department in August, 1949, indicated that the
American Government would not get involved in C h i n a . ^
With vast territory under their control, the Communists pro
claimed the establishment of the People*s Republic of China
on October 1, 1949.

Meanwhile, the Nationalists had re

treated from mainland China and announced that the site of
the Government of the Republic of China had moved to Formosa
as of December 8, 1949.
At this time the United States continued to recognize
the Nationalist Government on Formosa as the government of
China, but anticipated the loss of Formosa to the communists
soon.'*''*'

The drastic change on the China scene necessitated

the disclosure of American policy on what was expected to be
the closing phase of a civil war.

On January 5, 1950,

President Truman issued a statement in which he stressed the
The official title of the White Paper is United
States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the
Period 1944-1949, Far Eastern Series No. 30 (Washington,
D .C.: Government Printing Office, 1949).
In his "letter of
transmittal" to President Truman, Secretary Acheson said,
"Nothing that this country did or could have done within the
reasonable limits of its capabilities would have changed the
result; nothing that was left undone by this country has
contributed to ity" p. xvi.
See also McGeorge Bundy, The
Pattern of Responsibility (Cambridge, Mass.: The Riverside
Press, 1952), p. 191.
^ A State Department Policy Information Paper of Decem
ber 23, 1949, was leaked to the press from General MacArthur*s
Headquarters in Tokyo on January 3, 1950. The text was later
reprinted in Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings be
fore the Committee on Armed Forces and Committee on Foreign
Relations, U.S. Senate, 82 Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1951), Vol. 3, pp. 1667-69.

5
fact that Formosa had been surrendered to Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek after V-J day and that for the past four
years "the United States and the pther allied powers have
accepted his exercise of Chinese authority over the island."

12

This was interpreted as meaning "the United States Govern
ment regarded Formosa as Chinese territory without qualification."

13

The President then went on:

The United States has ho predatory designs on
Formosa or on any other Chinese territory.
The
United States has no desire to obtain special rights
or privileges or to establish military bases on
Formosa at this time. Nor does it have any inten
tion of utilizing its armed forces to interfere in
the present situation.
The United States Govern
ment will not pursue a course which will lead to
involvement in the civil conflict in China.
Similarly, the United States Government will
not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces
on Formosa.
In the view of the United States
Government, the resources on Formosa are adequate
to enable them to obtain the items which they might
consider necessary for the defense of the island.
The United States Government proposes to continue
under existing legislative authority the present
ECA program of economic assistance.^
This statement was an American official declaration
of a hands-off policy toward the Nationalists on Formosa.
One week later, on January 12, Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, in an address before the National Press Club,
stated that the American "defensive perimeter" in the Western
12D.S.B., XXII, No. 550
13

(January 22, 1950), p. 79.

Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation
W. W. Norton & Co., 19 69), p. 351.
14D.S.B., XXII, p. 79.

(New York;

6
Pacific ran from the Ryukyus to the Philippines but it exeluded South Korea and Formosa. 15

Thus, Formosa was written

off in the American policy planning both politically and
militarily in early 19 50.

This cleared the way for the

Communists to "liberate" the island if they could manage
to cross the Formosa Strait.

By June, 1950, the Communists

had virtually completed all preparation for an invasion of
Chiang’s stronghold.

16

Fortunately for the Nationalists,

the outbreak of the Korean conflict on June 25, 1950, fore
stalled a Communist attack on Formosa.
On June 27, 1950, two days after the North Korean
Communists launched their attack on the Republic of Korea,
President Truman issued a statement on the Korean situation,
which also marked a changed American position on Formosa.
The President took the view that the occupation of Formosa
by the Chinese Communist forces "would be a direct threat
to the security of the Pacific area and to the United States
forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in
that area."

17

He declared:

Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet
to prevent any attack on Formosa. As corollary of
this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government
on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations
against the mainland.
The Seventh Fleet will see
that this is done.
The determination of the future
15Ibid., p. 116.
16

Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu
Macmillan Co., 1960), p. 22.
17D.S.B., XXIII, No. 574

(New York:

(July 3, 1950), p. 5.

7
status of Formosa must await the restoration of
security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with
Japan or consideration by the United Nations.
The impact of the Korean conflict had led President
Truman to reverse his position on Formosa.

He was determined

not only to prevent Formosa from falling into communist hands
but also to assert that the status of Formosa was unsettled.
In his message to Congress on July 19, 1950, the President
spoke of his June 27 statement with regard to Formosa as a
policy of neutralization.

"The present military neutraliza

tion," he stressed, "is without prejudice to the political
questions affecting that island."
American intentions clear:

19

The President made

"That Formosa not become em

broiled in hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific
and that all questions affecting it be settled by peaceful
means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations."

20

The neutralization of Formosa was a unilateral action
taken by the United States, although the American Government
did inform the United Nations on the same day of this course
of action.

In order to justify this action, it was desir

able for the American Government to maintain the point that
the status of Formosa was undetermined.

This seemed to

repudiate the Cairo declaration to which the United States
18t, . ,
Ibid.
19

Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Volume IT: Years of Trial
and Hope (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1956), p. 346.
20t,
..
Ibid.

8
had subscribed.

President Truman wrote in his Memoirs

that when the Cairo Declaration was issued it had been antici
pated that China would be friendly to the United States, but
the

situation had drastically changed--"China had not only

fallen into unfriendly hands but also was now viciously
hostile to the United States."

21

Although the President himself did not express
explicitly that the United States felt a custodial duty
toward Formosa, it was spelled out by a ranking official of
the State Department.

In a statement delivered before the

Political Committee of the United Nations on November 27,
1950, John F. Dulles, then consultant to the State Depart
ment, made this American attitude quite clear.

He said:

Formosa is still affected with an international
interest.
It is a former Japanese colony in the
process of detachment.
The United States, certainly,
is entitled to some voice in the determination of
the future of Formosa, because, if it were not for
the tremendous military effort and the great sacri
fice which the United States made in that area of
the world, none of us here, today, would be sitting
around talking about F o r m o s a . 22
The American policy to neutralize Formosa was prompted
by military considerations with an aim of preventing the
armed conflict in Korea from spreading to other areas in
Asia.

It was a temporary measure which was supposed to be
21
22

Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 408.

Royal Institute of International Affairs,
Documents on International Affairs, 1949-1950 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 681-82.

9
terminated after the end of the Korean War.

23

Washington,

however, inevitably came to the aid of the Nationalist
Government itself.

At the time President Truman declared

the neutralization of Formosa, he also made three decisions
which were not made public:

(1) to give extensive military

aid to the Nationalist Government,

(2) to conduct a military

survey by MacArthur1s headquarters on the needs of National
ist forces, and (3) to make plans to carry out reconnaissance
flights along the China coast to determine the imminence of
attack against Formosa.

24

In July 1950 the United States

Government assigned Karl L. Rankin as Minister and Charge
d*Affaires to Taipei, the provisional capital of the Republic
of China.

25

.
.
.
In May 1951 an American military mission was

established in Formosa.
At the beginning of the Eisenhower Administration, a
"new look" policy with regard to Formosa was pronounced in
the State of the Union Message on February 2, 1953.

President

Eisenhower felt that President Truman*s order of neutralizing
23 In his news conference on August 31, 1950, President
Truman said, "Of course, it will not be necessary to keep the
7th Fleet in the Formosa Strait if the Korean thing is
settled." U.S. President, Public Papers of the Presidents
of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1965), Harry
S. Truman, 1950, p. 607
24

Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 34 9.

25
After the recall of Ambassador John L. Stuart to
Washington for consultation in 1949, the American diploma
tic mission in China had been headed by a charge d ’affaires.
Before Rankin*s appointment, the American Charge in Taipei
was lower than the rank of a Minister.

10
Formosa had the undesirable effect of protecting mainland
China from attack.

As the Chinese Communists were fighting

the United Nations forces in Korea, there was "no longer
any logic or sense in a condition that required the United
States Navy to assume defensive responsibility on behalf of
the Chinese Communists." 2 6

The President declared, "I am,

therefore, issuing instructions that the Seventh Fleet no
longer be employed to shield Communist China."

He empha

sized, "The order implies no aggressive intent on our
part."27
The deneutralization of Formosa or the "unleashing"
of the Nationalists, as it was often called, caused much
alarm among the American allies in Europe, especially the
British.

It was thought to presage an attempt to blockade

the Chinese coast.

28

However, the expression--"unleashing

of the Nationalists"— was an overstatement in that it was
neither in conformity with the factual situation which was
prevailing in the Formosa Strait nor in line with the accord
which was binding on the Nationalists.

In point of fact,

when the neutralization of Formosa had been in force, the
Seventh Fleet had never tried to interdict the Nationalist
26
President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1953, p. 17.

^Ibid.
28
Peter Calvocoressi, ed., Survey of International
Affairs, 1953 (Oxford University Press, for the Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1956), p. 189.

11
hit-and-run raids on the mainland coast.

29

In point of

written accord, when the Nationalist Government received
United States military assistance, it agreed to the terms
that all military material would be used for "internal
security" or "legitimate self-defense."

30

Furthermore, as soon as President Eisenhower announced
the deneutralization of Formosa, American Minister Rankin,
who shortly became Ambassador, obtained a promise from
President Chiang that no major military action would be
launched against mainland China without consulting the
chief of the American military mission in Formosa.

As a

matter of fact, this was only a precautionary measure because
the armed forces of the Nationalists were not capable of
engaging in more than commando raids on the Chinese mainland
without American logistic and other support. 31
That the deneutralization of Formosa marked a change
of China policy at the beginning of the Eisenhower Adminis
tration was therefore more apparent than real.

The American

29

A spokesman for Admiral William M. Fechteler, Chief
of Naval Operation, said that the U.S. Navy had never
"blocked" any "sorties" of the Nationalist Chinese forces.
New York Times, February 4, 1953.
^ E x c h a n g e of Notes between the United States Govern
ment and the .Chinese Nationalist Government regarding U.S.
Military Assistance for the Defense of Formosa on January 30,
1951. D.S-.B. , XXIV, No. 618 (May 7, 1951), p. 747.
31

Karl L. Rankin, China Assignment
sity of Washington Press, 1964), p. 155.

(Seattle:

Univer

12
policy toward Formosa remained basically unchanged "owing
to the tangible factors which continued*to govern."

32

Presi

dent Eisenhower wrote later that the "practical value" of
the deneutralization of Formosa was to "put the Chinese
Communists on notice that the days of stalemate were num
bered; that the Korean Itfar would either end or extend beyond
Korea."

33

He was convinced that it helped bring "that war

to a finish."

34

This implied that if the Chinese Communists

had not engaged in the Korean truce talks earnestly, the
United States might have assisted the Chinese Nationalists
in launching an attack on the mainland China.

As the Korean

truce was signed shortly afterward, in July 1953, there was
no way to know how the Eisenhower Administration would have
reacted if the situation had been otherwise.

It could be

suggested, however, that President Eisenhower was primarily
interested in using deneutralization of Formosa as a bar
gaining point to effectuate an early truce in Korea rather
than to sponsor a Nationalist attack on mainland China as
such.
The Nationalist Mission
When the Nationalists retreated to Formosa in December
1949, they were not intending to make Formosa their perma
nent domain.
32

Ibid.

33

1956

Two layers of government had been maintained,

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953(New York: Doubleday & Co., 1963), p. 123.
34Ibid.

13
a central government and a provincial government.

The

central government officials planned to move back to the
Chinese mainland as soon as a counter-attack could be
launched.

The Nationalist Government believed that the

Communist regime on the mainland would not last long.

It

was a "sacred" mission of the Nationalist Government to
regain mainland China and to throw off the yoke of Communist tyranny that had been imposed on the Chinese people. 35
The political slogan, "Return to the Mainland," was neces
sary not only to bolster the morale of the armed forces and
the 1,500,000 mainlanders who fled to Formosa before the
Communist takeover but also to serve as a rallying cry to
solicit the support of the 10 million overseas Chinese, a
36
majority of whom were in Southeast Asia.
The six months following the American statement of
a hands-off policy on Formosa had been a period of uncer
tainty and anxiety in Formosa.

Although the outbreak of

the Korean conflict changed the situation, the Nationalist
Government received the American policy of the neutralization
35 This writer resided in Formosa and worked with t h e •
Nationalist Government for ten years;
therefore, he is
familiar with the political orientation of the Nationalists.
36
The overseas Chinese numbered almost 10 million,
and their distribution was as follows: Vietnam, 1,000,000
(5% of the local population); Cambodia, 300,000 (10%);
Thailand, 3,000,000 (16%); Malaya and Singapore, 2,750,000
(45%); Burma, 300,000 (1.5%); Indonesia, 2,000,000 (3%);
Philippines, 300,000 (1.5%); Sarawak, 150,000 (25%); and
British North Borneo, 75,000 (22%).
James Reston in New
York Times, April 2, 1954, p. 2.

14
of Formosa with mixed feelings.

On the one hand, the United

States Seventh Fleet was ordered to protect Formosa from
communist attack so that the security of the island was no
longer a problem.

On the other hand, Washington claimed

that the legal status of Formosa on which the Nationalist
Government was dependent awaited an international settle
ment.

The Nationalist Government was unhappy about the

latter aspect of the American policy announcement, but it
did not take issue with Washington.

Instead, the National

ist Government tried to link its mission of regaining main
land China with that of the United Nations effort to repel
the North Korean Communist aggression against South Korea. 37
Immediately after the armed forces of the North Korean
Communist regime attacked South Korea with sweeping success,
the Chinese Nationalist Government offered 33,000 troops, to
be equipped and transported by the United States, for use
in Korea as a Chinese contribution to the common cause of
anti-communist aggression.

38

President Truman received the

Nationalist offer with favorable consideration initially
but had to decline it because of the undesirable complications which might ensue. 39

The role of Formosa during the

Korean War was the first controversy that developed between
37

This writer1s personal knowledge as a former
official in the Chinese Nationalist Government.
38
Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 342.
^ Ibid. , pp. 343-44.

15
General MacArthur and President Truman.

40

While the main

purpose of the Presid e n t s order of neutralization was to
keep Formosa out of the Korean conflict, the General took
the view that Formosa should take an active part m

it.

41

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had found an American spokes
man for his cause in the person of General MacArthur, but
it proved to be of no avail.

It was the President, not

the General, who decided American policy.
After the Chinese Communist intervention in the
Korean War, the Nationalist Government renewed its attempt
to be involved in the Korean conflict.

The Nationalists

proposed to make a landing on the South China coast as
counter measure to divert the Chinese Communist forces in
Korea.

42

The American Minister, Karl Rankin, was responsive

to this idea and tried to present it to the State Department
on his consultation trip to Washington in February 1951.
Rankin found that only John F. Dulles, then consultant to
the Department of State, was in favor of "a policy of
action."

43

During the remainder of the Truman Administration,

^ Ibid., pp. 354-58; see also John W. Spanier, The
Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 71-77.
41

This is the tenor of General MacArthur*s letter to
the Veterans of Foreign Wars intended for delivery on
August 17, 1950. When the text of this letter was made
known in advance, President Truman was furious about it,
and ordered MacArthur to withdraw it. The letter was re
printed in Military Situation in the Far East,
pp. 3477-80.
4
7
^Rankin,
China Assignment, p. 91.

16
the American policy in regard to Formosa was to "quarantine the fighting in Korea, not to encourage its extension."
President Eisenhower's announcement of the deneutra
lization of Formosa, February 1953, gave the Nationalist
Government, not unnaturally, a hope that it was a first
step toward active support of the Nationalist mission to
regain mainland China.
the Nationalists.

It was a source of satisfaction to

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek said that

the "moral force" of Washington's new Formosa policy
deserved the "unanimous support" of "all freedom-loving
peoples who realize the danger of Communist aggression and
are prepared to resist it."

45

A major part of the

Nationalist strategy had been the attempt to tie up their
mission to recover the Chinese mainland with other seemingly
relevant events.

This kind of maneuver on the part of the

Nationalists had failed twice during the Truman Administra
tion when they offered troops to fight in Korea and when
they proposed to make a landing on the South China coast.
Delighted with Eisenhower's deneutralization statement,
Chiang spoke his mind on February 4, 1953.

He said, "Our

plan for fighting communism and regaining the mainland will
necessarily form, in my opinion, an important link in the
general plan of the free world to combat world-wide
44
45

Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 369.
Quoted m

New York Times, February 4, 1953, p. 3.

44

17
communist aggression." 46

In order not to cause alarm over

this statement, he added, "The Republic of China will not
ask for aid in ground forces from any nation to achieve our
i „ 47
g oa l .
Although the Eisenhower Administration did not share
the aspirations of the Nationalist Government, there were
tangible signs to show that the American Government under
the Republican Party was improving its relations with
Nationalist China.

In February 1953, American Minister

Karl Rankin was reappointed as Ambassador to the Republic
of China.

This appointment of a diplomatic representative

of the highest rank indicated that a great importance was
attached to Nationalist China.

After presenting his creden

tials to President Chiang on April 2, Ambassador Rankin made
a statement at his press conference in Taipei.

In that

statement, he quoted Secretary of State Dulles as saying
that Americans "never acquiesced, never will acquiesce in
the enslavement of other peoples.

We do not accept or

tolerate captivity as an irrevocable fact which can be
finalized by force or by the lapse of time."

Ambassador

Rankin then went on to say, "The Government of China has
dedicated itself to the liberation of the mainland from
communism.

Americans share Chinese hopes for the success

^ Ibid.
47Ibid.

18
of this great enterprise."

48

This statement gave the im

pression that the Eisenhower Administration was going to
adhere to the 1952 Republican platform, which had advocated
a policy of liberation, as opposed to the Truman policy
of the containment of communism. 49
Meanwhile, only a few months after the Republican
Party came to power, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
praised the Eisenhower Administration for improving rela
tions with the Nationalist Government.

In an address to

the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington,
D.C., on April 18, 1953, the Secretary declared
We have vastly improved our relations with
the Chinese National Government.
Now we have
an ambassador at Taipei, Formosa, the provisional
capital. We are speeding the delivery of mili
t a r y assistance, which was woefully in arrears.
President Eisenhower has changed the instruc
tions to the Seventh Fleet so that, while it is
still instructed to defend Formosa, it is no
longer instructed to protect the Chinese Com
munists on the mainland.
In 1953 official American visitors to Formosa steadily
increased in numbers.

These American dignitaries included

Vice President Richard Nixon; Admiral Arthur Radford, Chair
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Walter Robertson,
48
49

Rankin, China Assignment, p. 159.

Coral Bell, Negotiation From Strength
Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), pp. 71-72.
50

(New York:

Text of Secretary Dulles* address was recorded
by the New York, Times, April 19, 1953, p. 84.

19
Assistant Secretary of State.

It indicated, at least, a

friendly gesture to the Nationalist Government in Formosa.
The American willingness to stress its improved relations
with the Republic of China led the Nationalists to believe
that someday they might win over the United States Govern
ment to their mission of recovering the Chinese mainland.

The Communist Objective
To the Chinese Communists, the "liberation” of
Formosa was to be the finishing touch to a long, drawn-out
revolution.

When President Truman announced the American

hands-off policy toward Formosa on January 5, 1950, the
Communists had reason to believe that the United States would
stick to a policy of non-intervention in Formosa.

However,

within just six months, the same American President had
drastically changed American policy because of the out
break of the Korean conflict.

The People's Daily (Peking)

on June 29 argued that the Korean situation could not justify
the American action of neutralizing Formosa.

51

The neutrali

zation of Formosa frustrated any Communist attempt to
assault Formosa.

What enraged the Communists most was

President Truman’s statement that the status of Formosa
awaited a future international settlement.
In an official statement on June 28, the Chinese
Communist Premier and Foreign Minister Chou En-lai declared
51

Tang Tsou, America’s Failure in China, p. 562.

20
"The fact that Taiwan [Formosa]
unchanged forever.

is part of China will remain

This is not only a historical fact but

has been affirmed by the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam
Declaration and the existing conditions after Japan's
surrender."

52

He charged that President Truman's announce

ment and the actions of the United States Seventh Fleet
"constitute armed aggression against the territory of China
and a total violation of the United Nations Charter."

53

The Communist denunciation of the American policy of
neutralizing Formosa did not rest there.

On August 24,

Chou En-lai cabled to the Secretary General of the United
Nations and to the President of Security Council, accusing
the United States of "armed aggression" in Formosa.

In

his cablegram, Chou En-lai reiterated that Formosa was an
integral part of China and that the United States failed in
redeeming its pledge professed in the Cairo and Potsdam
Declarations that Formosa would return to China.

By

President Truman's June 27 order to the Seventh Fleet, Chou
said, the American Government decided to "prevent with armed
forces the liberation of Taiwan by the Chinese People's
Liberation Army."

54

He called upon the Security Council to

52

Documents on International Affairs, 1949-1950,
pp. 633-34.
53
54

Ibid,

Text in Important Documents Concerning the
Question of Taiwan, p p . 21-22.
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condemn the United States for its "criminal" action and to
seek the withdrawal of "all the United States armed invading
forces from Taiwan and from other territories belonging
to China.11^
The American Government immediately responded with a
public statement that "the United States would welcome
United Nations consideration of the Formosa problem."

56

It was followed by a letter which American chief delegate
to the United Nations, Warren Austin, addressed to the
Secretary General of the United Nations on August 25.
letter set forth the American position in detail.

The

It re

futed the idea that the United States had ever "encroached
on the territory of China" or had "taken aggressive action
against China."

57

The letter stated, among other things,

that the American action was "an impartial action" and was
"designed to keep the peace and was, therefore, in full
accord with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations."
It stressed that the American neutralization was made "with
out prejudice to the future political settlement of the
status of the island."
55

59

The United States Government took

Ibid.

56

A statement released to the press on August 24,
1950.
Text in D.S.B., XXIII, No. 583 (September 4, 1950),
« 395.
TOR
p.
57

D.S.B., XXIII, No. 584

58t, .
Ibid.
Ibid.

(September 11, 1950), p. 412.
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the position that the actual status of Formosa was "terri
tory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied forces
in the Pacific" and that its legal status "cannot be fixed
until there is international action to determine its future."
As further evidence to show that the American Govern
ment had no aggressive intent on Formosa, Secretary of
State Dean Acheson on September 21 took the initiative by
asking that the "Question of Formosa" be placed on the
agenda of the current General Assembly session as an additional item of "an important and urgent character."

61

Subse

quently the General Assembly adopted the American proposal.
As the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea on the side
of the North Korean Communists became quite evident in
November, the United States maintained that it was an in
opportune time to discuss the long-range future of Formosa.
Therefore, on November 15, the United States asked the
General Assembly to defer the consideration of the item on
Formosa.

62

Later, that body adopted a British proposal to

postpone the discussion of the Formosa question indefinitely.

Secretary Acheson first spoke of this matter during
his address before the General Assembly on September 19.
He formally requested a discussion of Formosa by a note to
the Secretary General of the United Nations on September 21.
D.S.B., XXIII, No. 587 (October 2, 1950), p. 526 and No. 589
(October 16, 1950), p. 607.
62
D.S.B., XXIII, No. 596 (December 4, 1950), p. 911.

60
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However, the Security Council of the United Nations,
after prolonged debates for a month;, passed a resolution
on September 29 to: invite the Chinese Communists to be
present to state their complaint against the United States
for "armed aggression" of" Formosa.

Accepting this invita

tion, representatives of: the: Peking regime appeared before
the United Nations.

Y e t their vociferous and intemperate

speeches, falsely accusing: the United States of aggression,
were to no avail..

6:3?

Nevertheless, the intense reaction of

the Chinese Communists: to: the American position that the
legal status of Formosa was undecided proved to be one Of
the irreconcilable issues between the two sides.
After President Eisenhower announced the deneutraliza
tion of Formosa, Radio Peking said, "[President} Eisenhower
boldly proclaimed not only the continued occupation of
Chinese Taiwan but [also! use of the Kuomintang

[Nationalist

Party] brigands for aggression against the Chinese people." 64
It stressed that this action "does nothing to frighten the
victorious Chinese people:,,"1 but predicted, on the contrary,
that an active support a t Chiang Kai-shek regime would prove
to be "a millstone around' the_ neck of the American aggressors.n 6 5
summary o f the Security Council's debates on the
question of Formosa in: United Nations Bulletin, IX, No. 12
(December 15, 1950) ,. pp.. 658-669, under the heading of "Korea
Question Goes to Assembly after Council Fails to Act."
^ Q u o t e d in New York' limes, February 4, 1953, p. 4.
65ibid_
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The Eisenhower Administration's policy to deneutralize
Formosa with unilateral American naval protection for the
Nationalists served to aggravate the hostile attitude of the
Communists toward the United States.

An American-sponsored

Nationalist attack on the Chinese mainland, in the eyes of
the Communists, was no longer a remote possibility.

After

the Korean truce was reached in July 1953, the United
States did not withdraw its Seventh Fleet from the Formosa
Strait, as former President Truman had intended.

The

accessibility of Formosa to the Chinese Communists was as
remote as ever.

The United States continued to oppose the

Communists' avowed objective of "liberating" Formosa.

CHAPTER II
NEW AGITATION AND EMBROILMENT
Nationalist Urging for Counter-Attack
In a statement during a military review in honor of
Vice President Richard Nixon*s visit to Formosa in November
1953, Generalissimo Chiang said that 1954 would be "the
year of decision" while 1953 was "the final year" of
preparation for a counter-attack against the Chinese
.mainland.^
Indeed, the year 1954 saw increasing pronouncements
of the Nationalist pledges to regain the mainland.

In his

New Year Message, President Chiang said that a counter
attack against the Communist mainland, as a fight for freedom
and light, would come "in the not distant future."
emphasized,

He

"The recovery of the lost territory must be

paid for with our own blood and flesh."

2

This statement

obviously was made to tell the world that he would not seek,
foreign troops to achieve his mission.
On February 26, Premier Chen Cheng told the Legis
lative Yuan (Chinese Parliament):

"Our policy used to be

^New York Times, December 26, 1953, p. 2.
2

Ibid., January 1, 1954, p. 12.
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defense of Taiwan and preparation for the mainland counter
attack.

However, our future program will center on how to
3

carry out the mainland recovery project.'1

He stressed,

"If we wait for three or five years the chances will become
slimmer and slimmer.

By that time not only will we not be

able to attack but the enemy will be encouraged to attack
us." 4

It w.as the first time that a "number-two" Nationalist

official had expressed-the restless mood of the Nationalists
in Formosa.

To him the need for action was conditioned by

several factors:

the average age of the Nationalist soldiers

was near thirty years, and time was running out for these
men to be of service in a large scale military operation.
Furthermore, Generalissimo Chiang was approaching his
seventieth year.

He would not have many chances left to

accomplish the self-imposed mission of regaining the main
land during his lifetime.
In addition to these internal difficulties facing the
Nationalists, Generalissimo Chiang had long held that the
seizure of mainland China by the Communists was the root of
all turmoil in Asia.

On May 20, in his inaugural address

as President for another six-year term, he traced the
troubles in Korea and Indochina to the loss of the Chinese
mainland to the Communists.

He concluded:

"It is therefore

obvious that the only way to eliminate this calamity of
3

Ibid./ February 27, 1954, p. 2.

^Ibid.
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mankind and to reestablish international peace is through the
discharge of our duty in the recovery of the mainland."

5

He

appealed to the free world to give the Nationalists a
"reasonable amount of moral and material support" to fulfill
their mission.

He said, "We have confidence in our ability

to retake the mainland and in the victory of our counter
attack ." ^
Whether or not the Chinese Communists took seriously
the Nationalist threat to launch a counter-attack on the
mainland was difficult to assess, but they did feel the
increase in Nationalist raids on Chinese coast in 1954.
The Communists saw fit to use this threat as an excuse for
mistakenly shooting down a British commercial airplane over
Hainan Island on July 26.

In answer to a strong British

protest against this incident, the Chinese Communists
apologized and explained:

"Aircraft of the remnant Chiang

gang in Taiwan have enlarged further their sphere of harass
ment covering the coastal areas and islands of China.

There

fore, fighting is still taking place over the coastal areas
7
and islands of China."

5Ibid., May 21, 1954, p. 3.
^Ibid.
7Ibid., July 26, 1954, p. 3.
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American Determination to Resist Communist Expansion
The international scene in early 1954 was favorable
to the cause of the Nationalists,.as the United States was
alarmed by the surging Red tide in Indochina.

The Chinese

Communists had intensified their support of the North
Vietnamese Communists ever since the Korean truce.

8

The

communists1 successful inroads into Indochina were climaxed
by the convocation of an international conference at Geneva
in April 1954.

The very fact that the Chinese Communist

regime was invited to attend the Geneva Conference gave it
9
unprecedented prestige.
This joyful mood was not concealed
when the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai,
addressed the Conference on April 2 8 . ^

Aside from the

situation in Indochina, Chou took the occasion for renewed
accusations against the "American occupation" of Formosa
ever since the outbreak of the war in Korea.

He added,

significantly, "This question is not yet settled."

11

The United States attended the Geneva Conference
reluctantly and tried to ignore, rather than oppose, the
0
Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Affairs .
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966), pp. 241-43.
9 .
.
Richard P. Stebben, The United States m World
Affairs, 1954 (New York:
Harper & Brother, for the Council
on Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 247.
*^The introductory remarks of Chou's address.
in New York Times, April 29, 1954, p. 4.

Text
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Chinese Communist presence at the meeting.

12

Secretary

Dulles did not attend the Indochina phase of the Geneva
Conference and let Undersecretary of State Walter B. Smith
take over. 13

Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-lai,

on the other hand, played a leading role at the Conference
and the resulting Geneva Agreement was a de facto partition
of Indochina, a great setback for the free world.

14

The United States had not been in a position to demand
a better bargain for the West and subsequently did not sign
the Geneva Agreement.

After the Geneva Conference, the

American Government was determined to take positive steps
to make a regional collective security arrangement to resist
further communist expansion in Asia. 15

In addition to a

12

During Secretary Dulles' attendance at the Geneva
Conference, he did not speak a word to the Chinese Communists,
and refused to shake hands with Chou En-lai.
The Communists
complained privately about these snubs.
See Edgar Snow,
The Other Side of the River (New York:
Random House, 1961),
pp. 94-95.
13

The Geneva Conference consisted of two phases.
The
first phase (April 28 to June 10, 1954) dealt with unsettled
problems on Korea.
The second phase (June 11 to July 26, 1954)
centered on securing a peaceful settlement in Indochina.
The
decision of Secretary Dulles not to attend the Indochina phase
of the conference disappointed the western powers.
See George
McTurnan Kahin and John W. Lewis, The United States in Vietnam
(New York:
The Dial Press, revised edition, 1967) , p. 60.
Secretary Dulles explained the American position with a
statement on July 15. Text in Documents on American Foreign
Policy, 1954 (New York: Harper & Brothers, for the Council
on Foreign Relations, 1955), p. 283.
14

York:

A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia
Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 304.

(New

15 After the Geneva Agreement on Indochina was signed,
Secretary Dulles indicated the American attitude in his press
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proposed Southeast Asian defense pact, the United States
also gave active consideration to a mutual defense treaty
which Nationalist China desired.

16

When President Eisenhower, in his news conference on
July 22, 1954, confirmed the press report that the United
States was prepared to negotiate a mutual defense treaty
with the Nationalist Government, it aroused furious reaction
from the Chinese Communists.

Their first response came from

the New China News Agency, the official news agency of the
Peking regime, on July 25.

The report said that "United

States plans for concluding a so-called American-Chiang
Kai-shek bilateral mutual security pact are adding to the
determination of the Coastal Defense Units of the Chinese
People's Liberation Army to maintain their vigilance and
work for the liberation of Taiwan."

17

In his report on

foreign affairs at ,the Central People's Council on August
11, the Red Chinese Premier and Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai,
gave a lengthy exposition on Formosa.

Ife said that the

United States was "seeking to extend armed intervention by
(cont'd)
conference on July 23, 1954.
"The
important thing from now on," he said, "is not to mourn the
past but to face the future opportunity to prevent the loss
in northern Vietnam from leading to the extension of communism
throughout Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific." D.S.B.,
XXXI, No. 788 (August 2, 1954), p. 163.
16 Rankin, China Assignment, p. 186.
17 American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of
China Mainland Press, No. 855 (July 24-26, 1954), p. 4.
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more intensive use of the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek group,
fugitive on Taiwan, for carrying on a war of harassment and
destruction against our mainland and coastal areas."

18

He

said that the Chinese Nationalist Government "is further
reorganizing its armed forces and blustering about preparations for an attack on the mainland." 19

As negotiations

were in progress "by the U.S. aggressive circles with the
traitorous Chiang Kai-shek group for the conclusion of a
so-called bilateral treaty of mutual security," Chou ex
pressed the Communist opposition in most forceful terms.
He stated:
The liberation of Taiwan is an exercise of
China's sovereignty and it is China's own internal
affair: we brook no foreign interference.
Any
treaties concluded between the United States Govern
ment and the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek group en
trenched on Taiwan would be illegal and without any
validity whatever.
If any foreign aggressors dare
to prevent the Chinese people from liberating Taiwan,
if they dare to infringe upon our sovereignty and
violate our territorial integrity, if they dare to
interfere in our internal affairs, they must take
upon themselves all the grave consequences of such
acts of aggression.^0
So far the United States had made no legal commitment
to defend Formosa against communist attack.

President Tru

man's statement of neutralizing Formosa and President
18 Documents on International Affairs, 1954 (London:
Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of Inter
national Affairs, 1957), p. 318.
19Ibid., p. 319.
20Ibid., p. 320.
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Eisenhower's subsequent pronouncement of deneutralization
were executive orders which could be terminated at will by
any future President.

If the United States Government con

cluded a mutual defense treaty with the Nationalist Govern
ment, its commitment to defend Formosa would be much harder
to break.

Conversely, the Communist "liberation" of Formosa

would be a more difficult task to perform, for any serious
attempt to assault Formosa would mean a war with the United
States.

Naturally, the Chinese Communists employed all the

expression of protest they could muster to forestall a mutual
defense treaty between Washington and Taipei.

In the mean

time, the Communist military buildup along the South China
coast facing Formosa intensified, as if they were ready to
carry out their professed aim of "liberating" Formosa.

21

The Difference Between Formosa and the Offshore Islands
Facing a mounting tension over Formosa, the American
attitude was a clear-cut one.

In answer to a reporter who,

during a press conference on August 17, asked what would
happen if the Communists did attack Formosa, President
Eisenhower reminded his audience of the fact that the order
of the Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa from communist attack
was still in force.

Therefore, he declared, "Any invasion

of Formosa Would have to run over the Seventh Fleet."
21

22

22

In

New York Times, August 15, 1954, sec. IV, p. 8.
President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1954, p. 718.
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spite of this firm American attitude, Radio Peking continued
to propagate the shrill Communist cry to liberate Formosa.
When Admiral Felix B. Stump, Commander in Chief of
the United States Pacific Fleet, visited the Tachens, the
most easterly of the Nationalist-held offshore islands, with
four destroyers on August 19, the Communists gained new
accusations to level at the United States. -Radio Peking
declared that United States and Nationalist forces had
intruded into the Chinese seacoast and conducted "armed
provocation" against the Chinese people.

23

The Communists

did not say what the provocation was as there could not
actually have been any.

Inasmuch as the United States

recognized the Nationalist Government as the legal govern
ment of China, it was not improper for its naval vessels to
visit an island possession of a friendly government.

How

ever, a question came to the fore as to whether the Presi
dent's order to defend Formosa included the Nationalistheld offshore islands.
In answer to a newsman's inquiry on that point in his
press conference on August 24, Secretary Dulles said that
the basic instruction to the Seventh Fleet was to defend
Formosa, but the defense of the offshore islands "might from
a military standpoint be so ultimately connected with the
defense of Formosa that the military would be justified in
23

New York Times, August 20, 1954, p. 3.

34
concluding that the defense of Formosa comprehended a
defense of those

[offshore]

islands."

24

As a further ex

planation, Dulles said that some of the offshore islands
might have radar equipment and early-warning devices upon
them that were related to the defense of Formosa.

There

fore, he maintained that whether or not to help defend the
offshore islands "would be primarily a military decision."

25

For the moment, the "buck" was passed, but the question had
to be answered.
The Nationalists held more than thirty offshore
islands after they retreated to Formosa from the Chinese
mainland.

These islands were strung out on a 350-mile belt

along the South China coast, and their proximity to the
\

mainland ranged from five to twenty miles.

They could be

roughly divided into four main groups, the Quemoy group in
the south, the Tachen groups in the east, and the Matsu
group and Nanki groups between the others.

These islands

commanded strategic positions in relation to the Communist
ports on the mainland:

Quemoy opposite the port of Amoy,

Matsu opposite the port of Foochow, Nanki opposite the port
of Wenchow, and the Tachens opposite the port of Ningpo.
The Nationalists used the offshore islands as bases
for commando-type raids on the mainland, spying activities,
24

Ibid., August 25, 1954, p. 8.
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and leaflet-dropping.

They were no less important as

temporary stations for the Nationalist Navy while performing
blockade duties on mainland ports.

The Nationalist Govern

ment proclaimed the Communist-held mainland ports closed
after the retreat to Formosa.

The Nationalist Government

justified the blockade on the grounds that it was the legal
government of China, and as such was within its rights.

The

blockade, however, was not strictly enforced partly due to
insufficient naval strength and partly because of political
considerations.

26

The Nationalist blockade, while it did

not always prevent foreign vessels from sailing into and out
of mainland ports, hampered the Communist coastal navigation
to a degree.

It also served as a reminder that the Communists

were still not the complete masters of China.

For these

reasons, the existence of Nationalist-controlled offshore
islands presented a problem to the Communists.
Since the American attitude toward the defense of
the offshore islands was not clear, the Chinese Communists
were prepared to take advantage of the situation.

On August

26, 1954, forty communist raiders struck on Quemoy island,
the main island of the Quemoy group, but were repelled by
the Nationalist garrison.

On September 3, the Communists

began the first of a series of heavy bombardments of Quemoy.
Twice previously/ the communists had failed in major attempts
26

This writer's personal knowledge, as a former
official in the Nationalist Government, confirms the report
in the New York Times, September 26, 1954, Sec. IV, p. 10.
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to seize the island.

By shelling Quemoy heavily and suddenly,

it appeared that a third adventure was in the making.
American Involvement in the Offshore Islands
Whether the United States should help the National
ists defend the offshore islands posed a difficult question
to Washington.

The status of the offshore islands was

different from that of Formosa.

The Allied Peace Treaty

with Japan, singed in September 1951, stated:

"Japan

renounces all right, title, and claim to Formosa and the
Pescadores."

27

However, the Peace Treaty designated no

beneficiary, and was purposely so arranged because there
were two claimants to be the government of China.

28

There

fore, it might be said that the status of Formosa was still
undetermined.

The offshore islands, on the other hand, had

been historically attached to China, and no questions arose
27

Article 2, Session (b) of the Treaty.
Text in
U.S. Department of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955:
Basic Documents (2 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1957), I, p. 426.
28

Speaking on behalf of the United States at the San
Francisco Conference on September 5, 1951, John Dulles said:
"Some Allied Powers suggested that article 2 should not
merely delimit Japanese sovereignty according to Potsdam,
but specify precisely the ultimate disposition of each of
the ex-Japanese territories.
This, admitted, would have
been neater.
But it would have raised questions as to
which there are row no agreed answers. . . . Clearly, the
wise course was to proceed now, so far as Japan is concerned,
leaving the future to resolve doubts by invoking international
solvents other than this Treaty."
D .S .B ., XXV, No. 638
(September 17, 1951), pp. 454-55.
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as to their status.

29

As President Eisenhower wrote,

"If, therefore, the United States were to intervene in the
contest over these

[offshore]

islands, this country tech

nically would be participating in a Chinese civil w a r . " ^
The problem was further complicated by the fact
that the United States had become involved in the offshore
islands in a somewhat unconscious manner.
certain moral commitment had developed.

As a result, a
When the Korean

War broke out, General MacArthur took notice of the
Nationalist-held offshore islands.

He commented that they

were important from the standpoint of an eventual landing
on the mainland, but had no value to the United States.

31

However, soon afterward the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) had established bases on some of the offshore islands,
including Quemoy, under the cover name of "Western Enter
prise, Inc.," to do "business."

The Western Enterprise,

Inc., was responsible, among other things, for organizing
29 This was also the American attitude, which Secre
tary Dulles stated on December 1, 1954, and later was
repeated by a legal advisor of the State Department.
See
the State Department press release on December 1, 1954, in
D.S.B.-, XXXI, No. 807 (December 13, 1954), p. 896; and Ely
Maurer, "Legal Problems Regarding Formosa and the Offshore
Islands,"in Ibid., XXXIX, No. 1017 (December 22, 1958),
p. 1005.
30 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 461.
31Averell Harriman's memorandum to President Truman,
reporting on his assigned trip to Tokyo to talk with General
MacArthur in early August, 1950.
It was partially reprinted
in Truman*s Memoirs, II, p. 353.
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and equipping the Nationalist commandos to launch sporadic
raids on the South China coast.

32

When an American Military Assitance and Advisory
Group

(MAAG) was established on Formosa in May, 1951, its

mission of equipping and training the Nationalist forces
was limited to Formosa, and did not extend to the offshore
islands.

This was consonant with the Seventh Fleet*s

mission to shield Formosa, which likewise did not include
the offshore islands.

After the Eisenhower Administration

took office, the change of high military command in Washing
ton contributed to a gradual altering of the American mili
tary policy toward Formosa.

Admiral Arthur Radford,

Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, was promoted to
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in May, 1953, and
thus became top military man in the Pentagon.

Admiral Radford

was known to favor a hard line against the Chinese
33
Communists.
32

This writer's personal knowledge confirms the
report in Stewart Alsop's article, "The Story Behind Quemoy:
How We Drifted Close to War," Saturday Evening P o s t ,
December 13, 1958, p. 87.
33

According to Norman Graebner, Radford had made no
secret of his belief that the Red Chinese regime must be
destroyed even if it required a fifty-year war to accom
plish it. Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolation, A Study
in Politics and Foreign Policy since 1950 (New York:
The
Ronald Press Co., 1956), p. 155. Also, James Reston, "The
United States Policy Formation," New York Times, September 12,
1954, Sec. IV, p. 10.
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While the Nationalists had not been able to fortify
their military posts on the offshore islands without
American military aid during the Truman Administration,
the Communists had been stepping up their military buildup
in the coastal areas facing the offshore islands since the
truce negotiations began in Korea.

34

between the two sides was developing.

A military imbalance
In early 1953, the

opinion of American military advisors on Formosa was that
if the Nationalists really wanted to hold the offshore
islands, they should improve the defense of the islands,
and that this could be done by moving in some Americanequipped and trained Nationalist units from Formosa without
objection from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

35

This was

tantamount to encouraging the Nationalists to put more of
their military stakes on the offshore islands.

The National

ists were hesitant to do that.
.As this had been mentioned informally without any
action having been taken, Ambassador Rankin decided to "try
to bring matters to a head."

36

It is doubtful that he had

received prior instructions from the State Department.

On

July 6, Rankin visited President Chiang to discuss the
offshore islands.
34

Chiang was particularly worried about the

Rankin, China Assignment, p. 167.

35Ibid., p. 168.
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plight of the easternmost Tachen group, 200 miles away from
Formosa, because air support would not be immediately
available in case of communist assault. .Rankin comforted
him and remarked that similarly exposed islands, such as
Corregidor and Malta, had withstood months and years of
assault during World War II.

Rankin stressed that a

determined defense could help to deter aggression.

37

During the talk President Chiang asked Ambassador
Rankin to transmit three requests to the State Department.
First, that the United States give renewed consideration to
integrating the offshore islands into the Formosa defense
system.

Second, pending such a decision, that the United

States Government make public expression of American interest
in the offshore islands so as to deter the Communists.

Third,

that the American Government provide the Nationalists with
shallow draft naval craft to be used in the offshore islands
area.

Rankin consented to forward these requests, but told

Chiang that it would be unwise to expect quick answers.
Rankin reminded him that the Communists might attack the
offshore islands at any moment and that the Nationalists
could not count on American assistance "on short notice."

38

This was to urge Chiang to come to a decision whether or not
to strengthen the offshore islands defense with or without
37T,
. .
Ibid.
38Ibid., p. 169.
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later American assistance.

Before Rankin left Chiang said

that he would follow the American military advice to improve
the defense of the offshore islands.
In early February of 1953 Ambassador Rankin commented
in a State Department policy review that if the Nationalist
armed forces "were intended for possible combat other than
in defense of Formosa," he was in favor of expanding
American military assistance to the offshore islands and
placing the responsibility for various anti-communist
guerrilla activities mounted from the offshore islands
under the "purview" of MAAG.

39

It is not known whether or

not Washington approved Rankin’s proposition that the possible
use of the Nationalist forces for other than the defense of
Formosa might be anticipated, but his recommended action
was carried out.

Soon afterward, the offshore islands

became eligible to receive American military equipment, but
little was available until 1954.

40

The activities of Western

Enterprise, Inc., on the offshore islands were gradually dis
continued in early 1954.

Meanwhile, officers and men of

MAAG came to the islands to take an active part in preparing
39

The State Department policy review toward the
Nationalist China was sent to Ambassador Rankin near the
end of the Truman Administration and he was requested to
comment on it.
Rankin, China Assignment, pp. 150-52.
40

Thomas R. Philips (Brigadier General, U.S.A., Re
tired), "Quemoy and Formosa As I Saw Them," Reporter,
April 21, 1955, p. 32.
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defenses.

41

The sudden Communist bombardment of Quemoy on

September 3, 1954, dramatized the American involvement in
the offshore islands.

On the first day of heavy artillery

barrage, two American senior officers of MAAG were killed
on Quemoy.
American Response to Quemoy Shelling
At this time, President Eisenhower was vacationing in
Denver and Secretary Dulles was in Manila, negotiating a
Southeast Asia collective security treaty.

Therefore, the

Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington were the first to react
to the Communist bombardment of Quemoy.

As they regarded

it to be a probable prelude to an invasion of Quemoy, the
Joint Chiefs immediately proposed that the Nationalist Air
Forces be permitted to take defensive action by bombing the
Communist military targets across from Quemoy.
approved this recommendation.

42

The President

After the initial response,

the Joint Chiefs deliberated on the strategic value of the
offshore islands in relation to Formosa.

They concluded

that the offshore islands were not militarily essential
to the defense of Formosa, and that the Nationalists could
not hold the offshore islands without American assistance.
41

Ibid. See also Alsop, "The Story Behind Quemoy,"

p. 87.
42

Ibid. Also, Chalmers M. Roberts, "Battle on 'the
Rim of Hell':
President vs. War Hawks," Reporter, Decem
ber 16, 1954, p. 12.
43

Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 463.

43

43
However, the Joint Chiefs, with the exception of
General Matthew Ridgway, the Army Chief, recognized that
the loss of the offshore islands to the Communists would
have disastrous psychological consequences for the National
ists.

Therefore, Admiral Radford, the Chairman, supported

by the Chiefs of the Air Force and Navy, proposed to order
American naval and air forces to assist in the Nationalist
defense of ten selected offshore islands, including Quemoy.
The dissenting opinion of General Ridgway stated that the
Joint Chiefs should not base their judgement on non-military
considerations.

From a military viewpoint, Ridgway believed

that if the United States decided to defend the offshore
islands, military action could not be limited to air and sea
operations alone, and consequently would spread to a fullscale war against Communist China.

44

President Eisenhower

did not act on this three to one majority recommendation.
He decided to hold a National Security Council meeting at
Denver on September 12, with the return and participation
45
of Secretary Dulles.
Secretary Dulles, after concluding the SEATO treaty
in Manila, stopped at Taipei to confer with Generalissimo
44

Ibid., and Harold H. Martin, Soldier:
The Memoirs
of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1956),
pp. 278-79.
45

This decision of President Eisenhower was reportedly
made at the suggestion of Walter B. Smith, his former mili
tary subordinate and then Undersecretary of State.
Alsop,
"The Story Behind Quemoy," p. 87.

Chiang on September 9 before returning to the United States.
It was the first time that an American Secretary had ever
visited Formosa.

Upon arrival at Taipei, Dulles said, "The

United States is proud to stand with those, who, having
passed through so many trials, are yet courageously sustained by a faith that will not be subdued.

46

As to the

crisis developing in the Formosa Strait, Dulles said, "Red
China is now intensifying its military and propaganda
activity against Free China, but we shall not be intimidated."

47

He stressed,

"Our Seventh Fleet orders issued

by the preceding Administration continue firm under the
Eisenhower Administration."

48

Dulles did not, however, specify

whether the orders of the Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa ex
tended to the offshore islands.

During Secretary Dulles*

five-hour visit in Taipei, the American military mission chief
in Formosa, Major General William Chase, recommended to Dulles
that Washington announce American intentions to help the
Nationalists defend the offshore islands. 49
On September 12, Secretary Dulles arrived at Denver
to attend the scheduled National Security Council meeting,
which was held for the ostensible reason of the President's,
desire to hear Dulles' report on his Southeast Asia trip.
Before going to the Council meeting, Secretary Dulles had a
press conference.

With regard to the question whether or

4^New York Times, September 9, 1954, p. 3.
^ ^Ibid.
4 8 Ibid.

4^Rankin, China Assignment, p. 206.

45
not the United States would defend the offshore islands,
Dulles maintained his previous attitude that it was "a
matter primarily for the military, at least in the first
instance, to recommend what is implicit in an effective
defense of Formosa."

50

.
The Secretary stated that during his

stopover in Taipei the Nationalists had neither asked nor
had the United States promised to help defend the offshore
islands.
The National Security Council meeting, in fact,
centered on the discussion of the tension in the Formosa
Strait.

Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, asserted that now there were considerable military
reasons for holding the offshore islands.

The Chiefs

except General Ridgway urged that the United States commit
itself to defend the offshore islands and help
ists bomb the mainland.

the National

President Eisenhower maintained

that such action, if taken, would not be confined to Quemoy.
The President tended to accept the dissenting view of
General Ridgway as previously expressed.

He said, "We're

not talking now about a:limited, brush-fire war.

W e 1re

talking about going to the threshold of World War III.

If

we attack China, we're not going to impose limits on our
military actions, as in Korea."

51

The President reminded

50 New York Times, Spetember 13, 1954, p. 1.
51 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 464.
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his advisors, "If we get into a general war, the logical
enemy will be Russia, not China, and w e fll have to strike
.-i
„ 52
there.

Secretary Dulles then described the complexity of
the offshore islands problem as he saw it.

He explained

that the Communist bombardment of Quemoy was probing
American intentions and that it had to be stopped or the
United States would face disaster in the Far East.

However,

he said that if the United States drew a line and committed
itself to defend the offshore islands, it might find itself
at war with Red China without allies.

Faced with this

dilemma, Dulles advanced an alternate course of action.

He

said, "We should take the offshore islands question to the
United Nations Security Council with the view of getting
there an injunction to maintain the status quo and institute
a cease fire in the Formosa Strait.

Whether Russia vetoes or

accepts such a plan the United States will gain."

53

a means of wresting initiative from the Communists.

It was
The

President accepted Dulles' recommendation.
While the National Security Council did not decide
that the United States would help defend the offshore islands,
Secretary Dulles, after the Council meeting, told newsmen,
"The defense of Quemoy is primarily related to the defense
52

Ibid.

53t,
.,
Ibid.

47
of Formosa and it is being considered in that light."

54

Meanwhile, the naval arm of the United States, the Seventh
Fleet, had been intensifying its patrol in the Formosa
Strait ever since the Communist shelling of Quemoy.

The

chief of American military mission on Formosa, Major General
Chase, led a group of MAAG officers in a visit to Quemoy
on September 11, showing keen American interest there.

All

these signs marked the beginning of a persistent United
States attitude intended to keep Red China guessing as to
American intentions in the defense of the offshore islands.

54

New York Times, September 13, 1954, p. 2.

CHAPTER III
AMERICA IN THE MIDDLE
Artillery Coupled with Propaganda
After the start of the bombardment of Quemoy, the
Communist propaganda drive to "liberate" Formosa reached
a high pitch.

A leading article in the People's Daily on

September 5 proclaimed:

"Taiwan compatriots!

confidence that Taiwan will be liberated.
will be over.
arrive.

We have every

Your distress

Your days of freedom and happiness will

Final victory is ours I I n

a foreign policy

speech delivered before the National People's Congress on
September 23, Chou En-lai told 1,200 delegates that the
"liberation" of Formosa was an urgent task.

He said, "As

long as Taiwan is not liberated, China's territory is not
intact.

China cannot have a tranquil environment for peace

ful construction and peace in the Far East and throughout
the world is not secure." 2

In the Communist drive for

liberating Formosa, Chou stressed Peking's "indestructible"
^■Quoted in Richard L. Walker, China Under Communism,
The First Five Years (New Haven:
Yale University Press,
1955), p. 319.
2

Important Documents Concerning the Question of
Taiwan, p. 148.

48

49
friendship with the Soviet Union and its close ties with
other "people's democracies."

3

A closer tie, indeed, was fostered between the Soviet
Union and the Chinese Communist regime in 1954.

Nikita

Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist
Party, led an impressive Soviet delegation to Peking on
September 28 to participate in the celebration of the fifth
anniversary of the Chinese Communist regime and to negotiate a series of agreements.

4

In a speech delivered before

a large crowd in Peking on September 30, Khrushchev ex
pressed Soviet support of the objective of the Chinese
Communists of "liberating" Formosa.

He said, "The Soviet

people deeply sympathize with the noble cause of the great
Chinese people, support the Chinese people in their deter
mination to liberate their suffering brothers from the
oppression of the Chiang Kai-shek brigands on Taiwan, and
to eliminate the Chiang Kai-shek brigands on the Island."

5

On October 1, the Chinese Communist Defense Minister,
Peng Teh-huai, echoed the Soviet support by issuing "an
order of the day to all commanders and fighters of the
Chinese Liberation Army" in which he declared:
^Ibid.
4
Seven Sino-Soviet accords and policy statements of
significance were made during Khrushchev’s mission to Peking.
Texts in Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents
on International Affairs, 1954, pp. 321-27.
5
New York Times, October 1, 1954, p. 5.
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It is the glorious duty of the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army to liberate Taiwan.

. . .

In order to liberate Taiwan . . . I give
you these orders:
hold yourselves constantly
prepared for combat . . .®
The Sino-Soviet solidarity on the question of
Formosa was further expressed in their joint declaration
on October 12.

It stated:

The overt acts of aggression committed by
the United States against the Chinese People's
Republic, and especially its continued occupation
of a part of the CPR's territory, the island of
Taiwan, and also the military and financial support
it is sending the enemies of the Chinese people,
the Chiang Kai-shek clique, are incompatible with
the task of maintaining peace in the Far East and
lessening international tension.^
All communist propaganda was aimed at depicting that
American "occupation" of Formosa was the cause of tension
in the Far East, and that consequently it endangered the
peace of the world.

As a part of this propaganda scheme,

Chou En-lai sent a cable to the Secretary General of the
United Nations on October 10, to renew his charge of United
States "aggression of China's-territory of Taiwan," a
repetition of his abortive attempt in August 1950.

Chou

urged the Security Council to stop "aggressive action by
the United States in interfering with Chinese people's
liberation of Taiwan and to call on the United States to
withdraw all their armed forces and military personnel
Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 900 (October 1-3,
1954), p. 8.
7
Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954, p. 326
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g

from the island."

He accused the United States of using

the Nationalists to carry on a "war of harassment and
destruction" against the Chinese mainland, as well as
piratical attacks on foreign ships trading with Peking.

9

The American chief delegate to the United Nations,
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., at first refused to
receive a copy of C h o u ’s cable, as he thought it was unduly
circulated by the Secretary General.^

The Soviet delega

tion promptly backed up the Communist move by calling upon
the General Assembly on October 15 to place an additional
item of American "aggression" against Communist China on
the current agenda as an urgent matter.

In its explanatory

memorandum, the Soviets charged that the United States
Seventh Fleet "are staging provocative naval demonstrations
off the Chinese coast and providing cover for the Chiang
Kai-shek warships and aircraft which are continuing acts
of provocation against the People’s Republic of China.
Thus, it accused the United States of having converted
the area around Formosa into a "breeding ground for a new
war."

12

The Russian delegate asked the General Assembly
g
The Times

(London), October 15, 1954, p. 1.

^Ibid.
^ New York Times, October 15, 1954, p. 1.
■^Text of the Soviet memorandum in New York Times,
October 16, 1954, p. 2.
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to pass the Soviet draft resolution to condemn the United
States.
Ambassador Lodge promptly branded as a "plain lie"
the Soviet allegation that the United States was engaged
in aggressive action "in Formosa or anywhere else."

13

Nevertheless, the General Assembly acceded to the Soviet
request and placed the item on the agenda.

During the debate,

the United States Representative, C. D. Jackson, listed
seven major acts of aggression committed by the Chinese
Communists since 1950.

He deplored that those who supported

Red China in the United Nations should have regarded a
posture of resistance as "aggression."

"To bow to this

demand," Jackson said, "would be to adopt the principle that
self defense against communist attack is an international
crime."

14

The Soviet draft resolution was overwhelmingly

defeated, first, in the Political Committee and then in the
plenary session of the General Assembly on December 10 and
17, respectively.
Right Wing Republicans Impatient
Since the presidential election campaign of 19 52
in the United States, the Republican Party had professed to
discard the old policy of containment and to offer a new
^ Ibid. , p. 1.
14

C. D. Jackson, "Soviet Propaganda Charges Against
U.S. Effort to Deter Aggression in Asia," D .S .B ., XXXI,
No. 808 (December 20, 1954), p. 962.
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policy of liberation.

15

It was supposed to be a policy of

action/ which would give "more bang for a buck."

President

Eisenhower’s order deneutralizing Formosa in February 1953
appeared to be a start in that direction, but nothing
followed.

Republican Senator William F. Knowland of Califor

nia had been an outspoken critic of American Far Eastern
policy

during the Truman administration and he felt free to

voice his opinion
tration as well.

16

on Asian policy under the Eisenhower Adminis
In his Collier1s article of January 24,

1954, Senator Knowland expressed what he thought would be
a desirable China policy:
If we fail to take a strong stand behind
Chiang Kai-shekrs government and their claim to
their rightful homeland, we are in effect handing
all of Asia to the Communist gang. We have lost
ground to the Communists in Indo-China, and we
allowed the Chinese Reds to stop us in Korea.
. . . One more defeat at the hands of the Communists
in Asia will spell disaster. . . . We must be pre
pared, then, to go it alone in China if our allies
desert us. '
Nevertheless, the United States tolerated the parti
tion of Indochina in July 1954 without taking action.

Now,

15

Hans J. Morgenthau, "John F. Dulles," in An Un
certain Tradition:
American Secretaries of State in the
Twentieth Century, ed. by Norman A. Graebner (New York:
McGraw-Hill Co., 1961), p. 293.
16 In a bitter memorandum of August, 1949, Senator
Knowland and others termed the China White Paper "a 1,054page whitewash of a wishful, do-nothing policy which has
succeeded only in placing Asia in danger of Soviet con
quest."
Quoted in Graebner, New Isolation, p. 45.
17

William F. Knowland, "Be Prepared to Fight in
China," Collier *s , January 24, 1954, p. 120.
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confronted with the Chinese Communist bombardment of Quemoy
island with the possible attempt to seize it by force, the
Administration took the less positive attitude of keeping
Peking guessing as to American intentions.

There were

reasons to be alarmed at the unchecked communist expansion
and challenge in Asia.

Senator Knowland expressed his con

cern over the situation in an article for Collierfs pub
lished on October 1, 1954.
title:

The article carried the striking

"We Must Be Willing to Fight Now."

of the article were made known in advance.

The highlights
Knowland warned,

"The free world must face up to this grim threat now, for
tomorrow may be too late." 18

He maintained:

We and our allies must, as quickly as possible
draw a line in Asia and notify the communists that
if they cross it, they must fight.
The free nations
should let Red China know that if she invades—
directly, as in Korea or indirectly, as in Indochina-any territory we have undertaken to defend, she
must take the consequences not only on the violated
land, but on her own mainland.
To avoid a Communist world, we of the United
States and other free nations must be willing to
fight now, if necessary.-*-^
Senator Knowland conceded, "It will not be easy to
draw a so-far-and-no-farther line against the Communists
in Asia, but we must try to do so."

20

1o
William F. Knowland, "We Must Be Willing to Fight
Now," Collier's , October 1, 1954, p. 23.
19Ibid.
20Ibid.
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This kind of war-like pronouncement alarmed the
Democrats.

Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee charged

pointedly that a 11sinister group" including Senator Knowland,
apparently was trying to get the United States into a
full-scale war with Communist China.

He said that the

Administration must share "partial" blame for it.

21

Adlai

Stevenson, the titular head of the Democratic Party, also
assailed the foreign policy of the Eisenhower Administra
tion.

He said that President Eisenhower and his advisors

talked loudly of bipartisanship in foreign policy, but
"they haven't been able to establish bipartisanship within
the Republican Party." Stevenson singled out Senator
Knowland as the one who "takes a pot shot at the President's
policy every few days."

22

Adlai Stevenson's estimation of Knowland*s behavior
was accurate.

Senator Knowland very soon formally ex

pressed his dissatisfaction with the Administration's
foreign policy when he interrupted the scheduled proceedings
in the Senate and delivered his statement on November 15.
It was just one day before a meeting of senior members of
Congress in the White House at the invitation of President
Eisenhower.

23

Senator Knowland warned that the Soviet Russia

was "advancing the Trojan horse of coexistence" and that the
21
22

New York Times, September 24, 1954, p. 17.
Text in New York Times, October 10, 1954, p. 45.

^ I b i d ., November 16, 1954, p. 1.
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free nations might be "nibbled away" one by one under the
circumstances.

As there was "clear and present danger,"

he proposed that Congress promptly summon the State and
Defense Departments officials and Joint Chiefs of Staff
for a full and critical review of the Administration’s
foreign policy. 24

Since the Democrats had won the mid

term congressional election, Senator Knowland in effect
assigned this task to the incoming Democratic Congress.
Secretary Dulles responded with a statement that
he welcomed a discussion and review of foreign policy, but
added:

"I do not myself see any immediate emergency which

requires either that review or discussion should be on any
different basis from what it normally is."

25

As to the

situation in the Formosa Strait, Dulles said any communist
attempt to take Formosa would mean hostilities with the
United States.

But he asserted that the United States would

not be drawn into any war except upon its own decision that
action was required, and that the United States wanted to
maintain mobility of action in such a situation.

26

The President immediately, though indirectly, en
dorsed the stand taken by Secretary Dulles.

The White House

Press Secretary, James Hagerty, said, "He [the President]
24

Text in Ibid., November 16, 1954, p. 18.

25D.S.B. , XXXI, No. 805
26

(November 29, 1954), p. 808.

New York Times, November 17, 1954, p. 2.
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has often told me and said so publicly that he believes
we have one of the. wisest, most courageous and most dedicated
men in our history as Secretary of State--John Foster
Dulles."

27
7

In spite of the Administration's disapproving
attitude toward his alarm. Senator Knowland said that he had
no intention of resigning as Republican Senate leader be
cause of his public difference with the President and
Secretary Dulles over some aspects of foreign policy.

28

Soon afterward the President himself gave public indication
as to what his attitude would be toward dissidents in his
own party.

In response to a newsman*s question whether

Senator Knowland*s opposition to the Administration on
several recent issues would be a threat to Republican
harmony in the new Congress, the President said, "I would
hope that the men with whom I have to work would not be
differing greatly from me in the main issues in which we
have to work, or it would be extremely difficult."

29

The Communists * New Provocations
The Chinese Communists had kept the situation in
the Formosa Strait tense by shelling Quemoy sporadically

28

29

New York Times, November 21, 1954, p. 6 6.

Transcript of the President*s news conference on
December 2, 1954, in President Eisenhower, Public Papers,
1954, p. 1078.
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after" commencing an intensive bombardment on September 3.
Tn spite' ocf the President's denial that the American Govern
ment trad' prohibited the Nationalists from launching air
raids against the mainland coastal area, the Nationalist
Government was strictly advised not to bomb the mainland to
a degree more than justified as a defensive measure.

30

In

early November, the Communists shifted their target from
Quemoy to. the Tachen group, the most weakly defended of
the Nationalists' offshore islands.

The Communists began

to use airplanes to bomb the Tachen group in addition to
artillery fire.

The little war that developed in the Tachen

area was highlighted by Communist torpedo boats which
attacked and sank a Nationalist 1,800-ton destroyer.

The

Nationalist Foreign Minister George Yeh called this inci
dent:,. which was a sneak attack during mid-night hours, a
Communist "atrocity."

He said, "This is a test of the moral

3:0
The press declared on October 8 , 1954, that the
American Government had advised the Nationalists to halt
air raid's on the mainland but officials in Washington re
fused to confirm this report.
This was the exact time that
Ambassador Rankin made the suggestion to Washington that
the MAAG. in Formosa should advise the Nationalist military
authorities to restrain their air raids.
There had been a
difference of opinion between the Ambassador and the MAAG
o il
the: matter.
C f . Rankin, China Assignment, p. 207. When
President Eisenhower during a news conference on November 10,
19:54., said that the United States Government did not "order"
the Nationalist Government to halt air raids, it was true
in. that sense.
However, the Nationalists deferred to the
American military opinion that it would be undesirable to
raid the mainland more than was necessary as a necessary
measure... President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1954, p. 1034.
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position of a free nation, a test to find out how the United
States and other nations will react to this atrocity."

31

This stirring remark caused no reaction from the United
States.
As the bombardment of Quemoy, the renewed accusation
of American "aggression" in the United Nations, and the
attacks against the Tachen group had forced neither action
nor concession from the United States, the Chinese Communists
tried once more to irritate Americans by violating the most
treasured American value— the liberty of their fellow
citizens.

On November 23, 1954, the Chinese Communists

announced that thirteen Americans had been indicted "for
having clandestinely crossed the Chinese border by plane to
conduct espionage activity." 32

In actuality, eleven of

these men were crew members of a United States Air Force
plane which had been shot down on January 12, 1953, in a
leaflet-dropping operation over North Korea during the
Korean W a r . ^
According to the provisions of the Korean Armistice,
all prisoners of war on both sides were to be repatriated
31

New York Times, November 16, 1954, p. 7.

32

"Judgement of the Military Tribunal of the Supreme
People's Court of the People's Republic of China, November 23,
1954," in Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954, p. 349.
33

A statement by the U.S. Chief Delegate to the U . N . ,
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., in the plenary session of the General
Assembly on December 8 , 1954, in ibid., p. 355.
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not later than September 23, 1953, if they so desired.

34

Instead, the Chinese Communists retained these prisoners
of war and sentenced them to imprisonment from four to ten
years.

On November 26, 1954, the American Government lodged

a strong protest to the Chinese Reds through British diplo
matic channels, as the United States did not recognize the
Chinese Communist regime.

The American statement told the

Chinese Reds to bear in mind that "the long list of Chinese
Communist outrages against American nationals, which the
American people have borne with restraint thus far, is
significantly extended by the Chinese Communist announcement of November 23rd."

35

Senator Knowland was infuriated at the imprisonment
of thirteen Americans on trumped-up charges of spying.

On

November 27, just one day after the State D e p a r t m e n t s note
of protest, he held a press conference to advance his position
on the matter without prior consultation with the State or
Defense Departments.

Knowland said, "If the Communists don't

respond to our note and continue to hold our uniformed men
in prison in direct violation of the Korean truce, with or
without the support of the United Nations, we would be
justified in clamping a tight blockade on China.

We should

34

Article III, Section 51 (a) of the Korean Armistice
Agreement, Panmunjom, July 27, 1953.
Text in Documents on
International Affairs, 1953 (London:
Oxford University Press
for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956),
p. 399.
^ D . S .B ., XXXI, No. 806

(December 6, 1954), pp. 856-57.
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serve notice on them that no vessel can get in or out of
China until these Americans are released."

36

He maintained

that the United States should go it alone if her allies
were not willing.

Senator Knowland stressed, "We have the

power to do this and the moral obligation to do it.

Those

associated with us i n .the free world should cooperate but
I don't think we should give them a veto on our actions."

37

The Eisenhower Administration, however, was not
inclined to take such drastic action against the Chinese
Communists.

As the United States armed forces had been

in Korea to repel communist aggression under United Nations
command, it was deemed more desirable to seek the release
of the captives through the channels of the United Nations
rather than by taking unilateral action.

In an address

delivered on November 29, Secretary Dulles said, "Our nation
has agreed with others, by the United Nations Charter, to,
try to settle international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace is not endangered.
Therefore, our first duty is to exhaust peaceful means of
sustaining our international rights and those of our citizens,
rather than now resorting to war action such as a naval
blockade of Red China."
36

38

This was an open rebuttal to

New York Times, November 28, 1954, p. 1.
Ibid.

38
Secretary Dulles' address delivered before the 4-H
Congress in Chicago on November 29, 1954.
D . S .B ., XXXI,
No. 807 (December 13, 1954), p. 890.
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Knowland*s proposal.

As Secretary Dulles conceived it, the

Chinese Communists were trying to provoke the United States
into taking hasty action.

He stressed, "Our nation will

react, and react vigorously, but without allowing ourselves
to be provoked into action which would impair the alliance
of free nations."

39

President Eisenhower also counselled the American
people to be patient, but he stressed that American re
straint should not be interpreted "as appeasement or any
purchase of immediate favor at the cost of principle."

40

The President reminded the American people that these
American airmen had been held by the Communists for two
years, so their timing of the announcement was a "deliberate"
act.

The Communist intention, as he saw it, was "to goad

us into impulsive action in the hope of dividing us from our
allies."

41

"The hard way," the President said, "is to have

courage to be patient, tirelessly to seek out every single
avenue open to us in the hope even finally of leading the
other side to a little understanding of the honesty of our
intention."

42

The President disapproved of a naval blockade

40

A statement issued at the White House on December 2,
1954, in President Eisenhower, Pub1ic Papers, 1954, p. 1074.
41Ibid., p. 1075.
42Ibid., p. 1076.
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of mainland China as a means of hastening the release of
the American airmen.

Of this he said, "It is possible that

a blockade is conceivable without war.

I have never read

of it myself.
As might be expected, the American protest of un
lawful imprisonment of its airmen was outrightly rejected
by the Chinese Communists.

On December 4, the United States

called on the General Assembly of the United Nations to
act "promptly and decisively" to bring about the release of
the eleven flyers and all other captured personnel.

44

The

sixteen nations who had contributed forces to the United
Nations effort in Korea gave solid support to the American
appeal.

On December 10, the General Assembly overwhelmingly

passed a resolution condemning "the trial of prisoners of
war illegally detained after the date fixed by the Korean
armistice," and asked the Secretary General to make "continuing and unremitting" effort to obtain their release.

45

Immediately afterward the Secretary General, Dag
Hammarskjold, cabled Chou En-lai expressing his wish to
visit Peking to discuss the matter of the imprisonment of
American airmen.

The Communist response was delayed for one

44

United States note to the Secretary General of the
U.N. on December 4, 1954.
Text in New York Times, December 5,
1954, p. 3, and in D.S.B., XXXI, No. 807 (December 13, 1954),
p. 892.
^5Text in D.S.B., XXXI, p. 893.
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week.

On December 17, Chou sent two cables to the Secre

tary General.

In the first cable Chou agreed to his visit

to Peking to discuss "pertinent questions."

46

In his

second cable, however, Chou denied that the United Nations
was competent to "interfere in China's conviction of fullproved United States spies." 47

This demur, in fact,

destroyed the whole basis on which the Secretary General's
visit was projected.

Nevertheless, Secretary General

Hammarskjold journeyed to Peking in early January 1955,
only to return empty-handed.
Conclusion of Mutual Defense Treaty
After the signing of a mutual defense treaty with
the Republic of Korea in October 1953, the United States
arranged mutual defense treaties with all its allies in
the Western Pacific except Formosa.

48

It was not due to

American lack of awareness of a missing link in the island
chain of the United States defense in that area, but due
to difficulties involved in the treaty negotiations.

The

initial discussion on the matter had been made in December
19 53, and the main hurdle was the territorial scope of
application with regard to the treaty.

49

^ T e x t in New York Times, December 18, 1954, p. 3.
47Ibid.
48
Up to that time, the United States had concluded
mutual defense treaties with the Philippines on August 30,
1951; with Australia and New Zealand on September 1, 1951;
and with Japan on September 8 , 1951.
^Ra n k i n , China Assignment, p. 195.
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There were two aspects to the question.

In respect

to the "present" territory, the Nationalists desired to
include the offshore islands in addition to Formosa and the
Pescadores, but the United States would not agree.

With

regard to the "lost" territory, mainland China, the
Nationalist Government suggested a clause corresponding
to that in the Sino-Japanese peace treaty of 1952, which
applied ". . . t o all the territories which are now or
which may hereafter be, under the control" of the Nationalist
Government.

50

This meant that the Nationalist Government

would reserve its right to recover the mainland by launching
a counter-attack whenever feasible.

Washington tended to

regard such a provision as too sweeping under the circum
stances.

And yet.if the territorial application was limited

to Formosa and the Pescadores, it would be tantamount to
recognizing communist control of the Chinese mainland as
. 51
permanent.
Anxiously seeking an American treaty commitment to
defend Formosa, the Nationalist Government was willing to
make concessions on some principles which it had cherished.
50 In view of the fact that there were two claimants
for the government of China, the San Francisco Peace Con
ference invited neither to sign the peace treaty with Japan.
However, by terms of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan
was at liberty to choose one of them to sign a separate
peace treaty.
Japan decided to sign a bilateral peace
treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government on April 28,
1952.
51

Rankin, China Assignment, pp. 195-96.
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In June 1954 the Nationalist Government indicated that it
would agree to obtain the prior approval of the American
Government before undertaking any important military action
against mainland China so as to facilitate the treaty
negotiations.

52

When Secretary Dulles visited Taipei on

September 9, 1954, he talked with Generalissimo Chiang about
the treaty but the matter was still unsettled.

53

After the

decision of the National Security Council on September 12
to bring the offshore islands question to the United Nations,
Secretary Dulles contacted the western powers behind the
scenes.

54

In the meantime, Dulles sent Walter Robertson,

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, to Taipei on
October 14 to explain this American move.

Chiang was

bitterly opposed to the idea of a cease-fire through the
United Nations, as it would mean the acceptance of a twoChina concept.

Chiang argued that the Nationalist Govern

ment did not even have an American written agreement to
defend Formosa.

55

The result of Robertson's visit was that the cease
fire proposal in the Formosa Strait was shelved temporarily
52

Nationalist Foreign Minister George Yeh told
Ambassador Rankin on June 28, 1954.
Rankin, China Assign
ment , p . 197.
53
President
54
55

Ibid., p. 207, and Merlo J. Pusey, Eisenhower the
(New York: Macmillan Co., 1956), pp. 162-63.
Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 464.

Chalmers M. Roberts, "Strong Man from the South,"
Saturday Evening P o s t , June 25, 1955, p. 109.
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while the negotiations on the mutual defense treaty moved
at a quicker tempo.

56

While attending the General Assembly

annual meeting in New York, the Nationalist Foreign Minister
George Yeh was responsible for negotiating the treaty with
Washington,

At one point during the negotiations, Secre

tary Dulles was willing to include Quemoy and Matsu, the
offshore islands, under the American defense commitment,
but President Eisenhower struck that out.

57

The mutual

defense treaty was initialed on November 23, 1954

(the

same date that the Chinese Communists announced the spy
charges against the thirteen Americans), and was formally
signed in Washington on December 2.
The treaty consisted of a preamble and ten articles,
and the heart of the treaty was its provision on the
treaty area.

It was so defined that "in respect to the

Republic of China, it was Taiwan and the Pescadores," but
it could extend "to such other territories as may be
determined by mutual agreement."

58

As to the American

defense commitment, it was the same as that stipulated in
other mutual defense treaties:

"each party would act to

meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes."
56

59

The treaty would remain in force indefinitely

Ibid., and Rankin, China Assignment, pp. 213-14.

57

John R. Beal, John Foster Dulles:
A Biography (New
Harper & Brothers, 1957), pp. 226-27.
CO
Article VI of the treaty.
Text in D.S.B., XXXI,
No. 807 (December 13, 1954), p. 899.
York:
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Article V of the treaty.
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bait: either party could terminate it one year after giving
..
60
n otice.
After the signing of the treaty, Secretary Dulles
Held a: press conference.

He emphasized that the signifi

cance of the treaty was to "put to rest once and for all
rumors and reports that the United States will in any manner
agree: to the abandonment of Formosa and the Pescadores to
Communist c o n t r o l . " I n

the meantime, Dulles said that

"technical sovereignty" over Formosa and the Pescadores had
never been settled because the peace treaty with Japan
merely provided for a Japanese renunciation of its title
and" right to those islands. 6 2

When questioned about the

offshore islands, he answered:
The position on the offshore islands is un
affected by this treaty.
Their status is neither
promoted by the treaty nor is it demoted by the
treaty. . . . The injunction to our armed forces
is to defend Formosa and the Pescadores.
Now,
whether or not in any particular case the defense
of these offshore islands by reason of the nature
of those islands or by nature of the attack against
them is such that it is deemed part of the defense
of Formosa, that would be a matter which on the
first instance at least the military people would
advise, and the president would probably make the
final decision.
It was the familiar tactic of keeping the enemy
guessing.

In case of communist attack on Formosa henceforth,

^ A r t i c l e X of the treaty.
61D.S.B., XXXI, No. 807, p. 898.
^ Ibid. , p. 896 .
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Secretary Dulles indicated that the United States would take
retaliatory action which did not necessarily mean a
general war.

He said, "It is a retaliation of sufficient

severity to make it clear that the aggressor cannot gain
by his attack more than he loses." 64

This was a distinctly

modified version of Dullesr theory of massive retaliation.

65

While the treaty itself did not impose restrictions
on the Nationalist initiative to launch attacks on main
land China, restrictions were established in the form of an
exchange of letters between Secretary Dulles and Nationalist
Foreign Minister George Yeh on December 10.

That exchange

of letters set forth a policy:
In view of the * . . fact that the use of force
from either of these areas [under Chinese Nationalist
control] by either party affects the other, it is
agreed that such use of force will be a matter of
joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency
character which is clearly an exercise of the in
herent right of self-defense. ^
Furthermore, it provided that the Nationalist mili
tary "elements," pertaining to troops and armament received
under the American assistance program, "will not be removed
from the territories described in Art. VI

[Formosa and the

^^Ibid., p. 898.
6 5Secretary Dulles 1 theory of massive retaliation
was first expounded in his address delivered before the
Council on Foreign Affairs on January 12, 1954.
It was
somewhat revised in his article on "Policy for Security
and Peace" in Foreign Affairs, XXXII, No. 3 (April, 1954).
66

Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954, p. 363.
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Pescadores]

to a degree which would substantially diminish

the defensibility of such territories without mutual agreement."

67

With these double restrictions imposed upon the

Nationalist Government and with an American military mission
in Formosa on hand to guard against any possible unilateral
action by the Nationalists, the Nationalists hope to launch
a counter-attack on the Chinese mainland w a s , to all
intents and purposes, ended.

Thus, the Nationalists were

”re-leashed" for good, if.they had ever been for a moment
"unleashed" by the Eisenhower Administration.

So far. as the

American Government was concerned, nothing was left to be
desired in its mutual defense treaty with the Chinese
Nationalist Government.

The exchange of letters was kept

secret for a month, and was made known to the public on
January 13, 1955.
In an effort to seek some sort of American commit
ment to help defend the offshore islands, Nationalist
Foreign Minister George Yeh proposed during a visit to the
White House on December 20 that American assurance to pro
vide the "logistic support" for the defense of the offshore
islands would be "good psychological warfare."
Eisenhower refused it, saying,

"It would be a mistake to

expand the treaty at this time."

68

President

68

Obviously the Nationalist

Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 466.
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Government did not derive full satisfaction from the scope
and limitation of the mutual defense treaty, but it finally
secured an American written commitment to defend Formosa.
The Sino-Soviet Reactions
In spite of the defensive nature of the mutual
defense treaty which was concluded between the American
Government and the Nationalist Government, the Chinese
Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-lai issued a lengthy
statement denouncing the treaty on December 8 , 1954.

He

distortedly interpreted the mutual defense treaty as an
aggressive move by the United States.

Chou said, "By this

treaty, the United States Government attempts to legalize
its armed seizure of China’s territory of Taiwan, and with
Taiwan as a base, to extend its aggression against China
and prepare a new war." 69
1

He stressed:

To liberate Taiwan and liquidate Chiang Kai-shek
clique is a matter which falls entirely within the
scope of China’s sovereignty and internal affairs
and no interference by any foreign country will be
tolerated.
Threats of war cannot shake the deter- _
mination of the Chinese people to liberate Taiwan.
Chou warned that if the United States did not withdraw
its armed forces from the Formosa area, "it must take upon
itself all the grave consequences."
69

71

Extracts from Chou En-lai’s statement in Documents
on International Affairs, 1954, p. 330.
70

Ibid.

71Ibid., p. 331.
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The Soviet Government supported the Chinese Com
munists in denouncing the mutual defense treaty.

A state

ment issued by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on December 15
said that the Soviet Government "shares the position"
formulated in Chou En-lai*s statement of December 8 that
the treaty was "an interference in the internal affairs of
China, an attempt on her territorial integrity and places
in danger the security of China and peace in Asia."

72

The

statement also said that the Soviet Government "fully
supports" the demand of the Chinese Communists for the with
drawal of American troops from Formosa and the Formosa
Strait and for the cessation of "the aggressive actions
against the Chinese People*s Republic."

73

The Soviet state

ment, however, did not say what kind of support Russia
would extend to the Chinese Communists in case a head-on
armed conflict developed in the Formosa area between the
United States and the Chinese Communists.
Thereafter the Communists continued to denounce the
mutual defense treaty.

On December 25, the National Committee

of the Chinese People*s Political Consultative Conference
issued a declaration in which it proclaimed:
The attempt by the aggressive circles in the
U.S. to occupy Taiwan and extend aggression against
China by means of their treaty with Chiang Kai-shek
can only strengthen the Chinese people *s determination
72
The Times

(London), December 16, 1954, p. 8.
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to liberate Taiwan and^gut an end to the Chiang
Kai-shek traitor gang.
The United States Government considered communist
denunciations of the mutual defense treaty too absurd to
rebut.

However, the communist charges that the American

Government's signing of a treaty with the Nationalists was
"an interference in the internal affairs of China" appeared
to be plausible.

Since there were two claimants to be the

government of China, it could logically be construed as an
act of American intervention in the Chinese civil war to
sign a treaty with the Nationalist Government.

Even so, it

was not illegal for a state to intervene in a civil conflict.
According to international law, historically it had not been
forbidden a state to aid the legally recognized government
of another state to put down insurrection, although Some
recent authorities said that it was desirable to avoid
doing s o . ^
Perhaps it was for this reason that the United
States, since President Truman's order to neutralize For
mosa in June 1950, had avoided expressing any American action
regarding Formosa as an intervention in the Chinese civil
war on the side of the Nationalists.

The United States

policy stressed the theme that sovereignty over Formosa had
74

^
Important Documents Concerning the Question of
Taiwan, pp. 174-75.
75

Claude S. Philips, Jr., "The International Legal
Status of Formosa," Western Political Quarterly, X, No. 2
(June, 1957), pp. 284-85.
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never been settled, as the peace treaty with Japan in
1951 conferred its title to no one.
ment, it was a two-edged sword.

Though a valid argu

On the one hand, any action

by the Chinese Communists to invade Formosa would constitute
an attempt to seize by force a territory which did not
belong to them.

Such an action would contravene the prin

ciples of international law and the explicit provisions of
the United Nations Charter.

76

In that case, there would be

ample justification to call for international action.

On

the other hand, the United States Government had concluded
a mutual defense treaty with the Nationalist Government
which also had no clear legal title to Formosa.
asserted,

One critic

"We have a solemn compact with a government-in-

the-sky, a government with no legitimate site on the mainland or in Formosa."

77

Government inevitably
ment.

In this respect, the American
found itself in an awkward predica

It was even more embarrassing to the Nationalist

Government in that it had nothing more than prescriptive
"squatter's rights" to Formosa, as some scholars maintained. 7 8
76
Article I, section 1, of the United Nations Charter
provides, "The purpose of the United Nations are: . . . to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and
removal of the threats to the peace, and for the suppression
of acts of aggression or the breaches of the peace. . . ."
7-7Herbert Elliston, "Question on the Formosa Treaty,"
Washington Post & Times Herald, February 9, 1955.
Reprinted ,
in the Congressional Record, 84th Congress, 1st session, V.
101, Part 2, p. 3519.
"7^0. Edmund Clubb and Eustace
national Position of Communist China
Publications
Co., 1965), p. 29.
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The British Government recognized the Chinese Com
munist regime in January 1951, marking a basic departure
from the American policy.

It was the Labor Government

under Prime Minister Clement Attlee that extended this
recognition to Peking.

Prime Minister Attlee was eager to

have the American Government follow suit.

During his visit

to Washington in early December 1950 after the Chinese
Communists had joined in the Korean conflict, Premier Attlee
advocated the admission of Red China into the United Nations.
He believed that withdrawing from Korea and Formosa, and
giving the Chinese seat in the United Nations to the Com
munists "would not be too high price" in order to avoid an
all-out war with Communist China. 80
After the Korean armistice was concluded, and Attlee
had become the leader of the party in opposition as a
result of the Laborite defeat in the 1951 election, he did
not hesitate to air openly his differences with the United
States policy toward the Chinese Communists.

While the

Geneva Conference on Indochina was going on, Attlee, in the
House of Commons, reopened the debate on the question of
admitting Peking on July 14, 1954.

"As far as Formosa and

Chiang Kai-shek are concerned," he said, "the island should
be placed under the control of the United Nations, and
79
80

Truman, Memoirs, II, p. 406.
Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 4 81.

79

76
Chiang and his associates should be pensioned off."

81

Prime Minister Winston Churchill, in responding, took a
restrained position and maintained that it was not an
opportune time to force the issue.

82

In the late summer of 1954 Attlee visited the Soviet
Union and mainland China.

After arriving in Hong Kong from

Peking on September 2, he confirmed the news report that
Mao Tsu-tung had asked for British Labor Party support in
securing a change of American policy on Formosa.

83

On the

rest of his tour, Formosa was Attlee*s favorite topic.
While in New Zealand, Attlee told the reporters that he
"definitely" disapproved of the United States Seventh
Fl e e t ’s role in protecting the Chinese Nationalist area of
Formosa; but he added, "That is a matter for the United
States."

84

Upon returning to London on September, 22 after his
round-the-world tour, Attlee said, "I think the sooner we
get rid of Chiang Kai-shek and his troops the better it
will be." 85

On the eve of the Labor Party annual conference

81

Excerpts from the debates in the House of Commons
on July 14, 1954, in New York Times, July 15, 1954, p. 2.
82
The substance of Prime Minister Churchill’s de
fense, Ibid.
Times

8 3New York Times, September 3, 1954, p. 1; and The
(London), same date, p. 6 .
84

New York Times, September 15, 1954, p. 3.
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(London), September 23, 1954, p. 6.
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held on September 27 at Scarborough,

Attlee urged that

Formosa be "reunited" with China and suggested that Chiang
Kai-shek and his immediate adherents be retired to "a safe
Qg
place."
The Soviet newspapers Pravda and Izvestia gave
simultaneous coverage of Attlee’s speech.

87

As to the incumbent British Conservative Government’s
attitude, it had watched the events closely since the
Communist bombardment of Quemoy, and had established close
contact with the American Government.

The Conservative

Government was worried lest a situation develop in the
Formosa Strait that would result in a further increase of
tension.

88

When the mutual defense treaty between the

United States and Nationalist China was being negotiated,
the British Government had been kept informed of its general
lines.

89

After the treaty was signed, the British Govern

ment gave limited approval.

On December 8 , Foreign Secre

tary Anthony Eden told the House of Commons:

"Her Majesty’s

Government are satisfied that its object is to place rela
tions between the United States Government and the National
ist Chinese on such a basis as will result in a close degree
86

New York Times, September 28, 1954, p. 2.
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Current Digest of the Soviet Pre s s , VI, No. 39
(November 10, 1954), p. 17.
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of consultation."

90

. . .
He also said that the British policy

toward the offshore islands had been "to urge upon all
concerned the danger of fighting and the importance of
lowering tension and the avoidance of precipitate action."

91

So far this Conservative Government position satisfied the
Laborites.
However, a dispute arose in London when Anthony
Nutting, Britain's Minister of State and chief United
Nations delegate, declared during a television appearance
in the United States that in the event of a communist attack
on Formosa, Britain would be "involved" as a member of the
United Nations.

What Nutting said precisely in the National

Broadcasting Company television program, "Meet the Press,"
on December 12, 1954, was as follows:
Well, a communist Chinese attack on Formosa,
of course, is an attack upon a member of the United
Nations and would no doubt call for collective
action by the United Nations, in which we would,
of course, be involved, as a member of the U.N.
We are under an obligation to take action through
the United Nations when a member of the United
Nations is attacked, and we certainly took action
pretty quickly, led by the United States, when
Korea was attacked.
90

The Times (London), December 9, 1954, p. 3. There
is a Parliamentary session in The Times, which daily prints
th^ major dialogues occurring in the Parliament the previous
day.
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The transcript printed in "How Britain Feels About
Backing U.S. on Formosa," U.S. News and World Report,
December 24, 1954, p. 56.
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Nutting was perfectly correct in stating Britain's
obligations under the United Nations, but he might have
found a different way of saying it.

The Laborites, there

fore, immediately seized the opportunity to attack the
Government, and demanded an official clarification.

93

On December 20 simultaneous debates on the question
of Formosa were held in both chambers of the British Parlia
ment.

The Laborite attacks centered on two main points:

the nature of Britain's commitment to the defense of Formosa
and the status of Formosa.
In the House of Commons, Attlee, taking the lead,
demanded that some statement should be made to correct
the implication that Britain was bound to come to the aid
of the United States "in the event of an attack on her
when engaged in a possible intervention in a civil war in
China."

94

R. H. Turton, Parliamentary Under Secretary of

State, replied that no such statement would be made, for what
Nutting had said was a "perfectly factual situation of those
who are members of the United Nations and who are not."

95

The Laborites argued that Formosa was not a sovereign state,
and was not a member of the United Nations; therefore,
Britain had no obligation on that score.

Attlee wanted to

make it "perfectly clear" that "action of the United States
93
94

The Times

(London), December 14, 1954, p. 4.

Ibid., December 21, 1954, p. 9.

95T V . ,
Ibid.
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in Formosa is not an action of the United Nations" and that
"this country had no participation in it."96
In answer to a question about the present international
status of Formosa, the Marquis of Reading, Minister of
State, replied in the House of Lords that it was "somewhat
difficult in international law."

97

He explained that Japan

had renounced sovereignty over Formosa in the peace treaty,
but no beneficiary had been designated.

Therefore, he said,

"This Government does not regard it [[Formosa]

as forming

part of the Chinese People's R e p u b l i c . W i t h
Formosa, Reading stressed,

regard to

"The Government has no obligation

other than that arising out of our membership of the United
Nations. "99
What the debates in the British Parliament indicated
was that any move by the British Government toward a
firmer support of the position of the United States on
Formosa would court strong Laborite opposition.
The Chinese Communists tried to threaten the British
Government for its support of the United States on the
Formosa question.

In a speech made in the People's Political

Consultative Conference on December 21, Chou En-lai said that
Britain was "vigorously following . . . dangerous" American

96Ibid.
97Ibid.
98Ibid.
"ibid.
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policy on "certain major issues."

Referring to the mutual

defense treaty between the United States and Nationalist
China, Chou said that Britain1s attitude had encouraged
what he called the "seizure" of Formosa.

He declared,

"This

contravenes t h e ;obligation undertaken by the British Govern
ment in many solemn international agreements and impairs
the relations between China and Britain.
The British Government might ignore the threat from
Peking, but it could ill afford not to be mindful to the
clamors from the Laborites, especially as the next general
election would be held in the spring of 1955.

Aside from

other considerations, domestic politics would require the
British Government to chart a cautious course for its
Formosa policy.

^ ^ ew York Times, December 27, 1954, p. 1.

CHAPTER IV
NATIONAL UNITY DISPLAYED:

FORMOSA RESOLUTION

ADOPTED AND MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY RATIFIED
A Communist Show of Force
Following a well-publicized protest of the Mutual
Defense Treaty signed on December 2, 1954, between the
United States and the Chinese Nationalist Government,
Peking decided to force America’s hand by attacking the
offshore islands, which were not specifically protected by
the treaty.

On January 10, 1955, the Chinese Communists

employed one hundred airplanes of various types to raid
the Tachen island group.

One week later, on January 18,

the Chinese Reds overran Yikiang Island in the Tachen group
by amphibious assault with air support.

It was the first

time that the Chinese communists had made territorial gain
in the Formosa Strait in the months of tension since the
Quemoy bombardment on September 3, 1954.
Washington's initial reaction to this Communist
military conquest was indifference.

Secretary Dulles,

after conferring with the President, held a news conference
on January 18 to discount the importance of the loss of
Yikiang to the Communists.

He said that the Tachen islands

to which Yikiang Island belonged were "not in any sense
82

83
essential to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores
which we do regard as vital to u s ."^

When a newsman asked

about the possibility of a Nationalist-Communist cease-fire
in the Formosa Strait, the Secretary replied that a cease
fire would be in line with the broad policies of the United
States and the United Nations in seeking peaceful solutions
to controversial problems.

Yet he also said that it was

easier to discuss such matters in principle than it was to
work them out in practice.

Dulles expressed the view that

the American Government would not object to a cease-fire
arranged by the United Nations, but that he would not
initiate such a move without the concurrence of the Chinese
Nationalist Government.

2

The next day, January 19, President Eisenhower in
his news conference also said that the Tachen islands were
3
not "a vital element" in the defense of Formosa.
His
attitude, toward a cease-fire in the Formosa area was warmer
than that of Secretary Dulles.

He declared, "I should like

to see the United Nations attempt to exercise its good
4
offices.11

However, he added,

.
"Whether the United Nations

^New York Times, January 19, 1955, p. 3.
^Ibid.
3
Transcript of the President's news conference on
January 19, 1955, President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1955,
p. 186.
^Ibid .
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could do anything in this particular place, I don't know
because probably each side would insist that it was an
internal affair; although from our view point it might be
a good thing to have them take a look at the problem."

5

An Attempt to Draw A Line
Despite a seemingly indifferent attitude, the Adminis
tration decided to reappraise its policy toward the offshore
islands.

After the capture of Yikiang Island, the Chinese

Communists made it clear that this was a first step toward
the "liberation" of Formosa.
Pao

On January 19, the Jen Min Jih

(People's Daily) declared, "The victory shows that the

Chinese people are unshakable in the determined will to
g
fight for the liberation of Taiwan."
Meanwhile, the Chinese Nationalist Government had
asked for American military assistance, particularly air
support, to help defend the rest of the Tachen islands.
Ambassador Rankin forwarded the Nationalist request and
recommended "most sympathetic considerations" on both political and psychological grounds.

7

He believed that the loss

of the Tachens "would, by undermining confidence in United
States strength and determination, have a most unfortunate
g
effect on Chinese and Asian opinion."
^Ibid., p . 187.
^Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 972 (January 20,
1955), p. 3.
7
Rankin, China Assignment, p. 220.
^Ibid.
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Thus far, American policy toward the offshore islands,
as determined in the National Security Council meeting on
September 12, 1954 in Denver, had been simply to take the
question of a cease-fire to the United Nations without
making a decision as to an American commitment, if any, to
defend the islands.

The cease-fire idea ran aground after

Generalissimo Chiang rejected it during Assistant Secre
tary of State Robertson1s visit to Taipei in October 1954.
As luck would have it, Communist military action against
the offshore islands was limited to the artillery bombard
ment until the seizure of Yikiang Island by a show of force.
As the President wrote, "The time had come to draw the
i•
„9
line.
On January 20, 1955, the second anniversary of
General Eisenhower's term as President, a National Security
Council meeting was held in the White House.

During the

meeting, Secretary Dulles said, "It is unlikely any of the
offshore islands can be defended without large-scale
American armed help.

But we all agree that we cannot

permit the Communists to seize all the offshore islands.
Therefore, he proposed,

"We must modify our policy:

we

should declare that we will assist in the evacuation of
the Tachens, but, as we do so, we should declare that we
9
Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 466.
1QIbid., p. 467.
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will assist in holding Quemoy and Matsus

[sic] as long as

the Chinese Communists profess their intention to attack
Formosa.11^

President Eisenhower approved the Secretary fs

proposal and ordered implementation of this policy— an effort
to hold a desirable line.

However, as later development

showed, this "line" had not been drawn explicitly.
A Request for Congressional Sanction
In order to implement the policy of drawing a line
and holding it, it was necessary to serve a clear warning
to the

Chinese Communists.

The policy might have run the

risk of war but not necessarily
idea of Secretary Dulles.

so.

Herein lay a favored

In a speech delivered before the

American Legion Convention at St. Louis on September 2,
1953, Dulles said:
The Korea War began in a way in which wars
often begin— a potential aggressor miscalculated.
From that we learn a lesson which we expect to
apply in the interests of future peace.
The lesson is this:
If events are likely
which will in fact lead us to fight, let us make
clear our intention in advance, then we shall
probably not have to fight. ^
In the present crisis in the Formosa Strait, Dulles
conceived of issuing the warning in the form of a joint
congressional resolution, authorizing the President to
take whatever military measures became necessary to defend
Formosa.

In this connection, the Mutual Defense Treaty

12P .S .B ., XXIX, No. 742

(September 14, 1953), p. 339.
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signed with Nationalist China on December 2, 1954, obviously
could not meet the exigencies of the present situation.

In

the first place, the Senate had not yet ratified the
treaty. 13

In the second place, while the treaty area was

confined to the American defense of Formosa and the Pesca
dores only, the Administration intended to assist the
Nationalists in evacuating their forces from the Tachens
and to help defend Quemoy and Matsu.
A Presidential request for congressional sanction
in advance to employ American forces was an "unprecedented"
move in the American history in peacetime.

14

difficult undertaking by its very nature.

It was a

What appeared to

be more difficult was that a Republican President had to
deal with a Democratic-controlled Congress.

In order to

ensure bipartisan support of the President’s projected
request, Secretary Dulles, experienced in handling party
politicians, 15 engaged in a series of consultations with
13

The President sent the treaty to the Senate for
ratification on January 6 , 1955.
14

Sherman Adams, Firsthand Report
& Row, 1961), p. 129.
15

(New York:

Harper

John Dulles served for a short time as Senator from
New York, an appointee of Governor Thomas Dewey to fill the
unexpired term of Senator Robert F. Wagner, Sr.
Dulles
demonstrated his skill in dealing with congressional poli
ticians during his assignment of negotiating a peace treaty
with Japan and facilitating its ratification by the Senate.
See Bernard C. Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign
Policy:
The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement (Prince
ton:
Princeton University Press, 1957).
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Democratic and Republican congressional leaders, particularly
foreign policy l e a d e r s . ^
Initial Congressional Response
Senator Walter George, Democrat from Georgia and
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was
highly pleased with D u l l e s 1 approach to bipartisanship by
prior consultation before high policy was made.
some other Democrats were not so pleased.

17

But

Senator John

Sparkman, Democrat from Alabama and also a member of the
Foreign Relations Committee, saw no reason for the White
House to seek congressional sanction.

He said that the

President "has all the power in the world" to order the
Seventh Fleet into action.

18

Senator Mike Mansfield of

Montana, another Democratic member of the Foreign Relations
Committee, also said that the President could act without
congressional authorization but that he apparently wanted
"political protection."

He recalled that former President

Truman was bitterly criticized for his decision to send
American troops into Korea without prior consultations with
Congress.
16

New York Times, January 21, 1955, p. 1, and see also
Malcolm E. Jewell, Senatorial Politics and Foreign Policy
(Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1962), pp. 129-30.
17
1R

19

New York Times, January 21, 1955, p. 3.
Ibid., p. 2.
I b i d ., p . 3.
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The Republican leaders generally expressed support
for the President’s. intended action.

Yet there were a

few who, as was: the- case with several Democrats, felt that
it was not quite necessary for the President to seek congressional authorization to take actions consistent with the
executive powers- vested: under the Constitution.

Representa

tive Joseph. Martin,, the- House Republican floor leader, said
that in hxs apihiron,. the:President had all the authority
he needed t a appose: a: Communist attack on Formosa with United
States Armed Eo:rce:s~,. "but he wants the support of Congress
so the world' wiil'lL know that, in the defense of that area,
America stand's united '." ^
Eisenhower 1s Message to: Congress
Qn. January 274 , the President’s Message was transmitted to Congress.

222

In it, he said that Formosa and the

Pescadores "should:, remain in friendly hands," because "in
unfriendly hand's" they "would seriously dislocate the
existing, even' ifr unstable, balance of moral, economic
and military farces: upon which the peace of the Pacific
depends.*"

He recounted'a series of "provocative" political

and military actions. hy_ the Chinese Communists "establishing
2.0
32bxd.,,.. January 23, 1955, p. 1.

^ R e p u b l i e an -Senate leader Knowland had urged the
President to deliver the message in person, but Eisenhower
decided n o t to: present.it in that fashion in order to avoid
any implicatfions- that.it was a "war message." Arthur Krock
in New York Times, January 25, 1955, p. 24.
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a pattern of aggressive purpose . . . the conquest of
Formosa."

The President noted that the Communists had

climaxed their military action with the recent conquest of
Yikiang Island, and said that the situation "poses a
serious danger."

22

Under the circumstances, Eisenhower proposed two
courses of action.

The first was a call to the United

Nations to take proper steps to deal with the situation
in the Formosa area.

He said:

We believe that the situation is one for
appropriate action of the United Nations under its
charter, for the purpose of ending the present
hostilities in that area. We would welcome assump
tion of such jurisdiction of that body.
The President pointed out, "The critical situation
has been created by the choice of the Chinese Communists,
not by us.

Just as they created the situation, so they can

end it if they so choose."
The second was an appeal to Congress for support
and special authorization of power.

The President urged

that it was necessary for "the Congress to participate now,
by specific resolution . . .
peace."

to improve the prospects for

He continued:
I do not suggest that the United States enlarge
its defensive commitments beyond Formosa and the
Pescadores . . . But unhappily, the danger of armed
attack directed against that area compels us to
take into account closely related localities and
actions, which, under the current conditions,

^ T e x t of the P r e s i d e n t s Message in New York Times,
January 25, 1955, p. 3. The quotations that follow are also
from the Message; therefore, no additional footnotes are used
until the end.
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might determine the failure or the success of
such an attack.
The President emphasized that the authority thus
requested from Congress "would be used only in situations
which are recognizable as parts of, or definite preliminaries
to, an attack against the main positions of Formosa and
the Pescadores."

In asking for a congressional resolution,

the President explained that "the authority for some of
the actions" required "would be inherent in the authority
of the Commander-in-Chief," but he urged Congress to "make
clear the unified and serious intentions" of the United
States.
In sum, the President believed that a congressional
resolution would reduce the possibility of the Chinese Reds
"misjudging our firm purpose and national unity" to the
extent of precipitating "a major crisis."

While stressing

his desire for peace, President Eisenhower declared,

"The

United States must remove any doubt regarding our readiness
to fight, if necessary . . . ."^
Formosa Resolution Presented to Congress
As soon as congressional clerks finished reading the
P r e s i d e n t s Message in both Houses, identical resolutions
carrying the Presidential wishes were presented.

As a

matter of fact, the resolution was drafted by the Administra”
tion and approved by key leaders of both parties, including
23

The end of quotations from the P r e s i d e n t s Message.
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Senators George and Knowland.

24

The resolution contained

the following authorization:
The President . . . is authorized to employ
the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems
necessary for the specific purpose of securing and
protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed
attack, this authority to include the securing
and protection of such related positions and terri
tories of that area now in friendly hands . . .
There was no specific line of defense drawn in
the resolution.

In an early draft of the resolution, the

Administration had established a line which the United
States would defend, including Quemoy and Matsu, as Secre
tary Dulles had proposed and the President approved in the
National Security Council meeting on January 20.

However,

after a final conference between Eisenhower and Dulles,
such a specific line was deleted from the resolution in
final form.

26

this decision.

There were at least two good reasons for
For one thing, any line specifically in

cluding the offshore islands, such as Quemoy and Matsu, which
had always been Chinese territory, would have entangled
the United Nations in a jurisdictional squabble in its
effort to secure a cease-fire in respect to the offshore
24

Roberts, "Strong Man from the South," p. 110; and
also New York Times, January 23, 1955, p. 3.
25

Text m New York Times, January 25, 1955, p. 3.
The italics are mine.
These words became the focus of
controversy during the congressional debates.
26
Administration sources confirmed this deletion.
New York Times, February 1, 1955, p. 6 .
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islands.

For another, it would have indicated to the

Chinese Communists that whatever was not specifically pro
tected would become easy prey.
Prompt House Action
On January 24, the same day that the President's
Message was transmitted to Congress, Dulles and Admiral
Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
hearing, Dulles told the reporters:

After the House

"In my opinion, if the

resolution is passed, it will decrease the risk of general
war in that area [the Western Pacific].
it will increase the risk of war."

27

If it is not passed,

Later that day, the

House Foreign Affairs Committee under the Chairmanship of
James Richards, Democrat from South Carolina, unanimously
approved the resolution by a vote of 28 to 0.

In recommending

that the House adopt the measure, the Committee Report
stated that the primary objective of the resolution was to
deter further Chinese Communist aggression, and that it was
impractical to list individual islands to be defended.

As

the present activities of the Chinese Communists toward the
offshore islands were "part of the progressive chipping away
of the free world," the Report stressed, "Failure to act now
. . . offers a risk as great, if not greater, than action."

28

^ I b i d . , January 25, 1955, p. 1.
^ U . S . , Congress, House, Authorizing the President to
Employ the Armed Forces of the United States for Protecting
the Security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and Related Positions
and Territories of that A r e a , H.R.Rept. 4, 84th Cong., 1st
sess., p . 4.
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On January 25, the resolution was therefore placed
on the House floor for debate under a "closed" rule which
limited debate to two hours and did not permit amendment.

29

Speaker Rayburn and his associates in the Democratic hier
archy of the House, including floor leader John McCormack
of Massachusetts, stood in line with the Republican
leadership m

supporting the resolution.

30

McCormack urged bipartisan support for the President
so that "a Republican administration with a Democratic
Congress does not mean a divided nation."

31

Foreign Affairs

Committee Chairman Richards said that the joint congressional
resolution sought by the President was by no means a
declaration of war.

"All we are doing," he stated,

"is

stating clearly and firmly the policy of our Government."

32

Speaker Rayburn, while strongly supporting the President,
agreed with some of his Democratic colleagues that this
resolution "should not be taken as a precedent."

33

After a brief, controlled debate under the "closed"
rule, the House adopted the resolution virtually without
29 U.S. Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates
of the 84th Congress, First session, V. 101, Part I (January 5February 9, 1955), p. 659.
30
New York T i mes, January 26, 1955, p. 2.
31

Congressional Record, V. 101, Part I, p. 659.

32Ibid., p. 664.
33Ibid., p. 672.
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objection that same day by a vote of 409 to 3.

34

The three

dissenting votes were cast by Graham Barden, Democrat of
North Carolina; Eugene Siler, Republican of Kentucky; and
Timothy Sheehan, Republican of Illinois.

In explaining

his vote, Barden said that the debates had been inadequate,
and that what the House had done would permit the President
to take the nation to war without a formal declaration by
Congress.

35

Siler said that he opposed the resolution

because he had promised the mothers among his constituents
that he would not help engage their boys in war on foreign
soil.

36

At the other extreme, Sheehan held that the resolu

tion did not go far enough.

He said that the United States

should draw a line of demarcation against Communist Russia
and declare that any warlike actions on the part of her
satellites would cause Washington to retaliate against
Moscow.

37

Senate Committee Actions
In the Senate, a joint session of the Foreign Rela
tions and Armed Services Committees heard Secretary Dulles
34 At the beginning of the first session of the 84th
Congress, the Democrats controlled the House by a margin of
231 to 203, with one seat vacant due to the death of a mem
ber.
Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1955), XI (1955), p. 16.
35 New York Times, January 26, 1955, p. 2.
36Ibid.
37Ibid.
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testify on January 24.

Senator George, who acted as the

Chairman of the joint session, issued a summary of what had
happened during the hearing.

"The Secretary warned,"

Senator George said, "it might not be possible to hold
Formosa and the Pescadores if we sit idly by while all the
other Nationalist islands are taken; although neither would
it be necessary to defend all of these islands . . . ."

38

Despite the sense of urgency with which Secretary
Dulles appealed to the members of the two Committees, many
Democrats were not convinced.

They had misgivings, but

most of them chose to express them in private.
Mansfield was one of the few who spoke out.

Senator

He said, "The

Senate is confronted with a highly unusual resolution with
the implication that immediate action is essential.

If

there is an impending crisis why did not the President come
in person to present the facts to Congress?
foreign relations do not arise overnight."

39

Crises in
He held,

"Congress has the high sworn obligation to examine this
resolution as it would any similar resolution— that is, in
an independent light." 40

While most Republicans voiced

approval of the President's proposal, some among them
joined Mansfield in urging close congressional examination
before acting.
oo

Ibid., January 25, 19 55, p. 3.

39Ibid.
^9Ibid .
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Attempts at Amending
The next day> January 25, the Senate Foreign Relations
and Armed Services Committees, again sitting jointly, con
ducted a long interrogation in secret session of all members
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

When asked if the Joint Chiefs

were unanimous in support of the President's Formosa policy,
Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, reportedly
answered in the affirmative.

However, General Ridgway,

Army Chief, stated in effect that he was not consulted"
during a recent discussion of the Formosa problem among the
Joint Chiefs. 41

Radford told the Committees that he did not

rule out the possibility of striking against the Chinese
mainland or in defense of the offshore islands but he felt
that this would entail the use of air and sea power.

Ridgway

held that such moves would eventually lead to the use of
ground forces, which had been overextended in America's
worldwide commitment.

42

As a result of the testimony, some

Senators feared that the consequences of granting vast yet
undefined power to the President would result in a war of
unlimited scale.

Ironically, the remarks of the Joint Chiefs

helped generate a movement aimed at amending the Presidential
request.
41 Ridgway was out of Washington at the time but a
deputy participated in the discussion.
Later, the General
claimed that his deputy was not authorized to speak on his
behalf.
"General Wasn't Consulted— Ridgway versus Radford at
Hush Hearing," Washington Daily N e w s , January 27, 19 55.
Re
printed in the Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1, pp. 844-45.
^ Ibi d ., p. 844.
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On January 26, before the joint committee could vote
on the resolution, there were two attempts at limiting the
President's authority to use American armed forces in the
Formosa area, but each was rejected by a.vote of 20 to 8 .
The first to be defeated was an amendment introduced by
Senator Hubert Humphrey, Democrat of Minnesota.

He wanted

to strike out the phrase that would extend the President's
authority in protecting Formosa and the Pescadores "to
include the securing and protection of such related territories of that area now in friendly hands."

43

The second

rejected amendment had been offered by Senator Estes Kefauver,
Democrat of Tennessee.

His motion, which emphasized the

United Nations as the ultimate and appropriate authority
both to arrange a cease-fire and to settle the status of
Formosa, would have given authority to the President pending
effective United Nations action.

44

Finally, the joint

committee adopted the resolution by a vote of 27 to 2, with
Senators William Danger, Republican of North Dakota, and
Wayne Morse, Independent of Oregon, casting the negative
45
votes.
Initial Senate Floor Debates
When the joint committee passed the resolution without
43

New York Times, January 27, 1955, p. 2; also Con
gressional Record, V. 101, Part 12 (Daily Digest), p. D26.
44

Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 12, p. D26.
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amendment on the morning of January 26, Senator George,
acting as chairman of the two committees, did not intend
to press the Senate for action on the same day, but some
Senators desired to commence debate immediately.

46

While

most recognized the need for firm American commitment to
the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, some Senators
questioned the desirability of extending the President’s
authority to the "related positions and territories,"
pertaining to the offshore islands.

Since American defense

of the offshore islands was contemplated by the language of
the resolution, the possibility of a preventive war appeared
to be in the offing.

There was also concern that the role

of the United Nations was not sufficiently stressed.

The

two abortive attempts at amending the joint resolution in
committee reflected the trend of the opposition.

On the

Senate floor these views were reiterated and there were
renewed attempts at amendment.

The voices of opposition

were few but intensive.
Senator Russell Long, Democrat of Louisiana, held
that if the President were to take full advantage of the
authority in the resolution as presently worded, it could
lead to an all-out war with Red China.
46

He stressed that the

New York T i mes, January 27, 1955, p. 3.
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American people had not been informed of the implications of
this joint resolution by which American commitments "are
being extended far beyond anything any of us have realized
prior to this time."

47

Senator Morse, the most vehement opponent of the
resolution throughout the three-day debate, said,

"One of

the effects of the resolution will be to seal the lips of
the elected representatives with respect to the course of
action the President may take . . . .

What the President is

asking for is a predated authorization of anything he may
do under the resolution."

48

Taking note of the unsettled

status of Formosa, Morse asserted that the responsibility
for protecting Formosa belonged to the United Nations.
Therefore, he maintained that "stronger language and more
specific language than is contained either in the message
or the resolution" should be expressed by Congress.
Senator Kefauver urged,

49

"We must guard against

becoming involved in a large-scale war; not in defense of
Formosa and Pescadores, but in defense of the offshore
islands."

50

. . . .
He saw the need for soliciting allied support of

the American position, and argued,
47

"We cannot convince the

Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1, p. 735.

48Ibid., p. 738.
4 ^Ibid., p. 741.
^8Ibid., p. 763.
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world that the Communist attacks on the offshore islands are
primarily designed in preparation for armed attacks on
Formosa."

51

Expressing a mood of dilemma. Senator Humphrey said,
"The resolution is not one which we are permitted to design;
it is one which we are permitted to accept or reject; and
to reject it would be to undermine the P r e s i d e n t s authority
completely and totally." 52
White House Reassurances
In view of the fact that members of the Senate had
expressed misgivings of various kinds and had created an
atmosphere which was not conducive to prompt passage of the
resolution, the Administration decided to reassure the public
in general and Congress in particular.

On January 27, after

President Eisenhower had a conference with his top civilian
and military advisers, the White House Press Secretary, James
Hagerty, issued a statement saying:
The President made it clear that these United
States forces were designed purely for defensive
purpose and that any decision to use United States
forces other than in immediate self-defense or in
direct defense of Formosa and the Pescadores would
be a decision which he would take and the responsi
bility for which has not been d e l e g a t e d . ^3
51 I
t bid.
52Ibid.,

p. 768.

5 Text in D.S.B., XXXII, No. 815 (February 7, 1955),
213; and New York Times, January 28, 1955, p. 1.
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The purpose of emphasizing the purely defensive role
of the United States forces in the Formosa area was to end
talk on Capitol Hill that the resolution authorizing the
defense of Formosa was in any sense authority to carry on a
preventive war.

It also served notice that American mili

tary forces would not be sent to the Formosa area to help
the Nationalists reconquer the Chinese mainland. ' By stress
ing the President's sole responsibility to decide whether
or not the American forces should be used in other than in
immediate self-defense or in direct defense of Formosa and
the Pescadores, the statement reassured Senators who had
feared that some impetuous American military commanders or
line officers might "pull the trigger."
Senator George 1s Speech
Senator Walter George, after reading the White House
statement, gave an eloquent speech to the Senate, rallying
both the Democrats and Republicans to stand against any
alteration of the text of the resolution.

He said, "I

believe that President Eisenhower is a prudent man.

I

believe what he says, and I am willing to act upon it."

54

He asked, "If the Congress of the United States is willing
to withhold moral support from the President . . . what is
the alternative?" 55

In concluding his speech, George

especially admonished the junior Democrats:
^ Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1, p. 820.
55Ibid., p. 819.
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I hope no Democrat will be heard to say that
because the President . . . came to Congress he is
thereby subject to criticism.
He chose a courageous
course, a course which would be taken only by a
prudent man who knows the pitfalls along the course
and who knows the horrors of w a r . 56
After strong reassurance from the White House and
Senator George*s persuasive speech, efforts in the Senate
to limit the President's authority under the pending joint
resolution weakened.
remained adamant.

Sortie in the Democratic group, however,

v

Senator Herbert Lehman of New York said,

"My alternative is to confine our defense commitment to
Formosa and the Pescadores."

57

He still insisted that

Congress should not give the President authority to "engage
in unspecified and indefinite acts which might even be beyond
his constitutional powers." 58

Senator Morse said that the

White House statement only confirmed that American forces
might be employed in actions "over and beyond the immediate
defense of Formosa and the Pescadores."

Morse proclaimed

that he could not support such possible use of American
59
power.
Senate Dissenters Entrenched
On January 28, Senator George again took the floor
to urge prompt approval of the joint resolution.
~*8Ibid. , p. 821.
57Ibid., p. 826.
58Ibi d .
^8I bid., p. 841.
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that adoption of the measure would have a restraining effect
upon the Chinese Communists. 6 0

As a United Nations effort

to arrange a cease-fire was going to begin soon, he
stressed the need for the Senate to complete the legislation before the United Nations took action.

61

He said,

"At the beginning of that debate there should be a position
of strength, and not vacillation, on the part of the United
States."

62

He also pointed out that while the Communists

were speeding up their military preparedness, the National
ists were holding military planning "in suspension" until
the American attitude was made clear.

63

The objections from Senators Lehman, Morse and Langer
persisted.

Lehman was not satisfied with the White House

statement.

The President, he asserted,

. . . has not reassured me concerning his intentions
with regard to the Quemoy group, the Matsu group,
and the Tachen group. . . . He has not indicated
to me any reason why the blank-check language
should be contained in the resolution.
Nor has he
explained why there should be no reference to the
United Nations in the resolution. 4
Langer warned in simple terms of a possible danger
in the resolution.

As he declared,

60 T V .
Ibid.
61

The Security Council of the United Nations was
scheduled on January 31 to debate the Chinese coastal
islands situation.
62

Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1, p. 929.

63T,. ,
I bid.
^ I b i d . , p. 926.

105
It is simply a question of whether the Senate,
in advance, is going to authorize our President to
send forces into the mainland of China or whether
it is not.
If the President were to send such
forces into the mainland of China, it would be an
act of war. ■
Morse reiterated the theme of a preventive war,
which, he thought, was implicit in the resolution.

"One

of the most dangerous implications of this resolution," he
asserted,

"is that for the first time in our history we now

enunciate a threat of aggression against a nation not now
at war with u s . " ^

In his final remarks, Morse said:

If it is unity the President wants . . . we
can have unity because we are in complete union on
the proposal that we should defend to the limit
Formosa and the Pescadores.
However, we are not
in agreement that we should defend Quemoy and
Matsu, because we fear that would lead to World
War I I I .67
Some Senators had misgivings but were reluctant to
vote against the resolution.

Mansfield expressed this

view when he said:
Whatever the faults of the joint resolution
in its origin and content, however, I do not see
how it can be rejected . . . An adverse vote at
this time, a failure to uphold the President, can
only be interpreted throughout the world as a
faltering in our resolve, with disastrous consequences
to peace and to the free nations.6**
65Ibid., p. 940.
66Ibid., p. 956.
67Ibid., p. 973.
68Ibid., p. 975.
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Senate Action Completed
Inasmuch as there were a few Senators who persisted
in their opposition to grant the P r e s i d e n t s request without
restriction, the Senate had to take a formal vote on their
attempts at amendment.
First to be defeated, by a vote of 83 to 3, was an
amendment which Langer offered to forbid the sending of
American forces into the Chinese mainland or nearer than
twelve miles from the Chinese coast except to help evacuate
Nationalist forces in that area.

The only Senators who

voted for this limitation were Langer, Morse, and Lehman.

69

The Senate also rejected, by a vote of 75 to 11, a
substitute resolution proposed by Kefauver to declare it
to be the sense of Congress that the President had authority
to employ armed forces to defend Formosa and the Pescadores,
pending effective action by the United Nations.

This was

the measure which had been voted down in the Foreign Relations
Committee.

After the defeat of his motion, Kefauver declared

that he would vote for the joint resolution despite the
misgivings he had expressed. 70
The Senate then defeated, by a vote of 74 to 13, a
third amendment, which Humphrey originally proposed but
which Lehman took over after the Minnesota Senator decided
69

Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 12 (Daily Digest),
p. D31; and New York Times, January 29, 1955, p. 3.
70

Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1, p. 991.
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not to press it.

The Lehman amendment would have eliminated

a phrase in the joint resolution authorizing protection of
related positions and territories in the Formosa area.
Humphrey, while voting for this amendment, declared his
intention of supporting the joint resolution in advance.
He said,

"Even though the amendments which I hope will be

accepted should be defeated, I would still feel that I owed
the obligation to the Chief Executive, in view of his commitm e n t s , to go along with him." 71
Finally, the Senate, on January 28, adopted the joint
resolution without alteration, and by an almost unanimous
vote of 85 to 3.

72

The only three dissenting votes were

again cast by Lehman, Morse, and Langer. 73
Mission Accomplished
On January 29, President Eisenhower signed the joint
resolution into law.
Law No. 4.

It was officially designated Public

In a brief statement during the ceremony of

signing the congressional resolution, the President spelled
out the essence of the Administration's policy.

He said,

^ Ibid., p. 939 .
72

Senate Democrats initially had a one-vote margin
over Republicans, 48 to 47, with Wayne Morse as an independent,
at the first session of the 84th Congress.
The margin was
increased to two when Morse announced on February 17, 1955,
that he had joined the Democrats.
Congressional Quarterly
Almanac, XI (1955), p. 16.
73

Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 12, p. D31;
and New York Times, January 29, 1955, p. 1.
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"We are ready to support a United Nations effort to end
the present hostilities in the area.

We are also united

in our determination to defend an area vital to the
security of the United States and the free world."

74

The

Congressional approval of the Formosa Resolution clearly
indicated to the Chinese Reds that the United States was
prepared for the best or the worst— peace or war.
The President expressed his gratification at the
"almost unanimous vote" in both houses of Congress in
passing the desired resolution.

As a matter of fact, it

was the result of no small effort on the part of the Adminis
tration.

Prior consultation with both Democratic and

Republican leaders in Congress had won bipartisan support
in principle before the P r e s i d e n t s request was formally
delivered.

Close watchfulness of the mood of Congress and

timely reassurance from the White House further consolidated
the Administration's position.

The President's Message

itself was a double manoeuvre.

On the one hand, the pro

nouncement of American determination to stand fast and
prepare to fight if necessary suited the tastes of rightwing Republicans.

On the other hand, Democrats could lean

on the appeal to the United Nations for action which would
lead to a cease-fire and peace.
74

President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1955, p. 215.
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The interplay of these factors during an international
crisis quite effectively muffled the usual divisiveness in
Congress.

Nevertheless, the voice of dissent, though

feeble, could still be heard distinctly.

Although it was

not disputed that Formosa should remain in friendly hands
with American commitments for its defense, there was no
consensus as to the wisdom of possible American defense of
the offshore islands.

Many a congressman was reluctant to

do anything which might increase the risk of war with the
Chinese Communists.
Mutual Defense Treaty in the Spotlight
After the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed with the
Chinese Nationalist Government on December 2, 1954,
President Eisenhower on January 6 , 1955, transmitted the
treaty to the new Democratic-controlled Senate for ratifi
cation.

In the message of transmittal, the President had

said that the document was "defensive" in purpose and was
designed to "deter any attempt by the Chinese Communist
regime to bring its aggressive military ambitions to bear
against the treaty area." 75

He explained that the treaty

reinforced "the system of collective security in the Pacific
area" when taken in conjunction with similar treaties al
ready concluded with Japan, Korea, the Philippines, Australia,
and New Zealand.

76

75 President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1955, p. 31.
76Ibid.
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Further, the President stressed in his January 24
Message to Congress that the Formosa Resolution was no
substitute for the Mutual Defense Treaty.

He said, "Present

circumstances make it more than ever^important that this
basic agreement should be brought into force, as a solemn
evidence of our determination to stand fast in the agreed
treaty area."

77

Background for Bipartisan Support
Behind the official actions, the Eisenhower Adminis
tration, in fact, had made calculated moves to ensure that a
mutual defense treaty with Nationalist China would meet
with a minimum of resistance in the Senate.

On October 19,

1954, when the treaty was being negotiated and before the
mid-term congressional elections, the Administration sent
Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs,
to see Senator George at his home in Vienna, Georgia.

At

that meeting, Robertson informed the Senator, a senior
ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
of the Administration's intention to sign a mutual defense
treaty with the Nationalist Government, and secured George's
promise of support in advance.

78

77Ibid., p. 2 11.
7 8James Reston, "Democrats and the Islands," New
York Times, April 5, 1955, p. 4.
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After Congress reorganized in January 1955 with the
Democrats in control, Senator George, to the satisfaction of
the Eisenhower Administration, assumed the chairmanship of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,

79

He came to be an

adamant supporter of the bipartisan approach to American
foreign policy as urged by President Eisenhower in the
State of the Union Message to the Congress on January 6 ,
1955.

80

With the immense influence as a senior Democratic

leader in Congress and Chairman of the powerful Foreign
Affairs Committee, George was destined to exert his influence
in supporting the Administration's foreign policy.

81

After

79 When the new Congress convened, Senator George was
the ranking member of both the Senate Finance Committee and
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
He could be chair
man of either Committee.
Partly because of his primary
interest in foreign policy and partly because of promptings
from the President, the Senator chose the Foreign Relations
Committee.
Roscoe Drummond, "Preeminent Senator of 1955,"
New York Herald Tribune, May 1, 1955.
Reprinted in the
Congressional Record, V. 101 (Appendix), p. A1426.
80

Foreign Affairs portion of the Message in American
Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, I, p. 104.
81

Roscoe Drummond reported that it was indisputable
among the press corps in Washington that Senator George "is
the second most powerful and most influential man in Washing
ton— second only to the President himself." Drummond's
article reprinted in Congressional Record, V. 101 (Appendix),
p. A1426.
A New York Times correspondent described Senator
as "not merely a partner in bipartisanship but its ambulant
embodiment."
New York Times Magazine, March 13, 1955, p. 12.
Another news watcher observed, "His [George's] is the strong
est foreign-affairs voice Capitol Hill has heard since the
passing of Michigan's Arthur Vandenburg."
Martin S. Hayden,
"Senator George Is Most Powerful Single Solon," North America
Alliance release dated February 27, 1955.
Reprinted in the
Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 4, pp. 5355-56.
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the passage of the Formosa Resolution, the next task for
George was to secure ratification of the Mutual Defense
Treaty with Nationalist China.
A Disturbing Source:

C o h e n fs Memorandum

Although the Mutual Defense Treaty with Nationalist
China, signed on December 2, 1954, was not the first of its
kind which the United States had concluded with friendly
nations in the Pacific, some Democrats viewed it in a
different light.

On January 11, 19 55, the Democratic

National Committee began to circulate among Senate Democrats a private memorandum

82

on the subject prepared by

Benjamin Cohen, once a prominent member of President Franklin
R o o s e v e l t s "braintrust" and a legal counselor of the State
Department under the Truman Administration.

Cohen contended

that ratification of the treaty would constitute for the
first time formal recognization of Nationalist China’s claim
to Formosa and the Pescadores, a step which the United
States had been careful to avoid thus far.

"What we recog

nize as territories of Chiang's China," he said, "other
countries, including our allies which recognize M a o ’s China,
may feel compelled to recognize as territories of Mao's
China."

83

Therefore, an attack on Formosa by the Chinese

02

Reprinted in Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1,
pp. 1396-97.
^^I bid., p. 1396.
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Communists would not, as Cohen expressed it, be "international
aggression on their part but civil war in which the right
and purpose of other nations forcibly to intervene would be
open to serious doubt."

84

Although the memorandum did not question the vital
importance to the United States of having these islands
remain in friendly hands or the policy of defending them
from unprovoked Communist attack, Cohen doubted the wisdom
of the treaty on still further grounds.

He observed,

"It is

not at all clear that' any attempt by the Republic of China
to extend its effective control and jurisdiction from For
mosa to the mainland of China would be contrary to article I
of the mutual defense treaty.

..."

85

Another basic point

of objection, according to Cohen, was that the treaty area
could be extended to other territories than Formosa and the
Pescadores by "mutual agreement."

He asserted, "The provi

sion is a dangerous and unprecedented delegation of the
treaty-ratifying power of the Senate."

86

While the Democratic leaders in the Senate, including
Walter George, were not pleased with the circulation of the
memorandum by the Democratic National Committee without their
prior knowledge and consent, many a Democrat took it as a
84t,
.
Ibid.
85Ibid., p. 1397.
86T4
..
I bid.
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guide in studying the implications of the treaty.

87

When

Secretary Dulles testified before the Senate Foreign Rela
tions Committee on February 7, he explained the treaty pro
visions in deta i l , as well as a significant-restraint put
on the Chinese Nationalist Government by virtue of his sub
sequent exchange of letters with the Nationalist Foreign
Minister.

Nevertheless, some Senators still entertained

doubts along the line suggested in the Cohen memorandum.
Senate Committee "Understandings"
In the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Morse
wanted to put into the treaty a reservation which would
have deleted the provision that the territory covered by
the document could be expanded by mutual agreement.

88

Senator Humphrey proposed a similar but less fundamental
reservation by attaching to the resolution of ratification
an understanding that the "mutual agreement" with regard to
the extension of the treaty area should be construed as
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate.

89

Whatever

form the reservations took, they indicated a desire to put
in plain English that American commitment under the treaty
87

Reston,

"Democrats and the Island."

88 Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 12 (Daily
Digest}/ p. D54, and New York T i m e s , February 9, 1955, p. 1.
89

To alter the text of a treaty by deleting or
adding a language would require renegotiation of the treaty;
to introduce language of an explanatory nature in the
resolution of ratification would not.
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would be limited to the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores
and nothing else.

It was exactly the same thing attempted

in the debates on the Formosa Resolution.
On February 8 , the Foreign Relations Committee de
feated the Morse reservation by a vote of 11 to 2, and
Humphrey1s compromise reservation by a vote of 9 to 5.

In

view of the element of dissatisfaction with some provisions
of the treaty, the Committee majority under the chairman
ship of Senator George sought to placate the opposition
after rejecting their proposals.

The Committee drafted

three "understandings," in the spirit of the Cohen memoran
dum, but none of which was to be in either the treaty text
or the Senate resolution of ratification.

These "under

standings," to be incorporated into the Committee report of
the treaty to the Senate, stated:
1)

2)

3)

That the obligations of the parties . . . apply
only in the event of external armed attack; and
that military operations by either party from
the territories held by the Republic of China
shall not be undertaken except by joint agree
ment.
That the 1mutual agreement* referred to . . .
shall be construed as requiring the advice and
consent of the Senate of the United States.
That nothing in the treaty shall be construed
as affecting or modifying the legal status or
sovereignty of the territories to which it
applies.

90 U.S., Congress, Senate Executive Report No. 2 ,
84th Cong., 1st sess.
Reprinted in American Foreign Policy,
1950-1955, I, pp. 961-63.
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Senator George made it known that this arrangement
was agreeable to Secretary Dulles as well as to the majority
of the Committee.

The proponents took the view that while

not legally binding on the Administration, the "under
standings" would have a morally binding force as an expression
of fixed Senate attitude.

91

After the "understandings" were

accepted, the Committee approved the treaty by a vote of
11 to 2, with Senators Morse and Langer casting the negative
votes.
Legal Point of Opposition
The next day, February 9, the treaty was placed
before the Senate for ratification.

Senator George first

took the floor to explain the difference between the Formosa
Resolution and the Mutual Defense Treaty, urging prompt
action by the upper house.

He said, "The essential dif

ference is that by treaty the United States undertakes an
international obligation, whereas by Public Law No. 4
[Formosa Resolution]
tary."

92

our action was unilateral and volun-

It was precisely the solemn international obliga

tion in the treaty that triggered a legal argument.

What

was at issue was whether or not the Chinese Nationalist
Government could sign a treaty relative to territories over
which the sovereignty was unsettled.
91New York Times, January 9, 1955, p. 1.
92

Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1, p. 1381.
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Secretary Dulles had acknowledged publicly on the
occasion of the signing of the Mutual Defense Treaty with
Nationalist China that "technical sovereignty" over Formosa
and the Pescadores had never been settled.

93

With this in

mind, Senator Morse, speaking against ratification, said
that the document was hardly a treaty; rather, it was a
military alliance with a faction in the Chinese civil war.

94

Senator Lehman then observed that the three "understandings"
in the Committee Report declaring that the treaty neither
intended to determine the status of Formosa nor to envisage
American assistance in offensive military actions by the
Nationalists were inadequate.

These "understandings," he

said, lacked the force of law and merely expressed the interpretation of the Foreign Relations Committee. 95

Senator

Kefauver added that "I do not see how this treaty accomplishes
anything not accomplished by the joint resolution we have
already passed, and it has many foggy,
cations."

96

He maintained,

if not evil, impli-

'
"If we limit our position to

the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores, without a treaty,
then we have a sound right . . . to call upon all our allies
for their help in the event of war."
93
94

97

Supra, Chapter III, footnote No. 62.
Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 1, p. 1398.

95Ibid., p. 1406.
9®Ibid./ p. 1413.
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Ratification of the Treaty
Subsequently, Senator Morse renewed his effort to
modify the treaty in spite of the fact that such attempts
had failed in the Foreign Relations Committee.

The Senator

proposed two amendments and two reservations on the Senate
floor.

The first amendment, rejected 57 to 11, would have

added a sentence to the effect that the treaty did not affect
or modify the legal status or sovereignty of Formosa and the
Pescadores.

The second amendment, defeated 60 to 10, was

to eliminate the sentence which provided that the treaty
area might be extended by mutual agreement.

Two reserva-

98
tions of the same intent were rejected by voice vote.
i
Senator Morse undauntedly tried to carry his viewpoints
but the odds were against him.
Although the few voices of opposition were negligible,
their arguments that the Chinese Nationalist Government
lacked the sovereign power to sign a treaty and that the
three "understandings" to be read with the treaty were
extra-legal were never dealt with squarely.

One observer

commented that the Administration probably knew that they
already had the votes.

99

Indeed, the votes were over

whelmingly in favor of the treaty.

After defeating the

amendments and reservations proposed by Senator Morse, the
98I b i d ., p. 1415.
99

Years

Richard H. Rovere, Affairs of State;
The Eisenhower
(New York:
Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1956), p. 254.
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Senate on the same day, February 9, ratified the treaty by a
vote of 65 to 6 at the end of one day's debate.
U.S. in a Position of Strength
With the passage of the Formosa Resolution and the
ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Nationalist
China, the United States had built up a position of strength
ready to deal with any move by the Chinese Reds in the.
Formosa area even though the line of defense was not
specifically drawn due to strategic and political reasons.
While there was no doubt of American determination to stand
firm in the area, the Administration deliberately kept its
attitude vague toward the offshore islands.

In this sense,

it continued the policy of keeping the enemy guessing while
retaining maximum flexibility.

CHAPTER V
CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS AND POWER ALIGNMENTS
Cease-Fire Efforts Renewed
As previously mentioned in Chapter I I I , Secretary
Dulles had' contacted the British and other allies behind
the scenes in an attempt to promote a United Nations cease
fire in the Formosa Strait in the autumn of 1954.

This

attempt for a cease-fire was given up when Assistant Secre
tary of State Robertson was unable to persuade the National
ist Government to accept it.• Yet when tension flared to a
new height due to the assault and capture of Yikiang Island
by the Chinese Communists in January 1955, the United States
revived the cease-fire plan without regard to Nationalist
feelings.

As soon as President Eisenhower publicly

announced his willingness to see the United Nations attempt
to improve the situation in the Formosa area, both the
British and New Zealand Governments welcomed the move.

Sir

Leslie Munro, chief delegate of New Zealand to the United
Nations, declared that his Government would take the initia
tive to bring the matter to the United Nations.^

~hsTew York Times, January 20, 1955, p. 1.
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Prospect Unpromising
The Chinese Communists, as well as the Nationalists,
strongly disapproved of United Nations action in the Formosa
Strait.

On January 24, the same date that President

Eisenhower’s Message embodying an appeal to the United
Nations was sent to Congress, Chou En-lai, the Chinese
Communist Premier and Foreign Minister, issued a statement
that categorically repudiated the idea of a cease-fire.

He

declared:
The Government of the People’s Republic of
China cannot agree to a so-called cease-fire with
the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek clique repudiated
by the Chinese people.
The so-called cease-fire between the People's
Republic of China and the Chiang Kai-shek clique
that the United States Government and its followers
are trying to engineer is in actuality interven
tion in China's internal affairs and alienation
of China's territory.^
Chou quoted Article 2, paragraph 7 of the United
Nations Charter, barring the world organization from inter
vening in "matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state."
clause,

He contended that under this

"neither the United Nations nor any foreign

country has the right to intervene in the Chinese liberation of Taiwan."

3

.
.
.
In quoting that clause, it was interesting

to note that Chou omitted the remaining part which added:
". . . but this principle shall not prejudice the application
o

Text in Ibid. , January 25, 1955, p. 4.

^Ibid.
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of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.”

Though rather

ambiguous, Chapter VII permitted the Security Council to
enforce "action with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace and acts of aggression."

4

New Zealand's Proposal Introduced in the U.N.
Despite the Chinese Communist refusal to consider
a cease-fire, New Zealand asked the Security Council to take
up the question of the offshore islands on January 28.
The New Zealand delegate, Leslie M u n r o , who was currently
5
serving as President of the Security Council,
as a formality
addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council,
calling attention to the fact that:
The occurrence of armed hostilities between
the People's Republic of China and the Republic of
China in the area of certain islands off the coast
of the mainland of China has made it clear that a
situation exists the continuance of which is likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace.®
Munro's letter did not mention Formosa and the
Pescadores, but it showed the clear intention of the Western
powers to ask the United Nations to seek a termination to the
hostilities in the offshore islands.

In. a news conference

on the same day, the New Zealand delegate indirectly replied
4
Text of Article VII, Charter of the United Nations.
5
Council members assumed the Presidency of the
Security Council in rotation according to alphabetical order.
^Text in D . S .B ., XXXII, No. 816
p. 253.

(February 14, 1955),
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to Chou*s argument that the United Nations had no right to
question the situation in the Formosa area.

He said, "We

are approaching the .subject of these islands not on con
siderations of jurisdiction but simply on the consideration
that we desire the fighting to be stopped, and we are of the
opinion that there is no question of Article 2 (7)
jurisdiction clause]."

[domestic

Under the proceedings of the

Security Council, if a party involved in an issue under
discussion in the Council was not a member of the United
N ations, that party would be invited to attend the meeting
to state his case.

Therefore, the Security Council was

expected to invite the Chinese Communists to send a representa
tive to attend the upcoming Council debates, as it had done
in November 1950.
Simultaneous British Effort
The British, fearing that the Chinese Communists
would not attend the Council meetings, asked the Soviet
Government to help persuade Peking to accept the Council's
invitation.

On the same day that the New Zealand delegate

brought the question of the coastal islands to the Security
Council, Sir William Hayter, British Ambassador to Moscow,
visited the Soviet Foreign Minister, Vyacheslay Molotov,
and advised him that the British Charge d*Affaires in Peking
was informing the Chinese Communist Government of New
7
New York Times, January 29, 1955, p. 2.
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Zealand's move in the United Nations.

Hayter told the

Soviet Foreign Minister that the British Government hoped
they would have the cooperation of the Soviet Government
in the Security Council and that, in particular, Russia
would "urge on the Chinese Communists very strongly that
they accept the Security Council invitation to attend the
Council when it is made."

8

The immediate Soviet response was not very cooperative
Molotov extemporaneously remarked that the British Govern
ment "avoided all reference to the real reasons for the
'
9
tension in the area of Taiwan."
He asserted, "these
reasons lie in the gross interference of the United States
in China's internal affairs, in the desire to wrest Taiwan
from China.

Molotov said,

"If the United States ceased

its aggressive actions in the Taiwan area, this would help
to reduce international t e n s i o n . " ^

Furthermore, he indi

cated to the British Ambassador that if Britain did not
support the American "aggressive actions" in the Formosa
area, the United States would not undertake them.
8The Times

Molotov's

(London), January 29, 1955, p. 6 .

9Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VII, No. 4
(March 9, 1955), p. 33.

^ Ibid.
11TV
•T
I bid.
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remarks obviously were no expression of appreciation for
British efforts at conciliation.

12

Soviet Cease-Fire Plan
On January 30, the Soviet Union delivered to the
United Nations a cease-fire plan of its own for the
Formosa area.

The Soviet delegate urged the Security Council

to consider what it called "U.S. acts of aggression against
the Chinese People's Republic in Taiwan and other islands
of China."

13

The accompanying draft resolution accused the

United States of "aggression" and demanded that American
forces be withdrawn from the Formosa area.

The text of the

Soviet draft resolution was similar to the one that was
brought before the Council in November 1950.
The new version differed from that of the previous
mainly in its final paragraph which read:
[The Soviet Union] urges that no military action
should be permitted in the Taiwan area by either
side, so that the evacuation from the islands in
this area of all armed forces not controlled by
^
the People's Republic of China may be facilitated.
12

According to the Soviet version of the MolotovHayter meeting, the British Ambassador told the Soviet
Foreign Minister:
"It would be rather dangerous if the
Chinese [Communist] Government proceeded on the assumption
that the United States will in no circumstances assist their
Nationalist allies in the area of those [offshore] islands."
The warning, however, was not mentioned in a public statement
released by the British Embassy in Moscow.
C f . The Times
(London), January 29, 1955, p. 6 , and Current Digest of the
Soviet P r e s s , VII, No. 4 (March 9, 1955), p. 33.
^■^Text in New York Times, January 31, 1955, p. 3.
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The Russians, in effect, asked the Security Council
to request the Chinese Nationalists to evacuate their troops
from the offshore islands, and to guarantee them safe
conduct.
Meanwhile, in a, formal reply to the British request
for Soviet cooperation in the United Nations, the Soviet
Foreign Ministry issued a statement which put the blame on
the United States for the tension in the Formosa Strait.
"The Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Repub
lics hold," it declared, "that the cause of the situation
that has arisen lies in the fact that the United States,
with the aid of Chiang Kai-shek, several years ago seized
the island of Taiwan and the Penghu

[the Pescadores], which

belongs to China, and several other Chinese islands."

15

U.N. Invitation Issued
On January 31, the Security Council voted nine to
one, with the Soviets opposed, to consider the fighting in
the Chinese coastal islands as "a situation threatening
international peace and security."

In a subsequent vote of

nine to one, with Nationalist China opposed, the Council
invited Peking to take part in the forthcoming Council debates.
T. F. Tsiang, the Nationalist chief delegate to the United
Nations, said that it would be an "insult" to the Chinese
15

Current Digest of the Soviet Press, VII, No. 5
(March 16, 1955), p. 24.

127
people to allow the presence of representatives of Communist
China in the United Nations or elsewhere and that the invita
tion would increase the prestige of the Peking regime in
the Far East."^
The United States voted in favor of inviting the
Chinese Communists to participate in debating the coastal
islands question.

However, Ambassador Lodge made clear

that his vote for the invitation had no bearing upon the
United States opposition to the seating of Red China in
the United Nations, nor did it imply any change in the
17
American refusal to recognize the Communist regime.
The Soviet request, condemning what was termed "acts
of aggression" by the United States against Communist China,
was placed on the agenda as a second item, not to be con
sidered until action of the item concerning the coastal
islands had been concluded.

The vote was ten to one, with

Nationalist China casting the negative vote.

18

Peking 1s Negative Response
As soon as the New Zealand cease-fire move was made
known, the Chinese Communist press vehemently denounced the
effort.

The People's Da ily, in an editorial on January 29,

said:
M V ,

,

New York Times, February 1, 1955, p. 4.
17

Text of Lodge's statement m
(February 14, 1955), p. 253.
18

D .S .B ., XXXII, No. 816

New York Tim e s , February 1, 1955, p. 1.
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There is no cease-fire to discuss. To have a
cease-fire with the Chiang Kai-shek nest of traitors
is to sell out the interests of the Chinese people.
This cease-fire plot contravenes the United
Nations Charter and constitutes an intervention in
China*s internal affairs. ^
On January 31, the P e o p l e ^ Daily added that, "The
proposal of New Zealand is absolutely unacceptable to the
Chinese people.

The Chinese people are determined to

liberate their coastal islands, Taiwan and the Penghu
islands."

20

The formal Communist reply came three days

after the Security Council extended its invitation.

On

February 3, Chou En-lai issued a statement in which he set
forth three conditions to be fulfilled if the United Nations
expected Communist participation in the Council m e etings .
He declared:
The Government of the People's Republic of
China holds that [1] only for the purpose of
discussing the resolution of the Soviet Union and
[2] only when the representative of the Chiang
Kai-shek clique has been driven out from the Security
Council and [3] only when the representative of the
People's Republic of China is to attend in the name
of China, can the People's Republic of China agree
to send a representative to take part in the dis
cussion of the Security Council.
By demanding conditions impossible for the United
Nations to accept, Peking virtually rejected the United Nations
19

Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 977
31, 1955), p. 2.
20

21

(January 29-

Ibid., No. 97 8 (February 1, 1955), pp. 1-2.
Text in New York T i m e s , February 4, 1955, p. 2.
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invitation.

Chou, however, did not rule out the possibility

of international settlement of the problem through other
channels.

In concluding his statement, Chou said:

All genuine international efforts to ease and
to eliminate the tension created by the United
States in this area and in other areas of the Far
East will receive the support of the People's
Republic of China.
The Chinese Communists might have remembered their
experience in participating in the debates of the Security
Council on the question of Formosa in November 1950.

It

was futile for them to expect any gains in that world body
so long as the United States and other Western powers
23
commanded the votes.
On the other hand, Peking had
scored a tremendous success in the 1954 Geneva Conference
leading to the partition of Indochina.

It was highly

probable that what the Communists had in mind was another
Geneva-type conference.
U.N. Action Suspended
The State Department, regretting Communist China's
abrupt rejection of the Security Council invitation, said,
"It is for the Security Council, which is constantly striving
for peace, to consider this rejection.

. . ."

24

Meanwhile,

23

Until the early 1960's when a host of newlyindependent African nations were admitted into the United
Nations, the American Government had nothing to worry
about so far as votes of support were concerned.
24

Text in New York T i mes, February 4, 1955, p. 2.
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the State Department indicated its distaste for another
Geneva-style meeting.

As Henry Suydan, press officer of

the Department, observed,

"I find it difficult to imagine

that anyone who participated in that experience would wish
to repeat it."

25

Confronted with the prohibitive price

demanded by the Chinese Communists, the Security Council
decided without a vote on February 14 to suspend its efforts
to proceed with the New Zealand proposal.

At the same time,

the Council voted down, ten to one, the Soviet motion that
it take the Russian item calling for the ouster of American
and other non-Communist forces from all the Chinese islands.
T a i p e i fs View on a Cease-fire
President Eisenhower's expression of hope in a news
conference on January 19 that the United Nations would look
at the situation in the Formosa Strait was interpreted
in Nationalist China as a cease-fire move by the world
organization itself.

Taipei was unhappy about a cease

fire, but there was no immediate official comment.

On

January 19, China N e w s , an English language daily whose
publisher had close connections with government circles,
said that free China would fight to the very end "against
25Ibid., February 5, 1955, p. 1.
^ T h e debates of the Security Council on the offshore
islands question were summarized in a report in the United
Nations Review under the heading of "China Hostilities, 'Ag
gression* Charge Before Council," I, No. 9 (March 1955),
pp. 1- 6 .
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such a presumptuous idea as a cease-fire" with the Communists.

27

The next day, January 20, China News reported

that "both official and private sources" regarded the idea
of a cease-fire as "inconceivable and arbitrary."

28

The

papers quoted these sources as saying that Nationalist
China would "never recognize an artifically fixed line that
would "even hint at recognition of the status quo created
by the Communist rebellion as it exists today."

29

The

English daily also reported a Nationalist source as saying,
"A cease-fire involves a preliminary step to acceptance of
the two Chinas theory."

"Such an idea," it continued,

"affects our sovereignty and will meet with basic opposi—
,.30
tion.
Although a cease-fire would seem to have been to the
Nationalists*

advantage, considering their weak position

on the offshore islands, their opposition, although less
articulate, was no less intense than that of the Com
munists.

The reason for the Nationalists*

objection must

be viewed in the light of their political ideology.

In

spite of the fact that the Chinese mainland was under Com
munist control, the Nationalist Government considered itself
27

New York Tim e s , January 20, 1955, p. 3.

28

29

Ibid., January 21, 1955, p. 2.
Ibid.

30T, .
Ibid.
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to be the only legal government of China,

Although its

domain consisted only of Formosa, the Pescadores, and some
offshore islands, the Nationalist Government insisted that
it was still "suppressing a rebellion."

31

Following this

line of thinking, the Nationalists naturally opposed any
proposal that would help consolidate in law the actual
existence of two Chinese governments.
On Saturday, January 22, it was publicly known that
the President's Message requesting Congressional sanction
to use American forces in the defense of Formosa was scheduled
to be delivered to Congress on the following Monday.

Nation

alist Foreign Minister George Yeh, after a talk with Assis
tant Secretary Robertson on Saturday morning, encountered
questioning from newsmen who gathered in the State Depart
ment.

He spoke in a dour and impatient manner:

"We feel

that anything which would suggest two Chinas would be
objectionable, period, period, good-by."

32

After President Eisenhower's message went to Congress,
there was no official comment in Taipei.

However, China

N e w s , on January 25, summed up various local reactions in an
editorial declaring that the message had been received there
with "mixed feelings of gratification and disappointment."
31

33

This continues to be the position of the Nationalist
Government up to the present, although it has been softpedalled in recent years. (Personal knowledge of this writer.)
32
33

New York T i mes, January 23, 1955, p. 3.

Henry R. Lieberman, "Silent on U.S. Statement,"
in Ibid., January 26, 1955, p. 6 .
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It was understandable that Eisenhower's message was a source
of gratification because he was asking Congress for advance
sanction to use American forces to defend Formosa and other
related areas.

On the other hand, President Eisenhower,

while making no specific mention of defending the offshore
islands, clearly indicated that he felt American forces
would have to be ready to assist the Nationalist Government
to "redeploy" their forces in some of these islands if the
Taipei Government "should so desire."

34

This reference

was obviously to the Tachen Islands which the Administration
had declared were not vital to the defense of Formosa.

Conse

quently, the Nationalists were also disappointed in the
President's message.
Evacuation of the Tachens and Nanchi
As previously mentioned, American Ambassador Rankin
had given Generalissimo Chiang some encouragement to fortify
the Tachens in 1953 in the wake of American military opinion
in Taipei favoring such a measure.

However, it was decided

at the National Security Council meeting on January 20,
1955, that American forces should assist the Nationalists
to evacuate their forces in the Tachens.

35

Later, Joseph

Alsop, who knew that it was a reversal of the Administra
tion's policy, commented,

"Just two years ago the shoe was

on exactly the other foot."

36

34 President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1955, p. 209.
^ Sup r a , Chapter IV.
^ J o s e p h Alsop, "We Pushed Chiang Into Tachens,"
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After the decision made at that National Security
Council meeting, Washington began trying to persuade Taipei
to evacuate the Tachens.

The Nationalist Government did

not budge until February 5, after the Communists had rejected
the Security Council’s invitation to take part in the dis
cussion of a possible cease-fire.

The Nationalists were

more worried about a cease-fire move initiated by the United
Nations than they were by a retreat from the Tachens,

37

which, by their own estimate, were difficult to defend.

If

a cease-fire were to materialize under the auspices of the
United Nations, it would be an international recognition of
two Chinese governments.

The potential political, moral

and psychological impact of such an undertaking would be
more disastrous than the loss of the Tachens.

It would,

among other things, destroy the Nationalist hope with its
rallying cry, "Return to the mainland!", upon which the
raison d 'etre of the Nationalist Government was mainly
dependent.
The Nationalist Government, having learned that the
Communists also repudiated a two-China concept, acquiesced
in United States pressure and accepted American naval
assistance as of February 6 to evacuate its forces and
civilian population from the Tachens.

During the Tachens

(cont’d)
Washington Post & Times Herald, February
13, 1955.
Reprinted in Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 13
(Appendix), p. A876.
37
t
Rankin, China Assignment, p. ^223.
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evacuation, the United States employed seventy^-five vessels
of several different types, an impressive show of American
military might in the Western Pacific.

Notwithstanding the-.

emphatic Communist warnings that any provocation would lead
to a major conflict, the evacuation was uneventful.

38

Ob 

viously, the Chinese Communists did not intend to precipitate
a direct confrontation with the United States, especially
e

since the Defense Department had indicated that American
forces would defend themselves if attacked during the
evacuation operation.

39

After Washington informed Taipei, on February 22, that
the United States would not help defend Nanchi, an island
group about 150 miles north of Formosa, the Nationalist
Government decided to evacuate the islands and completed
40
the operation without American aid.
With the evacuation
of the Tachens and Nanchi, the Nationalist-held offshore
islands were reduced to Quemoy and Matsu.

However, these

were considered strategically important because they com
manded vessel movement in and out of the Ports of Amoy and
38

An American naval plane was shot down by Communist
coastal gunfire, but the flyer was rescued by American ves
sels.
President Eisenhower treated the incident lightly
during a news conference on February 9, 1955.
President
Eisenhower, Public Papers, 19 5 5 , p. 262.
39

New York Times, February 7, 1955, p. 1. President
Eisenhower personally approved the Defense Department’s
directive to the American forces assigned to the Tachen
evacuation.
Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 469.
40

Rankin, China Assignment, p. 223.
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Fuchow on the mainland.

Thereafter international discussion

af~ the Nationalist offshore islands pertained only to
Quemoy and Matsu.
Nationalists Firm on Quemoy and Matsu
In a statement on February 8 , Generalissimo Chiang
personally criticized the United Nations move toward a
cease-fire and the two-China scheme.

He stated that a

cease-fire would threaten the sovereignty of the Nationalist
Government and contended that it would whet the Communist
appetite for further aggression.

He repudiated the two-

China idea and called it "ridiculous.11

Chiang said,

"I

would like to ask those people holding such a view whether,
if unhappily Soviet Russia should invade their countries and
install Quisling [puppet] regimes on their soil, they would
still be prepared to swallow the reality of having their
countries cut into halves?"
Confucius:

41

He quoted a teaching of

"Do not do unto others what you do not like

done unto yourself."

42

Then Chiang observed,

"This is a

principle of behavior not only between men but also between
countries."

43

The Generalissimo believed that the Communist

occupation of the Chinese mainland was the result of Soviet
intrigue in China over the past forty years and that the
Peking regime was a puppet of Moscow.
_

44

_

New York T i mes, February 11, 1955, p. 3.
42_, .j
Ibid.
43I bid.
44

Chiang Kai-shek*s version of the Communist victory
in China was expressed in detail in his book, Soviet Russia
in China (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1957).
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After the evacuation of the Tachens, Chiang expressed
the Nationalists* determination to hold on to Quemoy and
Matsu at all cost.

In one of his rare press conferences,

on February 13, President Chiang declared, "They
and Matsu]

[Quemoy

constitute parts of the bastion where our people

and government are withstanding the aggression of the' international Communist bloc."

45

He stressed,

would they be abandoned to the enemy." 46

"In no case
Chiang reiterated

Nationalist opposition to the idea of two-Chinas:

"It

goes without saying that the Republic of China can not
renounce the sacred mission of liberating the compatriots
on the mainland."

47

While the Nationalists and the Com

munists were opposing each other on all other counts, they
agreed on at least one thing:

both rejected a cease-fire

arrangement.
Soviet Proposal for an International Conference
As soon as the Chinese Communists had rejected the
invitation of the Security Council to take part in the
discussion of the hostilities in the Formosa Strait, Soviet
Foreign Minister Molotov proposed in a conversation with
British Ambassador Hayter on February 4, that a ten-power
international conference settle the matter.
45

The proposal,

New York Times, February 14, 1955, p. 1.

46t. . ,
Ibid.
47
fibid.
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however, was kept secret until February 12 when Radio Moscow
broadcast its contents.

The Soviet proposal stated that

the unwillingness of the United States and Britain to
consider the "just and lawfully"-made demands of Peking had
rendered it impossible "lawfully and impartially" to discuss
the Formosa Straits problem in the Security Council.

48

Conse

quently, Moscow maintained that it was necessary to act
to reduce tension in the area through other channels.
According to the Soviet proposal, the ten powers
would consist of the United States, Communist China, Britain,
the Soviet Union, France, India, Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan
and Ceylon.

Among them, Britain, India and the Soviet

Union would be the sponsors of the conference.

The Russians

suggested that the conference be held in either Shanghai or
New Delhi.

49

It was interesting to note that the five

Asian nations included were those which already recognized
the Peking regime.

The very composition of the conference

indicated that such a meeting, if it were to be convened,
would be predominantly pro-Communist China.
Britain objected to the fact that the Soviet proposal
would exclude Nationalist participation.

Commenting on the

proposal, the British reply noted, "A conference that did
48

Text m Documents on International Affairs, 1955
(London:
Oxford University Press for the Royal Institute
of International Affairs, 1958), p. 451.
49
Ibid., p . 452.
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not include both of the two parties most directly concerned
could not have a useful result."

50

It further observed,

"The position of the United Nations should not be overlooked." 51

As the Soviet proposal was not addressed to the

United States, Washington made no official comment but
fully agreed with the British position on the matter.

52

British Views on the Offshore Islands
The British Government's attitude toward the hos
tilities in the Formosa Strait became increasingly clear
after President Eisenhower's January 24 message to Congress,
seeking advance congressional authorization to use American
forces in the defense of Formosa and related areas.

This

was in large part due to the fact that the Labour Party was
forcing the Government's hand more than ever.

Dissatisfied

with American policy as indicated in Eisenhower's message to
Congress, the Labour leader, Clement Attlee, on January 2 6
in the House of Commons asked Foreign Secretary Eden to
report on the situation in the Formosa Strait.
Speaking in defense of the American position, Eden
pointed out that President Eisenhower was careful to say that
he did not suggest enlarging the American defensive commit
ment beyond Formosa and the Pescadores.

At the same

^ Ibjd., p. 454.
51T, .,
Ibid.
52

New York Times, February 13, 1955, p. 1.
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time, the Foreign Secretary balanced his statement by
saying:
On the other hand, Her Maj e s t y 1s Government
also understand that in the matter of the coastal
islands the Chinese [Communist] Government cannot be
expected to act in such a way as might seem to
prejudice what they regard as their rights.
The British Government saw a significant difference
between Formosa and the offshore islands and was forced to
spell it out in a subsequent exchange between the Opposi
tion and the Government.

Attlee asserted that "in the

matter of Formosa and the offshore islands" there was an
intervention in the Chinese civil war on the part of the
United States.

Aneuran Bevan, leader of Labour radical

wing, claimed that both Formosa and the offshore islands
belonged to the Peking regime.

Eden replied that he was

surprised to hear the Labourite utterance that Formosa and
the offshore islands should be treated in the same category.
He stated bluntly:
Formosa has never in this century been a part
of China . . . whereas the offshore islands have
always been regarded by us as part of C h ina.54
The Labourites were not satisfied with E d e n fs
statement.

Attlee insisted that although Formosa was seized

by Japan, it was declared during the War to be an integral
part of China, and that Chiang Kai-shek's deposition did not
53

The Times

(London), January 27, 1955, p. 6.
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alter this fact.

Eden, throughout the debate, held fast

to his position that the status of Formosa was not comparable
to that of the offshore islands.

55

Peking likewise did not relish Eden*s distinction
between Formosa and the offshore islands.

The People1s

Daily., in an article on January 29, rebutted the British
Secretary*s statement, saying:
The purpose of Eden *s attempt to represent
Taiwan as not being part of China is to dismember
China and bring into being a so-called "two Chinas"
idea . . . This is a most unfriendly attitude on
their part to the Chinese people.
The Chinese
people absolutely will not tolerate it.^^
Relevance of the Cairo Declaration
Obviously the Labourite claim that Formosa belonged
to China was based on the Cairo Declaration of December
1943 to which the British Government had subscribed.

The

question of the Cairo Declaration, therefore, was addressed
to Prime Minister Winston Churchill, the British signatory
to the Declaration, in the House of Commons on February 1.
Churchill said that the Cairo Declaration "contains merely a
statement of common purpose," and since it was made "a lot
of things have happened." 57
55
56

He concluded,

"The position of

I bid.

Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 977
31, 1955) , p . 12.
57
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New York Times, February 2, 19 55, p. 1; and The
(London), February 2, 1955, p. 8.
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Formosa has become an international one in which a number
of other nations are closely concerned."

58

This was in

harmony with the American viewpoint on the status of Formosa.
The Chinese Communists, unable to tolerate any suggestion
that Formosa was a problem of international concern, im
mediately accused Churchill of a "dishonest repudiation of
the Cairo Declaration." 59
On February 4, the Labourites in the House of
Commons renewed interrogation on the question of Formosa,
particularly its present status.

In a written statement,

Foreign Secretary Eden replied:
The arrangement made with Chiang Kai-shek to
put him there was on a basis of military occupation
pending further arrangement, and did not, of itself,
constitute the territory Chinese.
Formosa and the Pescadore Islands are, there
fore, in the view of Her Majesty's Government, terri
tory the de jure sovereignty over which is uncertain
or undetermined. 0
In this statement, Eden also declared that the offshore
islands presently under the. Nationalist control were an
"undoubted part of the territory of the People's Republic
of China."

But he added:

Any attempt by the Government of the Peo p l e 's
Republic of China, however, to assert its authority
over these islands by force would . . . give rise
to a situation endangering peace and security, which
is properly a matter of international c o n c e r n . ^

^ New York Times, February 3, 1955, p. 6 .
6'0'The Times
61Ibid.

(London), February 8 , 1955, p. 11.
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Thus, it became clear that while the British position
on the status of Formosa was in line with the thinking of
the United States, its professed attitude that the offshore
islands formed part of the territory of Peking went too far
for Washington to accept.

Since the British Government did

not favor the Chinese Communists taking the offshore islands
by force, the logical conclusion was that the Nationalists
should surrender them to the Reds.

This was what the

Labourites asked Foreign Secretary Eden to say explicitly
in the House of Commons on February 7.

Nevertheless, the

Foreign Secretary refused, at least at the moment, to make
utterance on that count.

Eden said, "I think we should do
✓

far better to try to get agreement between all concerned."

62

Eisenhower-Churchill Correspondence
Since the crisis in the Formosa Strait began in
September 1954, the United States had kept its principal
ally, Britain, informed of American policy in that area.

In

addition to formal diplomatic contacts, President Eisenhower
had maintained personal correspondence with British Prime
Minister Churchill.

In a letter to Churchill of February 10,

1955, Eisenhower explained the great psychological and
political significance which the Nationalists attached to the
islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and pointed out that the aban
donment of these outposts would endanger the very existence
^ I b i d . , February 8, 1955, p. 11.
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of the Nationalist regime in Formosa.

Consequently, Eisen

hower believed that "certain assurances with respect to the
offshore islands" would have to be given to Taipei, but
they "must be less binding on us than the terms of the
Chino-American

[sic] treaty." 63

Eisenhower told Churchill

what the Administration would do in the event of a Communist
attack on the offshore islands:
We must make a distinction'— (this a difficult
one)-— between an attack that has only as its objec
tive the capture of an off-shore island and one
that is primarily a preliminary movement to an
all-out attack on Formosa.
Churchill replied, however, that there was "no
decisive relationship" between the offshore islands and the
defense of Formosa, and that the Nationalists' purpose for
holding the offshore islands was "as a bridgehead for an
invasion of Red China."

65

He was inclined to think that

the Chinese Communists would be satisfied to get the off
shore islands and would no longer harbor serious intentions
to attack Formosa.
these points.

Eisenhower could not agree with him on

He wrote again to Churchill on February 19,

explaining all the painstaking efforts made by the Adminis
tration to restrain the Nationalists from offensive military
actions against the Chinese mainland.

Eisenhower told him

that a Nationalist retreat from Quemoy and Matsu would not
^ E i s e n h o w e r , Mandate for Change, p. 471.
6.4Ibid.
T^..65Ibid., p. 472.

145
solve the real problem, which was the Communist determina
tion to conquer Formosa.

In addition to being a futile

attempt at solving the real problem by retreating from
Quemoy and Matsu, Eisenhower said,

"This retreat, and the

coercion we would have to exert to bring it about, would
undermine the morale and the loyalty of the non-Communist
forces on F o r m o s a . " ^
Anglo-American Differences Crystalized
Apparently, Eisenhower could not persuade Churchill
to accept his viewpoints on the offshore islands.

Churchill

made public the attitude of the British Government in a
statement to the House of Commons on February 23.

In that

statement, he said:
There is no question of our being involved
militarily or indeed of our being needed in the
defense of the coastal islands.
We should be careful
of what advice we should offer to our friends and
allies upon it. . . . This is especially true at
a time when the Chinese communists keep stridently
asserting that the islands are to be regarded as a
stepping stone to the seizure of Formosa itself
•.

•

•

While Churchill publicly announced that the British
Government had nothing to do with the offshore islands, he
was careful not to say what advice on that matter he had
given to Eisenhower for the sake o f Anglo-American unity.
Yet through secret diplomacy the British Government urged
^ I bid. , pp. 473-74.
67
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Washington to accept the principle of a Nationalist with
drawal from Quemoy and Matsu.

During the SEATO Council

meeting in Bangkok shortly afterward, British Foreign
Secretary Eden championed this policy in his talks with
go

Secretary Dulles.

The Secretary was instructed to tell

his British counterpart that the United States "did not
intend to blackmail Chiang into an evacuation of Quemoy and
Matsu as long as Chiang deemed their possession vital to
the spirit and morale of the Formosan garrison and population."

69

There was no progress toward Anglo-American policy

coordination on the offshore islands issue.
Sino-Sovie^ Solidarity
While the United States could not see eye to eye
with its major ally, Britain, on the question of the off
shore islands, the Soviet Union had been ^giving the Chinese
Communists unfailing support through diplomacy and propa
ganda.

These manoeuvers were evidenced by the Soviet version

of a cease-fire and the proposed ten-power international
conference for the benefit of Peking.

The avowed Soviet

support was not affected by the power reshuffle in the
Kremlin on February 8 , 19 55.

On the same day that Marshall

Nikolai A. Bulganin became the new Soviet Premier, Foreign
^®Beal, John Foster Dulles, p. 227.
69

Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 475.
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Minister Molotov made a policy statement before the Supreme
Soviet to reiterate the Soviet policy on Formosa.

He

declared:
The position of the Soviet Union in this
question is clear and well known:
we consider the
question of Taiwan is an internal affair of China,
while the aggressive action of the United States and
its threats of war we consider as an aggression
which must be unconditionally condemned by the United
Nations, if it values its authority.
Premier Bulganin, in his first speech to the Supreme Soviet
on February 9, also accused the United States of following
an "aggressive" policy in Asia.

He said, "They are setting

up military blocs, organizing military provocation against
the Chinese People's Republic and intervening in her internal
affairs."

71

Bulganin stressed that Communist China "can

count upon the help of its faithful friend, the great Soviet.
people" and "that help will be forthcoming when needed."

72

The Soviet message of February 14, on the occasion of the
fifth anniversary of the Sino—Soviet Treaty of Friendship
and Mutual Assistance, emphasized that the "inviolable
friendship" between the Soviet and Chinese people was of
"permanent significance today," especially in the Far East.
70
71

New York Tim e s , February 9, 1955, p. 6 .
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72Ibid.
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Meanwhile,

the Chinese Communist leadership played

up the significance of the Soviet support.

Mao Tse-tung,

in one of hi3 rare public appearances, spoke briefly but
emphatically at a reception in the Soviet Embassy on
February 14, held in observance of the Sino-Soviet Treaty.
He declared:
. . . With the great cooperation between China
and the Soviet Union there are no aggressive plans
of imperialism which cannot be smashed.
They will
certainly be thoroughly smashed.
Should the
imperialists start a war of aggression, we, together
with the people of the whole world, will certainly
wipe them out clean from the surface of the globe I ^
On the same occasion, Chou En-lai charged the United
States with "stepping up aggression and war provocation
against the Chinese people in the area of Formosa."

75

Chou's

speech also stressed that the Sino-Soviet alliance would
serve as a deterrent against "aggressive" American action.
The Chinese Communist military high command likewise
harped on Sino-Soviet unity in the event of an "aggressive"
war launched by the United States.

On February 22, Peng

Teh-huai, Communist Defense Minister, in a rally honoring
Soviet Red Army Day at Port Arthur, the joint-controlled
naval base in Manchuria, declared:
74
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If anyone should dare to launch an aggressive
war, our countries will support each other at all
times.
We warn the United States aggressive clique
not to make a miscalculation, otherwise nothina but the
most deplorable and ignominious end awaits it.
By repeatedly stressing Sino-Soviet solidarity to
warn the United States not to attempt an "aggressive war,"
Peking intimated that, if attacked, it would rely upon an
invocation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and
Alliance of February 14, 1950.

Article I of that treaty

provided:
In the event of one of the high contracting
parties being attacked by Japan or states allied
with it, and thus involved into a state of war,
the other high contracting party will immediately
render military and other assistance . . .^
Washington's Appraisal of the Treaty
The treaty provision appeared to be defensive in
purpose, and it was aimed at "Japan or states allied with
it."

During the discussion of the Formosa Resolution, the

Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, and
no doubt the Administration as well, had studied the implica
tions of the Sino-Soviet treaty and the possibility of Red
China enlisting Soviet assistance under the treaty provi
sions.

The Senate joint committee in its report on the

Formosa Resolution to the Senate stated that the United
^ Ibid., No. 993
77

(February 22-23, 1955), p. 6 .

Text in Documents on International Affairs, 19491950, p. 542.
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States was not to take aggressive action, but that the
language of the Sino-Soviet treaty was open to wide interpretation. 78

At the same time, the Administration indicated

to the committee that it doubted very much whether the
terms of the treaty would be invoked "even if further
difficulties should arise between the United States and
Communist China." 79

This conviction of the Administration,

which was probably derived from intelligence studies, was
also expressed in Eisenhower's letter to Churchill of
February 10, 1955.

As the President said, "I do not believe

that even if we became engaged in a serious fight along the
coast of China, Russia would want to intervene with her
.
80
own forces.
A Stalemate
Although the Chinese Nationalist Government was
opposed to inviting the Peking regime to participate in the
Security Council’s discussion of the hostile situation in
the Formosa Strait, the objection was overruled by a
majority of the Council members.

The failure of the Security

Council to deal with the Formosa situation was mainly due to
78
'
U.S., Congress, Senate, Authorizing the President
to Employ Armed Forces of the United States for Protecting
the Security of Formosa, the Pescadores, and Related
Positions and Territories, S. Rept. 14, 84th Cong., 1st
sess., 1955, pp. 7-8.
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the Communist rejection of its invitation to come to the
Council for peaceful discussion.

Britain’s simultaneous

move to solicit the Soviet cooperation in furtherance of a
desirable settlement was also of no avail.

The Soviet Union

took advantage of the disappointing development to propose
a ten-power international conference to take up the off
shore islands question.

Britain and the United States

gave chilly responses to the Soviet proposal because the
proposed conference would exclude the participation of
the Chinese Nationalist Government, which was one of the
two contesting parties in the dispute.

There was no

immediate prospect for a peaceful Solution to the inflammable
situation in the Formosa Strait.
Meanwhile, the Nationalist Government was forced to
withdraw from the Tachens and Nanchi, the far-flung offshore
islands,

in addition to having been restrained from taking

offensive military actions against the Chinese mainland by
the treaty agreements with the United States.

This retreat

from two exposed positions and a de facto cease-fire on the
part of the Nationalists were helpful in the reduction of
causes of conflict with the Communists.

However, the

Nationalist Government avowed no further retreat and was
determined to entrench in the remaining offshore islands
of Quemoy and Matsu.

The British sought to have the

Nationalists withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu, but the United
States would not coerce Taipei to do so.

Therefore, London
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made it known that the British Government would have no
part in an offshore islands war if the United States became
involved in one.

Likewise, Russian rhetoric notwithstanding,

the Eisenhower Administration concluded that the Soviet
military would not come to the aid of the Chinese Reds if
Peking precipitated a direct confrontation with the United
States in the Formosa Strait.
The conciliatory role that the British had tried to
play on the Formosa question led only to vituperation from
Peking.

Whenever the British Government made statements

relating to differences in the legal status of Formosa and
the offshore islands, the Red Chinese regime rewarded her
with instant and vigorous denunciation.

Peking's position

that Formosa and the offshore islands were "China's in
ternal affairs" seemed to preclude reconciliation.

After

much noise and confusion, the situation had reached a
stalemate on the international scene while the power align
ments had become clear.

CHAPTER VI
A WAR OF NERVES
A Broken Promise
Before Congress adopted the Formosa Resolution on
January 28, 1955, Secretary Dulles met with Nationalist
Foreign Minister George Yeh and assured him that President
Eisenhower would issue a statement that would in effect
guarantee the American defense of Quemoy and Matsu as soon
as the Resolution was passed.

However, the President refused

to comply with Dulles’ promise.

Assistant Secretary Robert

son informed Yeh on February 10, 1955, that there had been
"a little misunderstanding between the State Department and
the White House" on the matter.'*'

Yeh produced the minutes

Joseph Alsop, "The Real Quemoy Story," Washington
Post & Times Herald, February 16, 1955, reprinted in the
Congressional Record, Vol. 101, Part 13 (Appendix), p. A946.
This story was subsequently repeated by Marquis Childs, "Un
happy Choices Confront Ike, 11 Washington P o s t , September 1,
1958, p. 16; Joseph Alsop, "Quemoy: We Asked For It," New
York Herald Tribune, September 3, 1958, p. 18; and Christian
Science Monitor, October 9, 1958, p. 1.
In addition,•Karl Rankin, former American Ambassador
to Taipei, had an interesting passage in his book, China
Assignment: "In March, 1956, Secretary Dulles again made a
brief stop in Taipei . . .The Secretary took full and personal
responsibility for misunderstandings that had arisen during
the previous year over the offshore islands.
He was too
generous . . .", p. 253.
Although the manuscripts of John F. Dulles have been
deposited at the Princeton University Library, an important
part of the Dulles collection still has a United States
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of the meeting, a copy of which Dulles had given him, but
to no avail.
Foreign Minister Yeh was most unhappy to receive this
news in his farewell visit to the State Department before
leaving for Taipei on February 11.

When asked by a newsman

whether he had received a pledge of United States military
assistance for Quemoy and Matsu, he replied that Washington
had promised to help the Nationalists defend related posi
tions and territories.

"Did that mean Quemoy and Matsu?"

another reporter queried.

"Of course," Yeh replied, "the

pledge includes all the offshore islands."

2

Yeti's remarks aroused immediate reactions from Demo
crats in Congress.

Senator George said he understood that

the Administration had made no pledge to defend Quemoy and
Matsu.

But he was sympathetic in attitude, taking the view

that Yeh had said what he did for "home consumption" and
that he was trying to "keep up the courage and morale of
the people" on Formosa.

3

Those Democrats who had opposed

(cont'd)
Government security classification and
will not be opened until the original files in the State
Department on this period are made available to the general
public.
Louis L. Gerson, John Foster Dulles, Vol. XVII of
The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy,
edited by Robert H. Ferrell (New York:
Cooper Square Pub
lishers, Inc., 1967), p. 362.
2
New York Times, February 11, 1955, p. 1; Congressional
Record, V. 101, Part 2 (February 10 to March 14, 1955), p. 1463.
3
New York Times, February 12, 1955, p. 3.
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the Formosa Resolution were not as calm in their reactions.
"I should like to know who is lying," Senator Morse said,
"if the Nationalist Chinese have a Foreign Minister in this
country who is issuing such a lie, he should be repudiated
by this Administration."

4

Senator Lehman said that Yeti's

statement "may be prophetic of serious difficulties to
come."

5

Senator Humphrey announced that he intended to

request "a firm declaration of policy from Secretary Dulles
on the question of the offshore islands."^
The State Department was also unhappy about Yeh's
statement and suggested to him that he should clarify his
previous remarks.

TV

So, the next day, February 11, the

Nationalist Foreign Minister denied having used the word
"pledge," and revised his comment on whether the Administra
tion would defend Quemoy and Matsu under the Formosa Resolu
tion.

Yeh said, "I would not eliminate that possibility.

But it is a United States resolution.
States to decide."

8

It is for the United

This incident reflected congressional

sensitivity lest the Administration should commit itself to
4

Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 2, p. 1473.
5
, New York Times, February 12, 1955, p. 3.
6Ibid.
^Ibid., p. 1 .
^I bid., p . 3.
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the specific defense of the offshore islands under the
Formosa Resolution.
American Intentions Clarified
Thus, Secretary Dulles, in his address before the
Foreign Policy Association in New York on February 16, made
a special point of stressing that the United States "has
no commitment and no purpose to defend the coastal positions
as such."

9

However, he did not suggest that the Nationalists

should surrender the islands to the Communists.

He pointed

out that it was the Chinese Communists who had "linked the
coastal positions to the defense of F o r m o s a . D u l l e s
maintained that the United States "shall be alert to subse
quent Chinese Communist actions, rejecting for ourselves
any initiative of warlike d e e d s . " ^
At the same time, Dulles expressed the hope that the
Chinese Communists would forbear using force to achieve
their "goals."

It was the first such expression he had used

since the Chinese Reds rejected the Security Council's
invitation.

He said:

It is hardly to be expected that the Chinese
Communists will renounce their ambitions.
How
ever, might they not renounce their efforts to
realize their goals by force?^-^
9D . S . B ., XXXII, No.
^ I b i d . , p. 330.
i:LIbid.
1 2 x, .j

Ibi d .

818

(February 28, 1955), p. 329.
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In this connection, Dulles held that Communist
rejection of the United Nations invitation uhas not ended
the responsibility of that body."

13

The President sup

ported Dulles on this count by saying that the United
States was on record as seeking "every possible means for
a cease-fire with justice to everybody in that region."

14

Surprised Reactions from Congress
Dulles* address, declaring that the Administration
had no intention to defend the offshore islands "as such,"
likewise caused immediate congressional reactions.

It was

generally interpreted as suggesting that the offshore islands
might be traded for a cease-fire agreement in the light of
his call to the Chinese Communists to renounce the use of
force while not giving up their "ambitions."

Senator

Knowland, surprising no one, warned against a "Far Eastern
Munich" that would give the Red Chinese the Quemoy and
Matsu islands.

15

Unfavorable reactions to the address unexpectedly
came from the Democratic side.

On February 23, James

Richards, Chairman of the House Foreign Relations Com
mittee, accused Dulles of a lack of clarity or candor on
the policy toward Formosa.

14
15

He told the House that Dulles

President Eisenhower, Public' Papers, 1955, pp. 288-89.
New York Times, February 19, 1955, p. 4.
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had led Congress to understand that the United States
"would assuredly defend" the offshore islands of Quemoy
and Matsu.

16

But now, Richards said, "Confusion has re

placed determination among some of our leaders in the
executive branch."

17

He continued,

"The Communist dictators,

instead of being given notice that we would not acquiesce in
any further aggression in the area of Formosa, apparently
are being invited to bargain with us for territory held by
the Nationalist Government of China."

18

The House Demo

cratic floor leader, John McCormack, said that he, too, had.
understood from Dulles that Quemoy and Matsu were going to
19
be defended.
D u l l e s1 Trip to Southeast Asia
Secretary Dulles was not available to answer these
charges at the time, as he was in Bangkok for the first
Council meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO).

On February 23, the opening day of the SEATO

Council meeting, Dulles urged the member nations not to
view their defense problems as isolated situations but on a
broader basis.

He set forth a "three-front" strategy to

cope with Communist aggression.
16

The Secretary declared:

Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 2, p. 1963.

^ I b i d . , p. 1962.
Ibid.
19Ibid., pp. 1963-64.
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Asia is three fronts.
It is unlikely any war
started by Communist China would be confined only
to Formosa or .South Korea.
The forces of these
two fronts exist as a common' part of the forces
deterring possible Communist aggression in South
east Asia. 0
Dulles gave indications that the concentration of
American air and sea forces in the Western Pacific were at
an all-time high since the end of the Pacific War, and
that these forces were prepared to meet any emergency with
great mobility.

It was a warning to the Chinese Communists

that the United States was prepared to meet them on all
fronts, as Peking was prone to probe each front one by one
and then attack the weakest.
After the Bangkok conference, Dulles visited Burma,
Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, and the Philippines before
proceeding to Taipei for the exchange of instruments of
ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Nationalist
China on March 3.

In Taipei, he gave specific warning to

the Chinese Communists not to assume that the American
defense "would be static and confined to Taiwan itself, or
that an aggressor would enjoy immunity with respect to the
area from which he stages his offensive."

21

At the same

/

time, Dulles again expressed the hope that the Chinese
Reds "will not insist on war as an instrument of their
20

New York Times, February 24, 1955, p. 3.

21D.S.B., XXXII, No. 820

(March 14, 1955), p. 421.
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policy."

22

He stressed, however, that "The United States

will not enter any negotiations dealing with the territories
or rights of the Republic of China except in cooperation
with the Republic of China."
Dulles'

23

statement was meant to serve two purposes.

On the one hand, it served notice to the Communists that
the United States would be flexible in the defense of For
mosa, including possible attacks on the Chinese mainland as
well as an all-out defense of Quemoy and Matsu.

On the

other hand, the United States would not use Quemoy and
Matsu to bargain for a cease-fire, thus dispelling any
doubts that might have been generated by his February 16
speech.
The Chinese Communists were attentive to all the
American statements and moves.

In response to Dulles'

Taipei statement. People's D a i l y , in an article on March 5,
said, "It is day-dreaming for Dulles to think that the
24
Chinese people would beg for peace."
The paper declared,
"The Chinese people must liberate Taiwan to protect their
sovereignty and territory . . . This is the firm stand of
the Chinese people."

25

2 2 , .

Ibid.

23

Ibid.

24

Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1001
1955), p. 25.
25T..
1.
Ibid

(March 5-7,
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Serving Warning
The Secretary brought back a gloomy picture from
his two-week tour in Asia.

Despite repeated admonitions to

the Chinese Communists not to engage in further aggression,
Dulles was not sure of the effectiveness of these warnings.
While stopping over in Honolulu on his return trip, the
Secretary told reporters:

"I am still concerned about

intentions of the Chinese•Communists."

26

After arriving in Washington and twice conferring
with the President, Secretary Dulles made a widely pub
licized radio and television address to. the nation on
March 8 , formally announcing a new American strategy for
resisting Communist expansion in Asia.
people:

He told the American

"Everywhere I found ominous evidence of Communist

efforts to terrorize, to beguile, to subvert."

27

In order

to cope with the situation, Dulles held that any aggressive
Communist move should be regarded as an attack on the whole
of Southeast Asia and should be met with a mobile striking
force.

28

He pointed out particularly that American sea and

air forces in the Western Pacific had now been equipped
with "new and powerful weapons of precision, which can
utterly destroy military targets without endangering related
26

New York T i m e s , March 5, 1955, p. 2.

27D.S.B., XXXII, No. 821

(March 21, 1955), p. 459.
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civilian centers,"

29

'
Dulles was referring to tactical

atomic weapons which were then ready for use.
The "Paper Tiger" Image
During his tour of Asia/ Dulles was deeply impressed
by the success with which the Chinese Communists had por
trayed the United States as merely a "paper tiger," one
that would always find reasons to fall back when faced by
brutal and uncompromising power.

The Secretary made a

special effort in his address to point out the fallacy of
this description.

He emphasized, "We must, if occasion

offers, make it clear that we are prepared to stand firm,
and,’ if necessary, meet hostile force with the greater
force that we p o s s e s s . " ^
In the case of Formosa, Dulles said that the question
was not what to defend but how to defend, and that the
President would decide how to implement a flexible plan of
defense.

The Secretary observed that Peking seemed deter

mined to conquer Formosa, and that the response of the
United States to an outright aggressive move "will have
importance both to Formosa and to all the Southeast Asia
and Pacific countries."

31

29I b i d . , pp. 459-60.
30I b i d ., p. 463.
31Ibid.
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The Communist propaganda machine tried to stir up
anti-colonial feelings in the Asian countries by making use
of Dulles* speech.

Radio Peking, quoting the Tientsin

Ta Kung Pao of March 12, said, "By stressing that the United
States would only provide sea and air power, Dulles re
vealed at the same time that the United States was attempting to use Asians to fight Asians."

32

The British Suggestion
On the same day that Dulles made his radio and tele
vision address, British Foreign Secretary Eden also reported
to the

House of Commons on Southeast Asian affairs.

the topic of Formosa, Eden, observing that

On

the Chinese

Communists had refrained from attacking Quemoy and Matsu,
stated:
Her Majesty*s Government trust that it
[the Peking Government] will continue to exercise
this restraint and that . . . while maintaining
intact in all respects its position in regard
to Formosa and the Pescadores it will not prose
cute its claims by forceful means.^3
As to the Chinese Nationalists, Eden asserted that:
We would like to see them withdraw their armed
forces from the other coastal islands.
[Hopefully]
. . . they too, while maintaining their claims,
will not prosecute them by forceful means and will
abstain from all offensive military action. 4
^ New York Times, March 12, 1955, p. 3.
33

The Times

(London), March 9, 1955, p. 6.
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The British Foreign Secretary believed that if these
expectations could be realized, it would be possible to
settle the whole Formosa problem internationally.

35

While

the main features of Eden's proposal were to urge both sides
to renounce the use of force as a means to carry out their
claims, the immediate step to be taken required the
Nationalists to evacuate their forces from the offshore
islands.

It was implicit that after the Nationalist forces

withdrew, the Communists would take over the islands.

Eden

tended to think that by doing so it would clarify the
problem:

Thereafter any communist military actions against

Formosa would be attempts at seizing territory whose legal
status was undetermined.
The Chinese Communists, however, were not in the
least interested in E d e n 1s proposal, which involved the
Nationalist retreat from the offshore islands so as to
facilitate a political settlement.

In rebuffing the British

Foreign Secretary's conciliatory approach, Radio Peking, on
March 11 declared:
The substance of his proposal is to secure
the withdrawal of the United States and traitor
Chiang Kai-shek from China's offshore islands as a
means to legalize the occupation of Taiwan in
definitely by the United States and perpetuate
the military threat against China. 6

3 fi

New York Ti m e s , March 12, 1955, p. 3.
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That the withdrawal of the Nationalist forces from
the offshore islands would be a forward step toward a
peaceful settlement'of the Formosa problem proved to be
wishful thinking on the part of the British.

Peking was not

contented with the withdrawal of the Nationalists from
Quemoy and Matsu.

This confirmed President Eisenhower*s

belief that "what they are really interested in is Formosa,"
as he wrote to Churchill on February 19.

37

The Atomic Deterrent
When Secretary Dulles said in his address of March 8
that American forces in the Western Pacific possessed "new and powerful weapons of precision," he was referring in
veiled terms to atomic weapons.

The matter was clarified

in a White House meeting on March 10.

The President shared

Dulles* view that the Chinese Reds were determined to capture
Formosa and that surrendering Quemoy and Matsu to them
would not be an end to the matter.

Therefore, Dulles said,

"If we defend Quemoy and Matsu, w e * 11 have to use atomic
weapons.

They alone will be effective against the main-

land*s airfields."

38

The President approved a limited use

of atomic weapons if necessary and stated this point publicly.
In his news conference on March 16, President Eisenhower
said that the atomic weapons would be used with "bullet"
37

Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 473.

38Ibid., p. 476.
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precision against military targets in the event of
39
war.
As part of a concerted effort by the Administration
to exploit the deterrent effect of atomic weapons, Vice
President Richard Nixon, in a speech on March 18, stated
bluntly:
It would be insanity and madness for them
[the Communists] to embark upon an additional
aggression in the face of the consequences we
have made clear will follow.40
Nixon did not say whether the Administration would
aid the Nationalists in defending the offshore islands,
but he implied strongly the possibility.

As he said,

Those who suggest we could get peace in
the Pacific by giving up additional territory
to the Communists simply do not know the kind
of animal we are dealing with.4-*Meanwhile, Secretary Dulles stressed the dangerous
characteristics of the Chinese Communists.

He told the

Advertising Club in New York on March 21 that the Chinese
Reds "constitute an acute and imminent threat."

42

He said

that they seemed to be "dizzy with success," and that they
had "a very exaggerated sense of their own power" while they
"gravely underestimate the power and resolution of the
non-Communist world."

43

Dulles maintained that the

^ P r e s i d e n t Eisenhower, Public Papers, 1 955, p. 332.
4
0|
40New
York Times, March 19, 1955, p. 16.
41*Ibid.
42D . S . B ., XXXII, No. 823
43ibid.

(April 4, 1955), p. 551.
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"aggressive fanaticism" of the Chinese leaders "presents
a certain parallel to that of Hitler" and "contrasts with
the past tactics of Soviet communism."

44

The Secretary

concluded that the Chinese Communist tactics "may prove more
dangerous and provocative of war" in the immediate future
than those of the Soviet Union.

45

Behind these declarations of the readiness to use
tactical atomic weapons and the particular danger of the
temperament of the Chinese Communists was a military appraisal
that the period from March 15 to 25 was the time of "great
est danger" during which the Chinese Communists might
launch an all-out attack against Quemoy or Matsu.

46

Playing

up the deterrent effect of atomic weapons was designed to
prevent the Communists from attempting such an adventure.
Peking simply called it a vain attempt at "atomic blackmail."

47

In fact, a reluctance on the part of the Adminis

tration to actually plan to use atomic weapons in the
Formosa area was reflected in the President*s news con
ference on March 23.

He said that the United States would

not use atomic weapons in a "police action," although he
declined to predict how he would characterize a possible
44

I bid.
I bid.

46 .
Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 477.
47

New York Times, March 21, 1955, p. 5.
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fight over Quemoy and Matsu.

He spoke unequivocally against

indiscriminate use of atomic weapons.

The President said,

"I repeat, the concept of atomic war is too horrible for
man to endure and to practice, and he must find some way
out of it."

48

alternative.

A peaceful settlement of disputes was the
The President declared again, "Any just,

reasonable solution of the difficulty in the Formosa Strait
would receive our most earnest and sympathetic considera.,49
tion,
A New Trend in Cease-fire Ideas
The idea of a cease-fire, since its inception on
September 12 at the National Security Council meeting, had,
in fact, always haunted the thinking of the Administration
despite the abortive attempt made by the United Nations.
D u l l e s 1 address to the Foreign Policy Association on
February 16 was the first open American bid.

The Secre

tary's subsequent statements of March 3 and 8 , while stress
ing that the United States stood firm and would use atomic
t

weapons to deal with further Communist aggression, were
mingled with a desire for a cease-fire expressed in varying
terms.
In this respect, Secretary Dulles broke new ground
in his news conference on March 15 when he was asked to
48 President Eisenhower, Public Papers, 195 5 , p. 358.
49

Ibid., p. 362.
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comment on Eden*s assertion that a renunciation of the use
of force did not mean a renunciation of claims.

He said:

Well, if there were a renunciation of the use
of force-, that would meet the immediate require"
ments of the situation and there would be no
necessity that I can see for anybody, either on the
Republic of China*s side or the Communist side, to
renounce what they might call their legal preten
tions , their legal c l a i m s .
During his first visit to Canada as the Secretary
of State, Dulles reiterated this point.

In a news conference

held at Ottawa on March 18, Dulles said that the best way
for the Chinese Communists to avoid misunderstanding of
their aim in the Formosa Strait would be for the Peking
regime to make a clear statement that it would not use
force to achieve its goals.

In this connection, he re

marked that such a renunciation of the use of force would
entail no relinquishment of either Nationalist or Communist
China*s conflicting claims of sovereignty.

51

The Canadian Attitude
A cease-fire of this nature had first been expressed
by the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs,
L. B. Pearson,

in the House of Commons on January 25.

In

answer to parliamentary inquiries as to the cease-fire move
proposed by President Eisenhower in his January 24 message
50D . S . B ., XXXII, No. 822
51

(March 22, 1955), p. 527.

New York T i mes, March 19, 19 55, p. 1.
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to Congress, the Canadian Foreign Secretary told the
House:
My understanding of the basis of a truce or
cease-fire is that neither the Nationalists, which
we recognize, nor the Communists need be asked
to give up their claims on the territory now held
by the other side.
What they would be asked to
give up, of course, is the use of military means
to achieve their aspirations.
On March 24, Secretary Pearson further explained
the Canadian Government’s attitude toward the tension in
the Formosa Strait.

He told the House of Commons that

Canadian neutrality in any major war involving the United
States was impossible.

However, Pearson held that he did

not consider a conflict over Quemoy and Matsu to be one
"requiring any Canadian intervention in support of the
Chinese Nationalist regime." 53

He expressed the fear that

even limited American intervention in the Formosa Strait,
defensive in purpose, might start a chain reaction that
would cause the conflict to spread "even across the ocean."
Thus, the situation became clear:

neither Britain, America's

major ally in Western Europe, nor Canada, America's close
neighbor, would participate in a war over the islands.

52

Reprinted m
Part 1, p. 985.
53

54

the Congressional Record, V. 101,

New York T i m e s , March 25, 1955, p. 1.
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A War Scare
While the Administration played up the deterrent
effects of atomic w e a p o n s , it also endeavored to express
the American desire for a cease-fire to the extent of
advocating the formula that a renunciation of the use of
force did not mean a relinquishment of a claim.

Unfor

tunately, unexpected "war talk" from a high military official
in the Administration blurred the picture.

On March 24,

Admiral Robert Carney, Chief of Naval Operations, at a
luncheon party with Washington correspondents, reportedly
predicted an American war with the Chinese Communists over
Quemoy and Matsu by April 15. 55

Although it was an off-the-

record remark, the story was leaked out on March 25.

Since

the Administration made no secret of its preparedness to
use tactical atomic weapons in the event of a war, it was
not hard to imagine the grim prospect of such a conflict.
Immediately after Carney's alleged prediction of war, the
White House purposely allowed a "news leak" saying that the
President did not believe in any imminent danger of war,
but this could not dispel the effects of a war scare.

56

People

were more inclined to believe the bad news than the good,
as is usually the case.
55

New York T i mes, March 26, 1955, p. 1. Later,
Admiral Carney denied that he had predicted war.
Ibid.,
April 6 , 1955, p. 16.
56
Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 479.
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Following the propagation of Carney's war story, the
right-wing Republicans publicly advocated American commit
ment to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu.

On March 27,

Senator Knowland on the Columbia Broadcasting System's
"Face the Nation" television program said that America's
"active defense" of Quemoy and Matsu would be worth "what
ever was necessary to do the job . . . unless we are prepared
57
to see all of Asia go down the d r a i n .11

On the same day,

Senator Styles Bridges, Chairman of the Senate Republican
Policy Committee, appeared on the "Meet the Press" television
program of the National Broadcasting Company.
personally would hold Quemoy and Matsu.

...

will be done and I certainly am for that."

He said, "I
I think it

58

Talk of a "War Party"
In view of the scare that developed after Carney's
alleged prediction of war, the Administration, hoping to
clear the air, invited the leaders of both parties in the
House and Senate to the White House on March 30 and 31.
However, before the scheduled meetings took place, there
was an open exchange in the Senate between Lyndon Johnson,
the Democratic majority leader, and William Knowland, the
Republican minority leader.
^ New York Times f March 28, 1955, p. 3.
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Senator Johnson, who had been absent during the
debates on the Formosa Resolution due to illness, brought
up the charge of a "war party" in the Senate on March 28.
He told the Senate:
. . . i t would be folly to jeopardize our
future through an irresponsible adventure for
which we have not calculated all the risks.
We
do not want a war party nor do we want an
appeasement party. 9
Jhonson praised the President and Senator George,
saying that neither had joined a war party nor an appease
ment party.

The Senator*s remarks referred to the right-

wing Republicans who were regarded as favoring a preventive
war against the Communists. 6 0
Knowland replied that the three wars in which the
United States had been involved in his lifetime had come
under Democratic Administrations.

He declared that he knew

of no "war party" or "war faction" in the United States.

He

posed a question:
After having taken a firm stand in January by
passing the Formosa Resolution . . . are we to be
placed in position of marching up the hill, as soon
as there are^some dire communist threats, marching
down again in the face of those threats?^1
59

Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 3 , (March 15April 1, 1955), pp. 3784, 3789.
60
For the assertion that there was a war party in the
United States, see D. F. Fleming, "Our Brink-of-War Diplomacy
in the Formosa Strait," Western Political Quarterly, LX, No. 3
(September, 1956), pp. 535-52; and Richard H. Rovere, "Letter
from Washington," New Yorker, April 30, 1955, pp. 103-0 8 .
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Knowland said that all American people "desire our
policy to be not one of peace at any price but peace with
honor."

62

The charge that there was a war party in the

United States did not end with the Johnson-Knowland ex
change.

Senator Kefauver, who had been opposed to any

reference to the offshore islands during the debates on the
Formosa resolution, delivered a violent speech attacking the
Administration over the offshore islands policy on March 30.
He asserted:
That the United States should be plunged into
a war over Matsu and Quemoy ought to be unthinkable.
Yet there are those in high places in the present
Administration who are plotting and planning to
bring such a war about, whatever the risk involved.
President Eisenhower has wisely limited the
final decision as to United States action to
himself.
But the conclusion is inescapable that
the present war party is attempting to create a
situation and an atmosphere in which the President
would have no choice but follow them.
The issue was that the right-wing Republicans led
by Knowland were pressing the President hard to make an
unqualified public declaration that the United States would
defend Quemoy and Matsu while the Democrats sought to
reserve for the President full flexibility in decision
making, should the occasion ultimately arise.

Since a

majority of the Democrats had voted for the Formosa Resolu
tion under the appeal for national unity, they were deprived

63Ibid.,p.

4043.
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of the weapons of opposition at this stage.

Trying to

mitigate the influence exerted by the Knowland group on
the President was the best that the Democrats could do
under the circumstances.

64

Four days later, the Administration made a forceful
rebuttal of the war-party charges through the person of
Vice President Nixon.

Taking the opportunity of speaking

to a convention of the American Association of School
Administrators on April 3, the Vice President: declared:
I know no one in the House or Senate— Democrat
or Republican— no one in the Administration, no
one of our top military leaders, who wants war.
Any one who charges that there is a war party
in the United States is unfortunately beating the
Communist propaganda mill which has been grinding
out this big lie and trying to peddle it around
the world for y e a r s .
Let us advocate vigorously the policies we
think are best designed to avoid war and obtain
peace.
But let us do so without questioning the
motives of those who disagree with us.
We may
disagree on the means but we all agree on the end.
Britain's New Peace Formula
While the charge of a war party in the United States
was making headlines, Britain was seeking a new formula for
peace in the Formosa area.

According to a New York Times

dispatch from London, the British cabinet on March 29 had
64

William S. White in New York Times, March 29,
1955, p. 1.
^ I b i d . , April 4, 1955, p. 1.

176
discussed a guarantee of support for the United States in
Formosa and the Pescadores if and when Chinese Nationalist
forces were withdrawn from the Quemoy and Matsu Islands.
This guarantee would be of temporary duration, aimed at
emphasizing allied unity in opposing Communist aggression
against Formosa.

The British also proposed that during the

period of the guarantee a plebiscite be taken in which
the people on Formosa could make a choice between the
Nationalist and Communist governments.

66

The Chinese Communists would not agree even to dis
cuss such a scheme.
April 7, asserted,

People's D a i l y , in a commentary on
"It is quite clear that all suggestions

of a 'plebiscite* on Taiwan are aimed at building up the
'two Chinas' myth and legalizing the U.S. seizure of Taiwan."

67

"Whatever the United States may resort to," the

paper declared, "the Chinese people will never waver in
their determination to liberate Taiwan."

68

At the same

time, the People's Daily warned the British Government,

"It

would not be hard to see what reaction and consequences
would follow such an interference
scite]." 69

[as an attempted plebi-

The implication was that if the British Government

66

Ibid., March 30, 1955, p. 1. Owing to a labor dis
pute in the newspaper industry, The Times (London) was not
published between March 26 and April 26, 1955.
67
Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1025
10, 1955), pp. 51-52.
68Ibid.
69Ibid.

(April 8-
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pushed the idea of a plebiscite in Formosa, Peking could
conveniently exert pressure against the British Crown colony
of Hong Kong.
At this stage, the Communist attitude toward the
Formosa issue became crystal clear.

They were opposed to

any kind of peaceful settlement that could be conceived of
in a Western mind— no United Nations cease-fire, no twoChina formula, no being bought off with Quemoy and Matsu,
and no plebiscite in Formosa.

The "liberation" of Formosa

appeared to be the only solution that Peking, as it per
sistently clamored, would accept.
Continued Speculation in the United States
President Eisenhower expressed his displeasure at
war talk in his news conference on March 30.

He put the

Administration’s high military leaders on notice that the
cause of peace was not promoted by speculative talk of
war in the Formosa Strait.

He remarked,

"I cannot say that

there will not [be w a r ] , because I d o n ’t know.

But I do

say that if anyone is predicting it [will be] that soon, and
can give me logical reasons for believing it will be that
soon, they have information that I do not have."

70

The

President still refused to say flatly whether or not the
United States would defend Quemoy and'Matsu under any and
all circumstances.
70 President Eisenhower, Public Papers,

1955, p. 373.

178
He expressed the same attitude during the scheduled
luncheon meeting with House leaders of both the Republican
and Democratic parties that day.

House Speaker Rayburn

said he assumed that the United States would be unavoidably
involved in the event of a Communist attack on Quemoy and
Matsu.

The President disagreed with his assumption and

told him, "We have not made that decision and will not make
it until we know the circumstances surrounding any given
attack."

71

President Eisenhower said, "In any event, the

tricky business is to determine whether or not an attack
on Quemoy and Matsu, if made, is truly a local operation
or a preliminary to a major effort against Formosa." 72
The President indicated that if there was a reasonable chance
for the Nationalists themselves to repel invading forces
from the offshore islands, he would not order American
forces to come to their aid. 73
The next day, March 31, the President had another
scheduled luncheon meeting with the Senate party leaders.
He maintained the same attitude toward the defense of
Quemoy and Matsu that he had expressed to the House party
leaders the previous day.

The Senate Democrats did not

intend to query the Administration’s policy on Quemoy and
71

Quoted by Eisenhower in his Mandate for Change,

p . 480 .
72I b i d .
73

Adams, Firsthand Report, pp. 131-32.
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Matsu in the White House meeting despite the fact that
Senate majority leader Johnson had initiated the charge of
a war party.

Johnson had aimed it at the right-wing

Republicans rather than at the President.

As a matter of

fact. Senator Johnson, after a meeting with the Senate Demo
cratic Policy Committee,

issued a statement on March 29,

indicating the Democratic attitude toward the forthcoming
White House meeting.

The statement said in part:,

We do not take the position that we should
usurp or arrogate to ourselves the constitutional
responsibility of the President in foreign policy.
If we cannot agree with the President’s
decision, we will treat him reasonably and not
seek to use any disagreements for partisan pur
poses.
It is our intention not to confront the
President with any demand or any ultimatum;
not to urge that he drop bombs here or use
nuclear weapons there.
This pronouncement clearly indicated that the Demo
crats at that time at least supported the constitutional
theory that foreign affairs were a Presidential rather
than a Congressional prerogative.

After the White House

meeting, Senator Johnson continued to hold the same atti
tude.

He told newsmen:

arrived at.

"No policy decision of any kind was

The Democrats asked for no commitments nor did

the President; and none were made."

75

He said, "The

^ New York Tim e s , March 30, 1955, p. 1.
^ Ibid. , April 1, 1955, p. 4.
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Democrats felt that under his constitutional authority,
the responsibility is the President's."

76

Perhaps it was this conception of constitutional
theory that had prompted the majority of Democrats to
approve the Formosa Resolution and call for national unity
at a time of an international crisis.

They were willing,

even if with misgivings, to leave it to the President to
appraise the situation and make the final decision on
whether or not to intervene in case the Communists launched
an attack on Quemoy and Matsu.

As William S. White, con

gressional correspondent of the New York T i mes, vividly
described it, "the Democrats, in short, seem tied to the
President's Formosa policy with bonds as gossamer as the
moonlight but as effective as steel."

77

A Policy of Flexibility
Since the Chinese Communists rejected the United
Nations Security Council's invitation to talk over the
question of the coastal islands around a conference table,
the Eisenhower Administration had employed a "carrot and
stick" approach with the hope that it might induce the
Communists to agree to a cease-fire arrangement in the For
mosa Strait.

The "carrot" was the promise that a renuncia

tion of the use of force would not mean a renunciation of

77

William S. White in New York Times, April 10,
1955, Sec. IV, p. 7.
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"goals."

This happened to be the attitude first entertained

by Canadian Foreign Secretary Pearson and then advocated
by British Foreign Secretary Eden.

The "stick" was the

threat that a further aggressive move would be met with
atomic reprisal.

While this alternative was not primarily

intended, an unexpected and unwanted prediction of war
undermined whatever chance the Administration had for
securing its objective of a cease-fire.

Furthermore, it

prompted charges of a "war party" and it increased pressure
on President Eisenhower to utter a clear-cut policy on
Quemoy and Matsu.

However, the President adhered to a

flexible policy in the defense of Formosa, with possible
intervention in the event of Communist attacks on Quemoy
and Matsu.

American reaction to a Communist assault on

Quemoy and Matsu hinged on, in his judgment, whether or
not it was a preliminary to an invasion of Formosa and also
whether or not the Nationalists could repel invading
forces.

In this regard, a majority of Democrats in Congress

had shown an abiding trust in the President.

CHAPTER VII
A SURCEASE
Depression in the Senate
President Eisenhower*s public repudiation of the
war prediction and his subsequent meetings with congressional
party leaders served the useful purpose of clarifying the
Administration’s position regarding Quemoy and Matsu.

These

actions, however, could not silence a few Democrats who
had been opposed to the Formosa Resolution since its in
ception.

A handful of dissenting Democrats also renewed

their opposition to American involvement in the defense of
Quemoy and Matsu.

On April 1, Senator Morse, who had

recently announced his affiliation with the Democrats,
introduced a resolution expressing "the sense of Congress"
to the effect that the Formosa Resolution "shall not be
construed to authorize the President to employ any of the
armed forces of the United States in military operations
concerning Matsu and Quemoy."^

He asserted that the United

States had "not a single legal right" to intervene in the
offshore islands for the Chinese Nationalists.

2

Further,

^Congressional Record, V. 101, Part 3, p. 4218.
^Ibid.
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the Morse resolution would call on the President to
request the United Nations to supervise the evacuation of
Nationalist Chinese forces and civilians from Quemoy and
Matsu, which was in effect the same idea advocated by
British Foreign Secretary Eden.

Republican Senator Knowland

immediately denounced the Morse proposal.

He said that such

a resolution, if actually adopted by the Senate, would so
undermine anti-Communist morale "that in a year or two
most of Asia would be passing behind the Iron Curtain."

3

The Morse resolution, co-sponsored by Senators
Lehman, Long, and Humphrey, was referred to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, but it did not stand a chance
of success.

Senator George was strongly opposed to any

attempt to force the President to declare definitely the
American attitude toward Quemoy and Matsu.

Although he

did not voice it on the Senate floor, George told the Press:
"I do not believe it is wise for any group, right or left,
to press the President into a statement or rigidity which
will leave no flexibility."

4

The Senator said that the

Foreign Relations Committee would take up the Morse Proposal
"in due course, but I do not believe the Committee will
5
approve it."
Such was the fate of the Morse resolution.
^Ibid., p. 4284.
4
New York Times, April 3, 1955, p. 1.
^Ibid.
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While Senator George was an ardent supporter of the
Administration's Formosa policy, he had shown a change of
mood since Carney's prediction of imminent war with the
Chinese Communists.

In late March, George told a reporter:

"We are burning daylight.
Far East."

The darkness is coming on in the

The Senator had a strong feeling that the

foreign policy orientation of the Democratic Party should
be directed by the leadership from "the Hill" and not from
elsewhere.

His displeasure at the circulation of the Cohen

memorandum by the Democratic National Committee had forced
the latter to disavow that document.

7

Although George had

been, and was Supporting the Administration's Formosa policy,
his worried expression.to the reporter indicated a somewhat
different frame of m i n d . .
Adlai Stevenson's Viewpoint
It is interesting to note that Adlai Stevenson, the
titular head of the Democratic Party, had been silent since
the debates on the Formosa Resolution.

He had been kept in

the dark by both his party's congressional leaders and the
Administration.

Stevenson had not been consulted by either

party nor had he been given information on the Formosa policy.
He did not like the Administration's policy on Quemoy and
g
James Reston in ibid., March 27, 1955, sec. IV,
p. 10 .
7
James Reston, "Democrats and Islands," ibid.,
April 4, 1955, p. 4.
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Matsu but he refrained from speaking out for an additional
reason,.

Since the congressional leaders of his party had

supported the Administration's policy, his criticizing it
would at the same time be blaming the Democrats who had
supported it.

At the urging of his supporters, however,

Stevenson finally broke his silence.

8

In a radio address from Chicago on April 11,
Stevenson urged the Administration to consult America's
allies promptly and ask them to join the United States in an
open declaration condemning the use of force in the Formosa
Strait and agreeing to stand together against any invasion
until the final status of Formosa could be settled by "in
dependence, neutralization, trusteeship, plebiscite, or
whatever is wisest."

q

He declared that the policy of

"extravagant words" from the Administration had "alarmed
our friends a good deal more than it had deterred the
aggressors.

He questioned how the President could "read

the mind of the enemy within a few hours" of an attack on
the Quemoy and Matsu Islands to determine whether the enemy
planned to go on to the invasion of F o r m o s a . ^

This

o

James Reston, "Stevenson's Dilemma," Ibid.,
April 13, 1955, p. 4.
9Text in ibi d ., April 12, 1955, p. 4.
10 ,
, .
Ibid.
11TV^
Ibid.
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utterance,

in fact, challenged the judgement of the

President as the Commander-in-Chief in a critical situation.
In response to Stevenson's speech, Secretary Dulles
on the following day, April 21, said that what Stevenson
had suggested as "original ideas" were "the very approaches
which the Government has been and is actively exploring,"
but the result could not be advanced by "publicly prodding
friendly governments."

12

Dulles saw only one major point of

difference between Stevenson and his own idea:
son speaks feelingly about our A l l i e s . 1
one ally, namely the Republic of China."

13

"Mr. Steven

However, he forgot
The Secretary

held that the defense of Formosa primarily depended upon the
Nationalist Government; therefore "that ally can not be
ignored and rebuffed.
Eisenhower's Policy Directive
Indeed, the primary responsibility for the defense
of Formosa relied upon the Nationalist Government itself.
However, the Nationalist defense strategy was worrying the
Administration because Chiang's government attached equal,
if not more, importance to the remaining offshore islands
than to Formosa itself.

After the Nationalist Government

was forced to evacuate the Tachens in early February,
12D . S . B ., X X X I I / No. 826
13_, .,
Ibid.
Ibid.

(April 25, 1955), p. 677
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Generalissimo Chiang redeployed these forces on Quemoy and
Matsu, and sent additional troops to the islands to the
extent that one-third of all of his armed forces were
stationed in Quemoy and Matsu.

15

One critic regarded it

as a sly move on the part of Chiang in that he took initia
tive to "create an artificially manufactured tie between
the defense of the offshore islands and the protection of
Taiwan."

16

Others interpreted it as deliberately posing a

dangerous situation that could touch off a major conflict,
the only chance that might fulfill Chiang*s aspiration to
return to the mainland. 17

Whatever the intention of Chiang,

Washington did not like this Nationalist strategy.
Although it was not made known at the time, on April 5,
President Eisenhower had issued a confidential policy direc
tive, in the form of a memorandum, to Secretary Dulles,
mapping out a definitive American policy toward the off
shore islands.
a)

15

The confidential memorandum stated in part:

Without abandoning the offshore islands, make
clear that neither Chiang nor ourselves is
committed to full-out defense of Quemoy and
Matsu, so that no matter what the outcome of
an attack upon them, there would be no danger
of a collapse of the free world position in
the region . . .
Elie Abel in New York T i m e s , February 19, 1955, p. 4.

16 Tang Tsou, "The Quemoy Imbroglio:
Chiang Kai-shek
and the United States," Western Political Quarterly, VII, No. 4
(September, 1959), p. 1078.
17

C. L. Sulzberger in New York Times, April 11,
1955, p. 22.
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b)

Initiate, immediately the process of bringing
to Chiang*s attention the great advantage,
political and military, that would result from
certain alterations in his present military
plans .3-8

The desired changes in the Nationalist defense plans
included:

(1 ) ".

. . regard the offshore islands as

outposts consequently to be garrisoned in accordance with
the requirements of outposts," and
take place

(2 ) "evacuation should

(if this finally becomes necessary) only after

defensive forces had inflicted upon the attackers heavy and
bloody losses." 19

What the Administration wanted the

Nationalist Government to do was to take a flexible posture,
so that it would be possible to withdraw from Quemoy and
Matsu under overwhelmingly disadvantageous conditions without
losing morale.

Likewise, it implied that should American

forces be employed to help defend the offshore islands when
deemed necessary to the defense of Formosa, the commitment
was by no means unlimited.
On April 20, Admiral Radford and Assistant Secretary
Robertson went to Taipei, as representatives of the Adminis
tration seeking "to induce the Generalissimo to propose
some solution to the Formosa-Quemoy-Matsu problem that will
be acceptable both to him and to u s ."

20

They hoped to

18 Excerpts reprinted in Eisenhower, Mandate for
C h a n g e , pp. 611-12.
19I b i d .
20 Quoted by Eisenhower in his Mandate for Change,
p. 481.
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arrive at an agreement that would "neither commit the
United States to go to war in defense of the offshore islands
nor constitute an implied repudiation of the Generalissimo."

21

However, Radford and Robertson failed in their mission in
spite of the fact that, to Chiang, they were most welcome
American dignitaries.

The Generalissimo could not be

persuaded to accept the concept of redeploying his forces
and considering Quemoy and Matsu merely as "outposts."
There were good reasons for the Chiang Government to
be adamant in this regard.

For one thing, since President

Eisenhower*s order deneutralizing Formosa in February 1953,
the American military authorities had encouraged the National
ist Government in one way or another to fortify the offshore
islands.

22

For another, the Nationalist Government had been

persuaded to abandon the far-flung islands of the Tachens
and Nanchi groups with the expectation that the United
States would be committed to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu
as Secretary Dulles had promised.

23

Generalissimo Chiang,

counting upon this moral obligation on the part of the
Eisenhower Administration, felt that he could entrench on
the remaining offshore islands.
Furthermore, the Nationalists had great political

^ Supra, Chapter III.
23

Supra, footnote No. 1, this Chapter.
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stake in the remaining offshore islands.

A firm grip on

Quemoy and Matsu symbolized Nationalist authority on the
Chinese mainland.

The tiny islands were indispensable

possessions upon which the raison d*etre of the Nationalist
Government for a "return to the mainland" was built.

Conse

quently, the morale of the Nationalist Government hinged
on the ability to hold Quemoy and Matsu.
President Eisenhower was disappointed in Chiang*s
uncompromising attitude but showed some sympathy for the
Nationalist leader.

He wrote later,

"Despite my disappoint

ment, I could not help reflecting that if I had been in his
position, I might have made the same decision."

24

The American Government made no further effort to
"persuade" Chiang to revise his plan for the defense of
Quemoy and Matsu.

On the contrary, Washington indicated

that "we understand his position" in connection with the
defense of the offshore islands and some assurance on the
matter was given to the Nationalist Government in early
May.

On May 3, Secretary Dulles sent a cable to American

Ambassador Rankin, authorizing him to advise Chiang*s
government of this American attitude.

When Rankin gave the

substance of this telegram to Chiang in a visit on that same
day, the Generalissimo asked if it meant that President
Eisenhower would actually commit American forces to help
24

Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 482.
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defend Quemoy and Matsu.

In Rankin*s account of the conversa

tion, he wrote, "I thought not, but suggested if my previous
analysis was correct, this might not make much practical
*'25
difference.
The Administration's public announcements were
centered on renewed calls for a cease-fire and a renuncia
tion of the use of force by the Chinese Communists.
April 5, Secretary Dulles declared,

On

"We have made perfectly

clear our desire that there shall be no war . . . that there
shall be a cease-fire."

26

He said that if there was war

in the Formosa Strait, it would be the Chinese Communists
who started it.

On April 13, Dulles again called upon Peking

to renounce the use of force without giving up its claims
on Formosa.

He stated,

"We hope to be able and are trying

Rankin, China Assignment, pp. 228-29.
The story
was mentioned by a Dulles biographer, John Beal, in a
different version before the publication of Rankin*s book.
Beal wrote, ". . . Chiang Kai-shek received a personal letter
from Mr. Eisenhower satisfying him that the United States
would help defend Quemoy and Matsu. . . ." Beal, John Foster
Du l l e s , p. 221.
Whatever the form and substance of that
assurance might have been, American assistance to the
Nationalist defense of Quemoy and Matsu later proved to be
logistic support.
In 1958 when the Communists resumed the
heavy bombardment of Quemoy, they showed a more determined
effort to take the island by firing on Nationalist supply
vessels sailing to Quemoy.
In that situation, President
Eisenhower ordered the United States Navy to escort National
ist vessels to Quemoy, thereby breaking the blockade.
26D.S.B., XXXII, No. 824

(April 11, 1955), p. 643.
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in many ways to bring about acceptance of some sort of
cease-fire situation where force will be renounced as an
instrument for achieving national goals."

27

The Secretary

elaborated his version of a cease-fire in these terms:
We d o n 11
be themselves
brought about
has agreed to
unite Germany

expect that the national goals will
abandoned, just as it has been
in West Germany that Adenauer
renounce the use of force to
. . .

D u l l e s 1 pronouncement was an indication that the
Administration favored the maintenance of a de facto twoChina situation, for this would be the obvious result of
a cease-fire.
A Communist Propaganda Slowdown
While on the American domestic scene there were
anxieties over possible United States intervention in the
defense of Quemoy and Matsu, also among the Communists there
were signs to show that they did not really want to press
the issue to the extreme.

The Administration's sources

noticed a sharp decline in time spent on the "Taiwan Libera
tion" theme by the Peking propaganda mouthpiece.
ber and December,

In Novem

19 54, up to twenty per cent of Radio

Peking broadcast time was devoted to the question of Formosa
After that, toward early April 1955, time spent on the
subject dropped to about five per cent.
27Ibid., No. 826

29

More attention

(April 25, 1955), p. 676.

28I
t,
..
b i.d
29

New York T i m e s , April 7, 1955, p. 12.
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was paid to the forthcoming Asian-African Conference to be
held at Bandung, Indonesia, on April 18, 19 55.

30

Impact of Bandung Conference
The Bandung Conference had been initiated by five
Colombo powers, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, India, and
Pakistan, and drew participants from twenty-nine Asian and
African nations.31

The Conference was permeated with a

strong mood of anti-colonialism, not only in respect to
Western colonialism but also Communist colonialism.

Attuned

to the prevailing mood of the Conference, Chou Eh-lai, who
headed the Chinese Communist delegation, decided not to
read his prepared rather stormy speech scheduled to be
delivered on April 19.

Instead, he made an off-the-cuff

speech in a conciliatory tone and in defense of Peking's
policy.

He stressed that his delegation had come to Bandung

"to seek unity and not to quarrel."

32

Chou said that the

tension in the Formosa area was created "solely" by the
United States and that, but for his desire to avoid con
troversies, he would have submitted it for the deliberation by the Conference.

33

■^This has been derived from this writer's examina
tion of the Survey of China Mainland P r e s s .
31

A. Appadadorai, The Bandung Conference (New Delhi:
Indian Council of World Affairs, 1955) gives a succinct treat
ment, while George McTurnan Kahin,- Asian-African Conference
(Ithaca, N . Y . : Cornell University Press, 1956) deals with
the topic in more detail.
32

Kahin, Asian-African Conference, p. 52.

^ Ibid., pp. 51-52.
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Nevertheless, Sir John Katelawla, Prime Minister of
Ceylon, after questioning the sincerity of Communist China's
pronouncement of peaceful co-existence, brought up the
question of Formosa in a speech on April 22,
He suggested
t
an eight-power conference to discuss the issue.
The Ceylonese
Prime Minister also proposed a five-year trusteeship for
Formosa by either the United Nations or the Colombo powers.
According to his proposal, the people on Formosa would vote
in a plebiscite to determine their future form of government at the end of the trusteeship.

34

Chou's Offer to Talk to the United States
In response to this challenge, Chou made a sudden and
daring move on April 23.

During a secret session of the

Political Committee, he unexpectedly declared*, "The Chinese
people do not want a war with the United States.

We are

willing to settle international disputes by peaceful means."
Shortly afterward, this Communist declaration was issued to
the press as follows:
The Chinese Government is willing to sit down
and enter into negotiations with the United States
Government to discuss the question of relaxing ten
sion in the Far East and especially the question of
relaxing tension in the Taiwan area. ®
34

New York T i m e s , April 22, 1955, p. 2.

35 Kahin, Asian-African
'
Conference, p. 62.
^ N e w York Times, April 24, 1955, p. 1.
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A spokesman from the Chinese Communist delegation
was reluctant to elaborate on the statement.

He revealed,

however, that the announcement referred to "direct bilateral talks" rather than a multipower conference.

37

By

implication, this excluded Nationalist China from any
possible meeting.
The Administration’s Initial Response
In answer to C h o u ’s call "to sit down and enter
into negotiations," the State Department issued a statement
that same day, declaring that the United States would "in
sist on" Chinese Nationalist participation as an equal in
any discussion concerning the Formosa area.

The statement

expressed doubt about Communist sincerity in the offer but
said that it could be proved by announcing an immediate
cease-fire in the Formosa area, an immediate release of
unjustly detained American airmen, and prompt acceptance of
the Security Council's invitation.

38

The statement was made during the absence of Secre
tary Dulles, who was in retreat at Lake Ontario, Canada.
It was drafted under the direction of Undersecretary Herbert
Hoover, Jr.

The draft was read to the President at his

Gettysburg farm and approved by him via telephone.
the official American statement was issued,

38D . S.B., XXXII, No.

827

After

the State

(May 2, 1955), p. 738.
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Department took a wait-and-see attitude.

On April 24, a

spokesman from the Department said, "Now it is up to Mr.
Chou to formalize his proposal.

. . ."39

Congressional Reactions
Meanwhile there were reactions from Congress as
soon as the sensational news of Chou's offer was made
known. . Senator George's response was favorable.

He said,

"I don't know what degree of sincerity lay behind the words
spoken by the Red Chinese leader today, but when he says
that he is willing to talk, I think it is high time that
the high officials of this Government indicate a willingness
to talk also."

40

George dismissed the thought that willing

ness to talk with the Communists could be regarded as
"appeasement."

He observed,

"It is never appeasement when

a powerful country such as the United States indicates a
willingness to discuss problems."

41

In the evening of that

day, the Senator reiterated this attitude in his address
before the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

He

told the participants of the dinner party:
I unhesitatingly say that this nation should
be big enough and great enough . . . to sit down
and talk.
It is high time that we should relieve
the tension of the world if we can.
39

New York Tim e s , Aprxl 25, 1955, p. 1.

^ I b i d . , April 24, 1955, p. 3.
41Ibid.
42Ibid.
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Representative James Richards, Democratic Chairman
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, also felt that the
Red Chinese proposal should be explored if bona fide pro
posals for the talks were presented.

He cautioned, "If

C h o u ’s proposal appears to be an effort to get us to violate
our treaty with Formosa, it should be rejected at the start.
If it appears to be primarily propaganda, it should be
exposed as such.
Republican Senator Knowland called C h o u ’s suggestion
of bilateral talk an "invitation to Munich."

He said that

the Red Chinese proposal was "unacceptable" because the
United States would not "bargain away the rights of the
Chinese Nationalists in their absence."

44

Senator Alexander

Wiley, ranking Republican member on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, said that C h o u ’s offer should be
approached promptly "but warily."

He held that the sudden

change of heart in Peking "proves that Red China is very
definitely subject to pressure for peace by world opinion,
such as has been expressed by the Bandung Conference."

45

Senator G e o r g e ’s attitude in favor of talking with
the Chinese Communists received general support from Demo
crats.

On April 25, Senator Lyndon Johnson said that he
^ Ibid.
I bid.
45

Ibid.
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hoped that G e o r g e ’s statement "will receive the careful
consideration of every policy-making official of our
government." 46

He hailed Geor g e ’s speech by saying that

it "should have far-reaching-effect" as a "challenge for
bold and courageous thinking on the vital issues of war
and peace." 47

But Johnson also expressed doubt as to the

sincerity of C h o u ’s pronouncement.

Senator John Sparkman,

Democrat from Alabama, maintained that the best way to test
the sincerity of the Communist offer was to renew the
efforts of the United Nations to obtain a cease-fire in
the Formosa Strait.

48

C h o u ’s Qualified Statement
The Peking propaganda machine made no comment on the
State Department declaration of April 23.

49

The New China

News Agency treated the official American statement in the
form of a news report, saying that the State Department
avoided "definite clarification" of whether or not the
United States was willing to negotiate with Communist
China. 50

Meanwhile, Chou En-lai, in a statement made at the

^ I bid. , April 26, 1955, p. 4.
47t, .
Ibid.
48t
K i. d
n
Ib
.
49 This w r i t e r 's examination of the Survey of China
Mainland Press coincided with a report by New York T i m e s ,
April 25, 1955, p. 8 .
50

Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1033
23-25, 1955), p. 2 .

(April
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closing session of the Bandung Conference on April 24,
qualified significantly his previous offer to talk with the
United States.

Chou said that any negotiations with the

United States "should not in the slightest degree affect
the just demand of the Chinese people to exercise their
sovereign rights in liberating Taiwan."

51

According to an explanation given by a spokesman
of the Peking delegation, C h o u 1s stiffened attitude was
prompted by the statement of the State Department on the
previous day.

52

The Peking press still made no comment

or elaboration on Chou's offer to talk with the United
States, but the New China News Agency issued a news item
saying that the American Government raised many "unreason
able prerequisites" so as to close the door to talk on the
Formosa issue.

53

Chou's Interview With An American Correspondent
The fact that the Peking propaganda mouthpiece
chose not to comment on Chou's peace offer was meaningful
in that the Red Chinese regime's position on Formosa had
not changed.

Chou En-lai was merely repeating the persis

tent Communist attitude toward Formosa in attractive but
^ New York Tim e s , April 25, 1955, p. 7.
^ I b i d . , p. 1.
53

Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 1034
1955), p. 13.

(April 26,
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misleading language.

As a matter of fact, on April 24,

the same day that Chou qualified his peace offer at the
closing meeting of the Bandung Conference, he gave an inter
view to Sam Jaffe, a Nation correspondent, presenting
Peking*s viewpoint on the question of Formosa in a nutshell.
He told the American reporter:
The liberation of Taiwan is China*s internal
affair.
The Chinese people have the right to
make the demand and to put it into effect.
As to the tension in the Formosa area, it
has been caused by the U.S. intervention.
This
is an international question.
In order to relax
the tension in the Formosa area, China proposes
that China and the U.S. sit down and enter into
negotiations in order to seek a solution to
this question.
Apparently, the solution that the Communists sought
to obtain through bilateral talks with the United States
was to remove the "cause of tension— U.S. intervention in
the Formosa area."
forces in the area.

It meant the withdrawal of all American
In contrast, the United States sought

to have the Chinese Communists renounce the use of force
so that a cease-fire in the area might be possible.

The

conflicting aims of the two sides doomed the subsequent
bilateral talks to failure.
In that interview, Chou also explained why Peking
would not permit Nationalist participation in his proposed
54

The content of this interview, strange to say, was
belatedly made known to the Western world on April 29.
Survey of China Mainland P r e s s , No. 1037 (April 29, 1955),
p. 20, and New York T i m e s , April 30, 1955, p. 3.
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negotiations with the United States.

He commented:

Relations between China and the United
States is an international question.
Relations
between the People's Republic of China and the
Chiang Kai-shek clique is a question of internal
affairs.
These two matters should not be mixed
together.^5
In concluding his interview with the American corres
pondent, Chou made a remark calculated to relieve the Com
munists of the responsibility of stirring up tension in
the Formosa area.

"Whether the present situation will lead

to a world war depends upon the United S t a t e s h e

said,

"because there is no war at present between China and the
56
United States."
A Modified American Attitude
After returning to Washington on April 25, Secretary
Dulles conferred with the President.

The next day, at a

momentous news conference, the Secretary indicated
the Administration had decided to take a
toward Chou's offer to talk.

that

new approach

Dulles said that he did not

know whether C h o u 1s offer was a "sincere proposal" or a
"propaganda game" but that the United States
"find out."

"In doing so," he remarked,

would

try to

"we shall

not,of

course, depart from the path of fidelity and honor toward
our ally, the Republic of China."

57

When asked whether or

55Survey of China Mainland P r e s s , No. 1037, p. 20.

56ibid.
57

U.S. Department of State, Possibility of A CeaseFire in the Formosa Strait, Questions and Answers, No. 9
(May 1955), p. 1.
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not the United States would sit down and talk with Com
munist China, he said,

"that depends on what to talk about

. . . We are not going to talk about the interests of the
Republic of China behind its back."

58

However, the Secre

tary made a distinction between talking with the Communists
about a ceasei-fire and talking with them about other ques
tions affecting the interests of Nationalist China.

He

took the view that the former did not necessarily require
Nationalist participation.

Dulles commented that the

possibility of a cease-fire in the Formosa area "is a
matter which can be discussed perhaps bilaterally or at the
United Nations or possibly under other circumstances."

59

He explained that American interest in a cease-fire was due
to the fact that the United States had agreed to respond to
an attack against Formosa.
D u l l e s ' willingness to engage in bilateral talks
with the Chinese Communists in actuality reversed the State
Department pronouncement of April 23 which required the
presence of the Nationalists in "any" discussions with the
Peking government.

Moreover, the Secretary apparently

departed from the April 23 statement in another respect.
The statement had implied that an immediate cease-fire in the
Formosa area, the immediate release of unjustly detained

59

Ibid., p. 4.
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American airmen, and the prompt acceptance of the Security
Council's invitation were also prerequisites to Chou's
suggested meeting.

Yet Dulles now commented,

stated as conditions precedent.

"Those are not

Those things were not

stated as conditions and were never intended to be conditions."

60

Dulles also pointed out that it would not be a

new experience for the United States to talk with the
Chinese Communists and that the talks had not and would not
involve diplomatic recognition.
D u l l e s ' Position Endorsed
The next day, April 27, President Eisenhower gave
firm endorsement to Secretary Dul l e s ' position on negotia
ting with Peking by declaring:
If the Chi-Coms [Chinese Communists] wanted
to talk merely about a cease-fire, we would be
glad to meet with them and talk with them, but
there would be no conferring about the affairs of
the Chi-Nats [Chinese Nationalists].
The President deemed it "perfectly legitimate" to
talk with the Communists without Nationalist participation
on the question of a cease-fire in the Formosa Strait.
He explained that a cease-fire was mainly concerned with
the Chinese Communists because the Nationalists were not
firing on the Communists except in self-defense.

A cease

fire to the Nationalists, therefore, would be "purely
60I b i d ., p. 2.
61

Transcript in New York Tim e s , April 28, 1955, p. 12.

204
academic."

President Eisenhower did not regard this willing

ness to talk with the Communists as a reversal of the
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s policy.

He described the previous State

Department pronouncement as having "an error in terminology"
or "a touch of overstatement."

62

Right-Wing Republicans Opposed
The right-wing Republicans in the Senate were un
happy about the A d m inistrations modified attitude toward
talks with the Chinese Communists.

After Secretary Dulles*

news conference which marked this change, the Senate
Republican Policy Committee discussed Dulles* remarks in
private.

Later, Senator Styles Bridges, the Chairman of

that Committee, told reporters that it would be "a great
mistake" to sit down at any conference with the Chinese
Communists while ignoring the Chinese Nationalists,

"who

have been our ally through thick and thin." 6 3
In a news conference on April 27, Senate Republican
leader Knowland openly criticized the Administration *s
willingness to negotiate with the Chinese Communists.

He

declared that it was hard for him "to comprehend how we
could enter into direct negotiations with Communist China
without the interests of the Republic of China being deeply

New York T i m e s , April 27, 1955, p. 1.
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involved."

64

Know!and held; that there was no need for a

conference to bring about a; cease-fire.

"All they need,"

he said, "is to stop: shooting and building up their aggressive forces in that area o f the Formosa Strait."

65

Know-

land did not believe: t h a t Peking would change its aggressive
intentions.

He declared', "X, for one, do not believe the

Communist leopard h a s changed' its spots."

66

Following Know land'* s statement, another right-wing
Republican,. Senator William E. Jenner of Indiana, on
April 28 ashed the Senate: toe adopt a resolution to repudiate
in advance any territoriat. concession the Administration
might give to Communist: China:.. He maintained that the air
was "full of foreboding; that: a: carefully laid plan is
under way for the United' States" to give up bit by bit its
commitment in the Formosa- Strait."

67

He demanded that the

United States not "surrender, a: single square foot of free
638
land to Communist r u l e ~
"

However, the prevailing mood

in the Senate was n o t to: consider his proposal seriously.
The objection of: right-wing Republicans to talk with
the Peking regime w a s understandable in the light of their
64

Text in ibid'.., April’. 28, 1955, p. 13.

65lbid.
Ibid.
67

Congressignal Record, V. 101, Part 4 (April 1May 5, 1955) , p., 5220..
68Ibid., p. 5221.
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consistent opposition to "softness" toward Communists,
particularly the Chinese Communists.

The publication of

the China White Paper by the Truman Administration in
August 1949 saw the beginning of the most vehement attacks
on the China policy of the Democrats.

The Communist victory

in China became the theme that played a major role in the
1950 and 1952 national elections.

69

The Republican Party

during the 1952 Presidential election campaign had promised
to launch a dynamic policy of "liberation" instead of
"containment" in dealing with communism.

The Eisenhower

Administration, however, falling short of its professed
goal of liberation, was willing to negotiate with the
Chinese Communists.

Although this was naturally unthinkable

to the right wing of the GOP, the Administration ignored
the voice of opposition within its own Party.
Toward Bilateral Talks
After the United States gave a favorable response to
Chou's offer to negotiate, the tension in the Formosa
Strait was lessened.

In May, the press reported that a

de facto cease-fire prevailed in the area.

On May 3.7, Chou

En-lai, in his report to the Standing Committee of the
National People*s Congress on the achievements of the AsianAfrican Conference, renewed his offer to "sit down and enter
69

Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Bipartisan Foreign Policy,
Myth or Reality?
(White Plains, N.Y.:
Row Peterson &
Co., 1957), pp. 110-11.
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into negotiations'" with the United States.

Meanwhile he

declared that: t h e Peking regime was 'Willing to strive for
the liberation of: Taiwan by peaceful means so far as it is
possible."

70

Oh May, 30, Peking announced the release of

four imprisoned" American airmen as deportees, the first
concrete indication, of;'Communist willingness to negotiate
seriously..

With' Britain and, to a lesser degree, India

acting as intermediaries, agreement was finally reached
between the United' States and Communist China to begin
bilateral talks on.August 1, 1955, at Geneva.

71

As a matter; off fact, talks between the two sides had
been going on. for-some; time on a consular level.

Since June

1954 the American Consulate General at Geneva had been in
contact with; the;- Chinese Communist representatives there
in an effort tor: secure- the release of American citizens
imprisoned or: otherwise;detained in Communist China.

After

the failure o f the United Nations Secretary General in his
trip to Peking in January 1955 to negotiate the release of
American airmen.captured"during the Korean War, American
consular officers resumed contact with their Chinese Red
counterparts" for; the: same purpose without success.

72

It was

^^New York Times , May 17, 1955, p. 1.
^ % o r a detailed study of American negotiations with
Peking, see Kenneth TV Young, Negotiating with the Chinese
Communists:
The United States Experience, 1953-1967 (New
York; McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968).
For developments lead
ing to the. bilateral.' talks after the Bandung Conference,
see particularly'p p .. 4 4-5 2.
State Department Announcement on U.S. Representa
tions to Secure the Release of Americans Held Captive by
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not until August I.,, 195:5:,, however, that the bilateral talks
were elevated from consular; to ambassadorial level.

It

was indeed a gain in prestige;for the Peking regime.
The End of An Episode;
After a statement, was; issued simultaneously by
Washington and Peking on;July_ 25:to announce the forth
coming Geneva talks, Secretary Dulles reiterated the
American position..

He; said: that-the bilateral talks did

not imply "any dipiomaticr recognition whatsoever" of Com
munist China and that: the; United"States was not prepared to
negotiate "in any way"'! to: prejudice the rights of National
ist China.

The Secretary, declared, "We shall hope to find

out in the forth comings talk's- whether the Chinese Communists
accept the concept o f a: cease-fire in accordance with the
United Nations principle;.

..

.V73

In addition, he remarked

that the United States was; veryymuch concerned with the
release of the American; civilians still detained in Communist China.

4

The; United: States was true to its declared

principles and the Geneva; talk's on a cease-fire in the
Formosa area ended in a deadlock.

74

While the talks produced

((cont'd)
Communist: China.
Text in Documents on
American Foreign Relations, 1955 (New York:
Harper &
Brothers for the Council, on;Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 307.
73

1955.

A statement made: b y Secretary Dulles on July 26,
Text in i b id..,. p.. 312:.,

^ Y o u n g , Negotiating; with the Chinese Communists,
pp. 93-115.
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no concrete results,. the: d e facto cease-fire was to last
for three years., H r . August: 1958 the Communists started
all over again with' a: heavy bombardment of Quemoy, but
that is another story.
An Evaluation
The Administration:1s: policy toward the 1954-1955
crisis in the Formosa: Strait has been criticized as one
that brought t h e nati o n .to: the brink of a general war and
that alienated all, off America 's allies with the exception
of the "trigger:—happy"' Chinese Nationalists.

75

However,

Secretary Dulles was: so pleased with his diplomacy in
simmering down t h e crisis: that he claimed it as one of the
three instances during: which his "brinkmanship,, had been
successful.

The Secretary affirmed that he had said in

substance the following:::
The; ability to get to the verge without
getting into" t h e war is the necessary art.
If
you cannot master' it you inevitably get into
w a r . i f you try to run away from it, if you are
scared to go: to: the: brink, you are lost.
We
had to look: it: square in the face— on the question
of enlarging_ the:. Korean War, on the question of
getting into: the: Indochina War, on the question of
Formosa.
W e walked to the brink and we looked it
in the face., We: took strong action.^ $
Dulles also toas ted of: himself:
75

"Of course, of all the

Fleming,, "Our Brink-of-War Diplomacy in the Formosa

Strait."
75
7

James Shepley, "How Dulles Averted War," Life,
January 15, 19^55', p v 78..
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things I have done, I think the most brilliant of all has
been to save Quemoy and Matsu."

✓

77

On the other side of the coin, the United States
was still painted as a "paper tiger."

Chou En-lai was

quoted as having often said with pride:
We have attacked America bluntly several
times, every time the attack was effective.
Through the Korean War, we forced her to attend the
Panmunjom truce conference; out of the battle of
Dienbienphu, there came the Geneva Conference and
peace for Indo-China; the internment of American
civilians compelled her to agree to a conference
at ambassadorial l e v e l . ^
Nevertheless, Dulles was credited with having a
better understanding of the Chinese Communists than the
British and French statesmen, and he caused a lot of
"headaches" for Peking.

"The trouble was," Chow Ching-wen,

a high ranking defector from the Chinese Communist Party,
said, "many Americans who were not themselves familiar with
the realities of the Chinese Communist regime sought to
hinder Dulles from carrying his policy decisions, which, not
unnaturally, pleased the Chinese Communists."

79

77 Cited by Emmet J. Hughes in his The Ordeal of
Power:
A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years (New
York:
Atheneum, 1963), p. 208.
78

Cited by Chow Ching-wen in his Ten Years of Storm
(New York:
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960), p. 287.
Chow
Ching-wen, a well-known Chinese scholar and former president
of National Northeast University, had served for eight years
in high-ranking positions in the Chinese Communist Party
before his escape to Hong Kong in 1957.
^ I b i d . , p. 288.
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The fact of the matter was that the United States
had dealt with a wily antagonist whose strategy, as
President Eisenhower had been aware, w a s :

"Enemy advances,

we retreat; enemy halts, we harass; enemy tires, we attack;
enemy retreats, we pursue."

80

The United States did not

retreat in the face of a display of force, nor did it yield
over a conference table.

Although both sides claimed a

victory, the Chinese Communists, being true to Mao Tsetung's theory of guerrilla warfare that they would "on no
account fight" if not "sure of victory,"

81

temporarily

suspended their ambitions of "liberating" Formosa, and ten
sion in the Formosa Strait was eased.

80
81

Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 483.

Tang Tsou, "Mao’s Limited War in the Taiwan
Strait," O r b i s , III, No. 3 (Fall, 1959), p. 337.

CONCLUSION
Formosa was written off in the American policy
planning in early 1950.

At the outbreak of the Korean con

flict, however, the United States reversed its attitude and
developed a "passive" interest in Formosa:
not fall into "unfriendly" hands.

the island should

Meanwhile, the Nationalist-

held offshore islands, such as Quemoy and Matsu, had served
as advance bases from which some American intelligence
activities directed at the mainland China were conducted.
The beginning of a series of heavy bombardments of
Quemoy by the Chinese Communists on September 3, 1954, posed
a problem for Washington.

The United States had made a

voluntary commitment to defend Formosa since the Korean War,
but this commitment did not extend to the offshore islands.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff interpreted the Communists'
shelling of Quemoy as a preliminary to an attempt to
capture the island, which might be an operational scheme
to facilitate the invasion of Formosa.

Thus, a case was

made for the American military participation in the defense
of Quemoy.

President Eisenhower made no immediate military

decision on that score, but accepted a proposal Of Secre
tary Dulles that the United States should ask the United
Nations to arrange a cease-fire in the Formosa area.

212

213
However, the idea of a cease-fire was shelved
temporarily due to strong objections from Chiang's Govern
ment.

Instead, the United States signed a mutual defense

treaty with the Chinese Nationalist Government.

The prac

tical effect of the treaty from the American point of view
was to restrain the Nationalists from taking offensive
military action against the Chinese mainland.

At the same

time, it allayed Nationalist fears by putting the American
commitment to the defense of Formosa on a solemn legal
basis.

A cease-fire restraint was in actuality imposed upon

the Nationalists by the treaty.

To the Communists, the

treaty was a source of aggravated resentment against the
United States, as it made the "liberation" of Formosa a more
difficult task than ever.
However, the Treaty did not mention the offshore
islands as included under its protection.

The Chinese

Communists saw this as a chance to probe the American atti
tude toward the offshore islands.

After seizing Yikiang

Island by force, the Communists openly professed that they
had taken a step toward the "liberation" of Formosa.

Since

Peking linked the offshore islands with Formosa as its
ultimate objective of conquest, the United States could not
but react to meet this Communist challenge.

President

Eisenhower made an unprecedented move in requesting Congress
in advance to sanction the use of American forces in the
defense of Formosa and related positions.

Meanwhile, the
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President asked the United Nations to take appropriate
actions leading to a peaceful settlement in the Formosa
Strait.

With bipartisan support for the President, the

requested Formosa Resolution was promptly adopted by Congress,
although some Congressmen were opposed to American involve
ment in the defense of the offshore islands.

Subsequently,

Congress approved the Mutual Defense Treaty with Nationalist
China with equal promptness.
With two pieces of legislation in hand, President
Eisenhower maintained a flexible position in the defense of
Formosa,

including the possible defense of Quemoy and' Matsu.

It was a guessing game for the Chinese Communists as well
as for the American public.

While the need for American

defense of Formosa was not questioned, a controversy arose
over the possible defense of the offshore islands.

The

opposition to American involvement in the defense of Quemoy
and Matsu was voiced not only by members of Congress but
also by America's allies.

In spite of pressure from various

quarters upon the Administration to state clearly its policy
on Quemoy and Matsu, President Eisenhower maintained his
attitude of deliberate inscrutability throughout the crisis.
The President was in a very difficult position.

The

Nationalists had been forced to evacuate the far-flung
offshore islands of the Tachens and Nanchi groups.

What

ever the merits in asking the Nationalist Government to give
up the remaining offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, it

would not have been a good policy to retreat while the
Communists advanced by force.

Furthermore, it was

Eisenhower's conviction, which proved to be right, that a
mere surrender of Quemoy and Matsu would not solve the real
problem— the avowed Communist objective of "liberating"
Formosa.

On the contrary, the coercion of the Nationalist

Government that would have been necessary to execute such a
surrender and the subsequent impact on the morale of the
Nationalist forces and the people on Formosa would have
produced very undesirable effects.
Under the circumstances, if the President stated
flatly that the United States would not help defend Quemoy
and Matsu, as some Democrats and the British Government
desired, it would have been tantamount to inviting Communist
seizure.

The Nationalist Government could not possibly hold

the islands under a major Communist attack without American
air and sea support, if the President declared American
commitment to the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, as the
right-wing Republicans and the Nationalist Government hoped,
it would have, among other things, the most undesirable
consequence of a public manifestation that the United States
was involved in a Chinese civil war.

In this connection,

it must be recalled that the American Government, as well
as the British, took the position that the legal status
of Formosa was as yet undetermined.

Therefore, American

commitment to the defense of Formosa would not constitute
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an intervention, although the diametrically opposite position
was taken by the Chinese Communists.
Caught between the horns of a dilemma, President
Eisenhower decided that the only tenable position was to
adopt a wait-and-see attitude.

In the event of a Communist

attack on Quemoy or Matsu, the American forces would react
only if the President, as the Commander-in-Chief, judged
it to be a preliminary to an invasion of Formosa.

Never

theless, this was an unenviable position from which the
United States desired to be extricated whenever feasible.
While the United States did not intend to intervene or
mediate in the unfinished Chinese civil war, a cease-fire
in the Formosa Strait would be in the best interests of
the United States.
American interest in a cease-fire, the maintenance
of the status quo in the Formosa area, was not difficult
to comprehend.

Since the June 1950 outbreak of the Korean

conflict, the United States had had a commitment, which
subsequently became a treaty obligation, to defend
Formosa against Communist invasion.

To fulfill an inter

national obligation of a military nature was not a pleasant
prospect even if the situation dictated it.
Following the Communist rejection of the United
Nations effort to conduct a peaceful settlement, the United
States had endeavored to seek a cease-fire in the Formosa
Strait by t h e “carrot-or-stickv approach but without success.
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Chou E n - l a i ’s gesture of peace at the Bandung Conference,
though a self-serving manoeuver on his part, opened the door
for talking rather than fighting.

As originally conceived,

the United States took the view that the United Nations was
the most desirable channel through which a cease-fire in
the Formosa area could be arranged.

Chou's daring offer

caught the State Department unprepared, especially in the
absence of Secretary Dulles.
The initial American response indicated doubt as to
the sincerity of the Communist peace offer.

In fact, the

State Department's reply set forth certain pre-conditions
before talking could begin.

This attitude might well have

hampered a cease-fire which all along had been the Adminis
tration's policy objective.

However, with the support of

Democratic leaders in Congress and with the concurrence of
the President, Secretary Dulles on his return made a
courageous move to modify substantially the previous State
Department response and a dialogue with the Chinese Com
munists was finally established.
The Administration's ardent desire to achieve a
cease-fire did not mean it was ready to surrender to the ,
Communists at a conference table, as the right-wing Repub
licans had feared.

Due to American adherence to its declared

principles on negotiation, the Geneva talks did not result
in a cease-fire agreement.

Although the Administration had

not achieved its primary policy objective through the
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bilateral talks, the tension in the Formosa area was reduced
and a state of de facto cease-fire existed until 1958.
Throughout the 1954-1955 crisis in the Formosa
Strait, the Americans desired only the maintenance of the
status quo.

Although the basic tension in the area could

not be eliminated as long as the aims of Washington and
Peking remained in conflict, the Eisenhower Administration
weathered the storm in the Formosa Strait without military
intervention or concession.

A policy that was firm in

principle and conciliatory in attitude had achieved the
desired objective.
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